Politics of Enmity

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Enmity and Politics: Reaffirming or Rejecting the Concepts?

People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against. (Huntington 1996: 21)

Invoking the politics of enmity *hic et nunc* requires a certain explanation. Why resurrecting this seemingly marginal political concept of enmity, instead of sticking to “usual suspects” like sovereignty, power, representation and so on?

For one thing, enmity remained understudied as a political concept. According to Gil Anidjar, “a cursory reading of Western philosophical and political reflections... quickly reveals that... ‘the enemy’ never becomes a basic concept, barely even a significant operative term”; notable exceptions are Carl Schmitt’s attempt to locate the decision concerning the distinction between friend and enemy as the precondition of the political and Jacques Derrida’s reflections on the enemy in the *Politics of Friendship* (Anidjar 2003: xxiii-xxiv).
Schmitt remains especially instructive here insofar as he virtually establishes the concept of the enemy and makes approximation – if not equivalence – between the concept of the political enemy and politics itself. According to him, “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” [Schmitt, 1966: 26]. By making reference to Latin, Schmitt further distinguishes between the private or non-political aspect of the friend/enemy relation, on the one hand, and its properly political character on the other: “The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense… The often quoted ‘Love your enemies’ reads … ‘diligite inimicos vestros’. No mention is made of the political enemy” [1996: 28-9]. Schmitt considers the enemy only in his political aspect: “the enemy is solely the political enemy” [1996: 28]. Thus, only the concept of the political enemy belongs to politics and defines it.

Derrida himself, while making a valuable effort to reconfigure the entire political field through the figure of friendship, worryingly recognizes that the enemy figure persists and, more so, remains somewhat constitutive for Europe, without which she would lose its political being (Derrida 1994; see also: Anidjar 2003: 49).

Hence, despite numerous optimistic prophesies and doubtless pacification that the EU brought to Western Europe at least (or at last), one is bound to agree with Schmitt that ”rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend and enemy antithesis” (Schmitt 1996: 28). Thus, in current political discourse, one might ironically find the return of the banished Schmittian distinction with a vengeance. The growing reemergence of the nation and national within the EU itself, and of both internal and external clashes and antagonisms that it brings with it, are poignant remainders of the current need to conceptually rethink
Politics of Enmity thus calls upon immediate thinking of Otherness – for enmity is inherently relational. We are easily caught up in between Scylla and Charybdis, seeking to reinforce, to reinstate our own group’s existence by conflicting it with the Other. On everyday level, we witness the existence of different groups creating different Others: national Us, ethnic Us, municipal Us, neighbourhood Us, gendered Us, racial Us – they all call for a constitutive Other that resides in realities of our self-definitions. As mentioned, Schmitt emphasized the proximity between friend and enemy. Through the political, enemy becomes friend and vice versa. They assume each other and reinforce each other. It is precisely the relation of enmity that is political and epistemological simultaneously: it creates and revives political community of friends.

Throughout modern history, there was no better engagement of the concept of enmity as in nations and nationalisms. For, both are in many ways peculiar and elusive concepts that could easily be interpreted as being both ’banal’ and infinitely complex; primordial and modern; imagined and real; they also have a great role in the politics of enmity. Since belonging to a specific national group can be seen as an important source of the collective strength for many, solidarity of these collectives may serve as the basis for action to further
strengthen these (imagined) bonds. The process itself, more often than not, assumes the existence of another, equally potent, equally solidary collective – usually irreducibly distinct from ours. This positioning which comes part and parcel with the idea of the nation – more so with nationalism – seems to centre around the idea of enmity: the antipode of solidarity among those who belong to ‘Us’. Enmity, as well as solidarity, is thus one of the cornerstones of the ‘practicing of a nation’, something which shapes and perpetuates a nation as political identity framework.

On the one hand, it is often argued that nationalism can be seen as the modern form of Gemeinschaft which answers ontological needs created by the uncertainties of modernity and its power structures. On the other hand, we witness a growth of a global society with an increasingly integrated system, primarily socio-economic, but also cultural and perhaps political. Globalisation creates opportunities, but also crises in which we have to remake our lives and identities (Giddens, 2000). At the same time, social relations continue to be governed and institutionalised in accordance with national temporalities and located within the spaces of the nation. The shift from national to post-national regimes cannot be established. Rather, what we see is the emergence of trans-border nationalism as a perverted adaptation of the nation-state model (Brubaker, 2015). The powers of the nation-state are increasing in spite of the global challenges of migration, opening the new perspectives on solidarity but also on enmity.

Bearing these issues in mind, this volume attempts contribute to the discussion about the nation, nationalism and its inevitable attendant, enmity. In what sense have friendship and hostility (Schmitt 1996, Derrida 1994, Bojanić 1995; 2015) gained new meanings, and what would those meanings be? Does nation-building always involve a common enemy one has
to fight? Or does it meet its limits with being a mere remedy for contemporary forms of inequality, or a tranquilizer for those unsettled by the complexity and insecurity brought up by globalized capitalism? These questions become increasingly important as we witness the crisis of the collectivity-building process of the European Union. Do the contemporary politics of difference contest the notion of enmity or, quite to the contrary, reaffirm it?

The volume opens with the section that considers economy of enmity within national identities. Through confronting the capitalism-based nationalisms and globalization, this section explores various aspects of the politics of enmity. In the opening contributions, Alpar Lošonc and Vladimir Gvozden discuss aspects between the dynamic of capitalism and the nationalized enmity-based relations. Pointing out the structural connection between capitalism and its effects on causing uneven development and national(istic) articulations, they pinpoint the fragility of the liberal account of the pacification of enmities, stating that the globalized-economized competition could not ensure the barrier against the renewed enmities. Hatice Hande Orhon Özdağ attempts to demonstrate the abrasive effects of globalization on the nation states of both the core and the periphery. She insists that spreading neoliberal and postmodern ideas and norms, and supporting conflicting identities in the periphery, incites ethnic, pre-modern identities, which in return negatively affect both the core and the periphery. While nation states in the periphery weaken because of the problems created or supported by mechanisms of globalization, the domination of the nation states in the core is reinforced. In the following article, Ercan Gündoğan returns to Lenin’s and Stalin’s conception of the national question and their nationality policy in the Soviet Union. Gündoğan shows that Soviet nationalities policies freed nations from the prison of the Tsarist Russia, but
failed to produce an effective socialist friendship-based model for the fusion of nations. In the final article of this section, Robert Gallagher utilizes the Aristotle’s notion of εὖ ζῆν (to “live well”) contrasting it to contemporary globalism and arguing for the friend-foe antithesis with the example of Ukraine.

The second section draws our attention to Central and Eastern Europe and its historical legacies of enmities. Olof Bortz writes on a renowned American political scientist Raul Hilberg, frequently called the founder of Holocaust studies. The article explores the role and significance of national stereotypes, as problematic and unresolved aspect of his work and, more so, of the German Weltanschauung altogether. National stereotypes and their extreme outcomes are the main focus of the following article, written by Andrej Kubiček. He explores the strategies of (self)excluding Roma, ranging from acceptance of pariah status to uneasy attempts to assimilate them in host people’s nations; instead, he focuses on the third way – Roma nation building strategy out of different Roma communities. Finally, Irina Dusacova engages into one more case of the nation-in-the-making in the case of Moldova by trying to identify the symbolic Other for the Moldovan media. She argues that the distinction, or rather enmity between East and West, constitute the ultimate basis for Moldovans’ ethnic identification.

The third section examines enmity and friendship in distinctive cases in post-Yugoslav space. Rastislav Dinić dwells into Gellner’s and Cavell’s interpretations of Wittgenstein channeling them into the political problems of community and nationalism. Starting from this distinction, Dinić poignantly emphasizes the meaning of Dušan Makavejev’s films that show his vision of the Yugoslav identity and Yugoslavia as a political community, quite resembling the one of Cavell’s. Reinvention of the community in Makavejev’s case is thus based on popular culture that perpetually talks about its own community. In
the following contribution, Marko Kovačević brings in István Bibó, a prominent Hungarian political thinker and practitioner, making a parallel between his oeuvre and the processes in former Yugoslavia some 70 years after. The author argues that contemporary discourses of nationalism and identity politics can be seen as an instance of the Hobbesian culture of anarchy applied to Balkan contexts. Last, but not the least, article in this section is the one by Tamara Petrović Trifunović and Dunja Poleti Ćosić, examining the media discourse in Serbia during the “refugee crisis” in 2015/16 in the Balkans. Compared to overtly xenophobic rhetoric in many EU states, there was a predominantly sympathetic representation of refugees in the mainstream Serbian media; nevertheless, according to the authors, this sympathy was merely disguising the actual lack of services provided to the population in transit by the Serbian state.

The last section explores notions of Serbian-Albanian enmity, appearing almost primordial to ordinary person in Balkans. Božica Slavković builds her case of Albanian Other on the Albanian aspirations to realize the idea of the Greater Albania, supported by Great Forces of pre-WWI period. Ledion Krisafi provides new evidence on the Albania-Yugoslavia relations between the end of WWII and an Informbiro resolution in 1948 and questions the prevailing opinion (the “myth” as he calls it) about 1945-1948 harmonious relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. The article offers insights into the real intentions and fears of the then Albanian leadership, and Enver Hoxha’s intentions regarding Yugoslavia. Finally, Atdhe Hetemi constructs his article as a study of the (hostile) inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo, that are very much based on the interpretation of the past given in own political/ethnic community.

The volume originated from the project Figuring out the Enemy: Re-imagining Serbian-Albanian Relations that aimed to challenge Serbian-Albanian hostility by reinvestigating events
and discourses, ideas and traditions that undermine the present enmity and promote friendship. In spite the overall tone of this volume that almost reinforces the inevitability of the enmity, we hope that it will contribute to a better understanding of ethnic enmities, especially between Serbian and Albanian communities, leading consequently to better conditions for εὖ ζῆν, or living a livable life in the crossroads of the Balkans and beyond.

References


Section I: Economy of Enmity – Theorizing the Nation and Identity

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“Old” Politics of Enmity and the Rise of Ethnicism in Contemporary Capitalism

Nation is the identitarian constellation that has proven to be an ideal frame for the intensification of enmities and exclusivist claims. However, from 1970s we witness manifest surplus of identity that is not *per se* national, at least in terms of an inflation of writing about it. The fashionable catchword identity “became a central category of cultural studies during the 1990s’” (Barker 2004: 93). As a result, there are hundreds of scholarly articles about identity seen through the prism of literature, culture, society, law, ethnicity, national and international policy etc. The ambivalent character of the identity could not be underrated: it is a problem and solution, as well. This ambivalence determines our thinking of the nation/ethnicity relation.

The politics of enmity could be thematized from different perspectives. Of course, there is the standard opportunity to begin with the presupposed transhistorical-inimical nature

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of the human beings as a substantial content to be applied in every concrete historical epoch. In this case, the theologically or non-theologically treated human nature serves as the source for the explosion of enmities between individuals or collectivises. Such procedure inevitably leads to the naturalization imbued with the ideological meanings, and the logic of naturalization long time haunted the discourse on nationalism and was always of importance for the national-nationalistic designs.

In our attempt to show that the dynamic of nationalism most often successfully hides its own “nature”, we intend to address the axis “ethnicity-nation” because the modern substantialization and naturalization of culture leads to the deepening of that same axis.

But, there are other opportunities as well. For example, the always highly controversial Carl Schmitt in his often-debated political philosophy (including his famous friend-enemy distinction) projects a transcendental-ontological possibility of enmity on the basis of the “pure difference” between the Self and Other who is not the empirical given being, or entity but the constitutive element in the complex space of differences. In accordance with this, the intersubjective relationship (or “intersubjective pluralism”) as such, i.e. the ontological fact of the exposure of the being to other being opens the transcendentally existing enmity. This deconstructive reading\(^3\) with a far-reaching repercussion for the understanding of enmities could provide interesting insights for our problem, but we are not engaged here with the depths and contradictions of the philosophy of Carl Schmitt, or with the traces of his “authoritative

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\(^3\) For this mode of reading of Carl Schmitt see the excellent argumentation of Prozorov 2006: 75. Prozorov points out the paradoxical result: Schmitts anti-liberalism is more plural than liberalism itself. In fact, confronting with the pluralism liberalism necessarily meets its own illiberalism.
“liberalism” (see Streeck 2016). In fact, we aim to note that the political ontology of enmity-relations is loaded with some theoretical deficiencies concerning the position of nation in capitalism: political ontology dealing with the transcendental level of argumentations could not articulate the nation (or its ideological counterpart, nationalism) as the politico-economic quasi-community, or as the community instead of community. Despite the clear advantages of the second approach in relation to the first one, it does not provide satisfying account for the structurally formed opportunities of enmities related to the nations.

Our critique concerning the political ontology of enmity and the naturalization of enmity reveals our methodological trajectory. Following the well-known orientation (“always historicize”) our intention is to affirm the nation consequently as the collective entity, or as the horizon of collectivity within capitalism: the nation and its ideological strategical articulation, namely, nationalism is overdetermined by the structural laws of capitalism. The fact of overdeterminedness means that the crucial institutions of capitalism such as the property-relations, statehood (“nation-state”), culturalism, the interpenetration of politics and economy etc. exert influence on the nation and its forms. For example, there is no opportunity to account adequately on nationalism without its references to the state. Besides, capitalism presents the social measure of the wealth (the capital is the social form of the creating and measuring of the wealth expressing in commodities): enmities (national enmities as well) are directly or indirectly conditioned by the conflicts and contradictions connected to the acquiring and controlling of the wealth. The commodity-wealth, commodity mediated wealth is politico-economical category and essential reference for the politics of enmity. Without approaching the aspects of wealth there is no theoretical path toward the nationally mediated enmities.
As a matter of fact, the intelligibility of the nation could not be imagined without the dynamics of capitalism. According to Karl Polanyi, the emergence of national markets was not spontaneous; the comprehensive role of nationalism and national frame was important for “the making of markets”. At the same time, there is a theoretical task to think the non-functionality of nationalism in relation to capitalism: our goal is to settle at least the indispensable conditions for this non-functionality. There are widespread discussions on the (eventual) benefits of nationalism (national movements, for example in Latin America) for the emancipation even on the left, but the critical picture on the moral indexation of nationalism should be sharp: the debate on the good or bad, benign and malign nationalism in the perspective of enmity is completely sterile, and directs us toward theoretical impasse (see Mayerfield, 1998, Clift, Woll, 2012, Carayon, 2002). Nationalism often shows that protests, resistance and disagreement can lead to the final agreement and adjustment. Thus, what is needed is to present the structural opportunity of enmity in the nation contrasting to the: a) the moralizing representation of nation, b) violence of normativity4 in relation to the nation. In certain sense we are in line with Schmitt’s transcendental reason concerning the ontological opportunity of „dangerous life” (Schmitt), but pace the „Cron-jurist” we are interested in the historical-social transcendentality.

The history of modernity could be conceptualized by the ideology of pacification of (agonistic or agonistic “being-against”) enmities. The liberal articulation of the enmity and the finalization of this “being-against” plays an important role in modernity. Actually, liberalism provides the economic, market-mediated competition as the pharmakon: the economization of the competition inherently contains coercion and violence but, at the same time, acts against the violence. In accordance

4 This is, at least partially, a Foucauldian issue.
with the double nature of violence and coercion, the “economic competition was considered to be the only way societies in the throes of desacralization could be protected against their own violence” (Dupuy, 2014: 9). Therefore, economic competition is seen as the “self-protection” of a society against its own inherent potentials of violence and coercion. Liberalism postulates this “self-immunity” as the vehicle for the pacification of enmities, and its understanding of enmity is impregnated by the ideology of pacification: the problem is that the processes of pacification involve illiberal moments and reveal the hidden illiberal elements in the process of liberation. The balance between “bad” and “good coercion” is extremely fragile. Let us not forget the “liberal nationalism” (in these times rehabilitated by such a political philosopher of multiculturalism as Will Kymlicka) that could be precisely interpreted as a strategy of pacification, but was connected to the emerging of the liberal imperialism. From the contemporary perspective, it is illustrious that the successes in practicing this strategy proved to be very precarious: the liberal representation of the nation is deeply intertwined with the violent dynamic of capitalism and its expansion. So, the critical explanation of the liberal “othering” and antagonizing between Self and Other has to do with the illiberal violence and coercion.

The practice of historicizing is itself subordinated to historicity. We almost repeat here a statement of Étienne Balibar, who strongly accentuates the non-substantial processual categories such as identification (actually the processes of identification and reidentification) in contrast to the category of identity that could be reified (Balibar 1997: 325). For us, this problem of the dialectic between identification and re-identification exists in the context of the already mentioned relationship between nationality and ethnicity. This emphasis on ethnicity, or on the axis ethnicity/nationality implicates the explication of the triad politics/economy/culture and the culturalization of
identities. By pursuing this objective, we are trying to make a
diagnosis of the contemporary, „late capitalism” characterized
by the *ethnicization of social conflicts and class-relations, and
ethnification of enmities* as well as of ethnicification of workers
and commodities.

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There is a national *order*. The appearance of nation in
history is to be explained by the sequences of socio-economic
and socio-cultural homogenization. Constituting the union,
the processes of national unification by language, habits and
customs, and common regulations include the forms of imple-
mentation and thereby different forms of coercion. The genesis
of nation is rightly associated with constitutive violences later
condemned to the oblivion and suppression in order to sta-
bilize the national reproduction and survival. Therefore, the ex-
istence of nation is always a constellation of remembering and
oblivion, e. g. the remembering of the heroic past and the obli-
vion of the violence of the beginning. The nation is frequently
depicted as the form of voluntary association, but the real situ-
ation is much more complicated, because the institutions of na-
tion and national citizenship comprise the contradictory set of
impositions and voluntariness, ascribed norms and voluntari-
ly accepted duties and responsibilities. The nationalization of
the society must enact biopolitics that governs the human life,
that is, controls the sequences of birth and death, and orientates
the processes of normalization.⁵ The self-definition and self-un-
derstanding of the nationalized individual subject refers to the
structure of national order.

The nation is not a neutral entity on the historical scene
but the politico-economic bearer of the interest and frame of

⁵ The relationship between biopolitics and nationalism is an other
Foucauldian issue.
complex relationship between collective and private interests. The nation, or the subjects that act in its name, must triumph against the asymmetrical power of absolutist states, and practice egalitarianism amongst its members endorsing its democratic horizon. The nationalized subjects affirm the caesura in relation to the past, there is no simple non-reflective continuity between the past and contemporaneity, that is, the nation institutionalizes the tradition as the mediated experience of the past. At the same time, these subjects must subordinate the newly emerging minorities that feel as endangered by the national construction and claim for the special treatment in new state exposing to the charge of non-loyalty. The tendencies imposed by the intention of nationalization of a given territory indicate a lot of conflicts such as the sharpened competition in acquiring and monopolization of the resources. Michael Walzer in his endeavour describes the national-state as a specific “regime of toleration”: it gives certain room for a difference, makes possible some egalitarian arrangements and provides opportunities for identifications and belongings (Walzer 1997: 26). Of course, this happens along the friendship/enmity lines both internally and externally. In accordance with Walzer national identity is continually being renegotiated not only in relation to internal political and ethnic, but also in relation to these external international or transnational identities.

However, the nation-state is to be reproduced, its level of reproduction is never finalized, there is always fragility in its stabilization. Borders, territorial framing (see Elden 2007), territorial dimensions of nation, eventual dissociation between nation and state, claiming decentralization, seeking the identity between nation and state, are problems necessarily attached to the existence of the nation. There is no nation without nationalism that operates as ideological-cohesive patterns for mobilization, and sacrificing for the nation, that is, as the ideology
of national unity: nationalism represents as its own necessary feature being internal to the national construct. There is no sense to investigate the priority of nation or nationalism, there is no need to construct the successive chain of cause and consequence in this case. In order to interpret the nation and nationalism we should see the temporal *simultaneity* of cause and consequence, e. g. between nation and nationalism.

This short explanation could be supplemented with different concretized historical-contingent dimensions. By standard accounts, there are dividing lines in developing a nation: in accordance with the teleology built in the constitution of a nation (Fogel 2017), we could classify the entities, groups, communities by the measure of the developed-established nation. The prevailing classification amongst the parts of Europe (West, Central and East Europe; or the 19th century conception of “Great Nations”) is marked by this teleology that is not neutral, but mediates the patterns of domination between heartlands and periphery. But, by linking the dynamic of nation to capitalism we negate the stubborn prejudice that the nationally articulated enmities are the remnant of the premodern past and the expression of the delay in the development). Modernity is full of structural dissonances that oppose the well-ordered teleology of development and the teleology of national development. For instance, the well-known delay of fragmentized Germany in contrast to the republican-revolutionary France is deconstructed by Hegel: the revolution is the manifestation of the original deferment of the confrontation with the absolutism. For example (jumping into the recent history), the interpreters who explained the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s as the “revenge of the dark past” or as the “return of the past”, lost this link between the paths of post-socialist capitalism and nation (and nation-state) imagined as the best framework for people’s emancipation, integration and modernization. Without any doubt
there are wide-ranging mediation between the past and contemporaneity concerning different nations: we could articulate the element of myths in these contexts, but we should not give away the conceptual frame of capitalism *tout court*. We could never elucidate the enmities as the relic of the past because precisely this sequence of time is reworked, reinterpreted by the movements, „creative destruction” of capitalism that cleverly uses difference and repetition in its interpretation of the role of nation-states and national economies.

The couple of nation and nationalism is a complex configuration of power on the scene of capitalism. There are actually different rhythms of dynamics amongst separate parts of the world. So, we do not ignore the existing diversity but propose a conceptual frame that could articulate the *unity in differences*. These diversity across geopolitical and geo-economic lines should be portrayed as the manifestation of uneven and combined development which is the historical law of capitalism (Smith, 1990, Allinson and Anievas 2009). The ignorance about the economic aspects in nationalism studies are related to the conviction that certain modes of economic communication, specifically market communication, always exert pacifying influence, that is, neutralize negative elements, in particular excesses of coercion in nationalism. The remark of a noteworthy economist Albert Hirschman about the stabilization of the category of interest in market operations replacing the manifestation of passion, that is, “rationalizing passion”, can be similarly applied to nationalism. Accordingly, nationalism would require connecting nation to state as its self-affirmation, but since nation is modern in its nature, the category of interest can counterbalance the negative manifestation of national passions. Actually, the theories of nationalism is usually more concerned with cultural than with politico-economic resources and acknowledge primarily the *cultural* enemy: regardless of the fact
that certain categories have cultural but also economic meaning as their common denominator. Finally, homogenized culture itself is an element which is linked to politico-economic effects, since the division of labour is impossible to achieve without the homogenization of cultural resources. But, we should make further steps. Nicos Poulantzas, who presents a detailed list of differences between the meanings and forms of space and time in capitalism and in precapitalist period, puts an emphasis on the “economic unity”, unified market of capitalism, generalized commodity norms backed up by the circulation of capital: for him, the robust link between capitalism and nation means that capitalism must operate across national state (Poulantzas 1978).

There are lot of discussions on the problem of internationality: why different national-states occur in the space of “world-society” (Callinicos 2007)? Could we have a homogenized world-society without the fragmentarization of national states? Are there any substantial differences between national and international markets? Some endeavours are trying to solve the problem by dividing the politics and economy; in accordance with this, the politics and economy are separated without the opportunity of structural interpenetration and the economic coercion proves to be impossible. Some other views suggest the initial competitiveness between nations resulting in conflicts (see Helleiner, 2002, Levi-Faur, 1997, Porter, 1990, Pozo-Martin, 2007). But, even if this account on the original competitiveness envisages the “creation” of enmity, it reverses the logic of explanation: the processes of nationalistic “othering” and competence should be explained by the laws of capitalism, that is, it should be mediated by these laws and not vice versa. The market-based competition was proposed by important authors as the powerful channel for the pacification of enmities. Liberalism especially opted for the norms of concurrence and world-exchange as the radically non-violent path for the cosmopolitan
togetherness and coordination. In line with this emerged liberal nationalism that made an effort to reconcile the logic of modern individualism with the collective patterns of nationhood and advocated the integration of heterogeneous members (minorities, etc.) of given national communities by the marketized competition. But, the concurrence involves the situation of “being-against” in the acquiring and stabilizing of commodified-monetarized wealth. This category, which embeds social measure of power, indicates politico-economic coercion and violence: the nationalized wealth is not there by chance. Such liberals (or “possessive individualist”) as Locke, affirm the war against “waste” (see especially Neocleous 2011) in order to expand the volume of national wealth: this war is tied to the destruction of indigenous people who are accused of the original lack of industrious attitude and predetermined idleness. The war against uncultivated land as the process of original “accumulation of capital” (Marx) takes place as the politics of enmity against those who are charged with the inertness, and “non-work”. In resorting to the economic coercion, liberal imperialism brings this struggle against “waste” to its logical conclusion. The paternalistic inclusion of the barbarians to the civilization of work ethics hides the phenomenon of nationalized wealth and enmity in the perspective of capitalist commodity. And that has inevitable consequences to the understanding of the politics of enmity.

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There is a philosophy of globalisation that emphasizes the sharp contrast between terms such as “supra-nationalism”, “transnationalization” and national frames. This line of thinking assumes the ending of the politics of enmities in national context and the finalizing of the category of national wealth. In contrast to these important studies points out the persistence of the nationally fragmented space. Besides, the
researches underline that “the competitiveness of national localities suggests the continual importance of nationalism” (Ten Brink 2014: 136) or that the transnational subjects of capitalist dynamic are dependent on the capacities of national state apparatuses. Confronted with the dichotomy between transnational and national tendencies, we are forced to draw a complex configuration that maintains strong links between the commodified wealth and national borders. Thus, it seems that the nationally mediated enmities are not contingent against the practices of transnationalisation.

Actually, we intend to emphasize the nexus between the transnationalisation and ethnification. In fact, ethnicism operates by the politics of fear that could inflame enmities, for example in the case of the migrants treated as the agents of cheating and stealing of my, our jobs and employments. In neoliberal capitalism mixed with neoconservative impulses, the problem of insecurity, the weakening of the ties of social integration has become acute: from the various part of the theoretical and political scene we hear calls to establish “authentic” community and restore the “lost belongingness” in order to counterbalance the atomisation of modern societies.

This orientation is not immunised to the ethnification of the social conflicts and antagonism. But the ethnicism remain wedged between myth and nihilism – between the mythical idea of the bygone “authentic togetherness” and the lack of any kind of community. In our interpretation ethnicism actually connects “commodified narcissism” and the ideology of authentic community; even more, it appears that this type of narcissism uses the notion of ideal ethnic community for a making of the new economic and political order that excludes the Others. Ethnicism, by emphasising ethnic identity and the sacredness of origin, serves as the terrain for the ideological naturalization: the ethnic component was supposed to be the nature
that resisted the *supra*ethnic temptation. The ethnicist attitude threatens to reduce the multiplicity of political, intellectual, economic and cultural phenomena to an easy and cheerful detection of sense, or “destiny” – this is, of course, similar to “old” nationalism but, as we shall see, the role of state and democracy is quite different. *In point of fact, ethnicity is not the revealed natural immediacy, but the product of various social determinations.* For example, the fragile, war-like Hutu-Tutsi distinction in Rwanda was the mix of class and ethnical moments, and professional occupations, but the government of German and Belgian colonial administrations have formed a strong distinction and stratification striated by ethnical criteria. Besides, ethnocieties are often produced in the context of migration reacting to the processes of dislocation and industrialization. It is no accident that the ethnic transformation in the ideology of the Chinese ruling class became most explicit with the opening up of the Chinese economy to world markets in 1978 and “the suppression of the movement for political reform in 1989”, which was followed by an intensive “patriotic education campaign” (Davidson, 2016: 240). In this sense, the ethnicity involves numerous socio-economic determinations in the context of the uneven development in capitalism (for these selected examples concerning the Hutu-Tutsi relation see Davidson, ibid.: 8, for China see Zhao 1998, Li 2008).

The neoliberalized capitalism determines the relations between nationalism and ethnicism. As far as the theory of nationalism is concerned, it is remarkable that recent republican and neorepublican theoreticians have made a huge effort to make a strong distinction between nationalism and ethnicism. Our choice is Dominique Schnapper (1994), who has developed a very subtle theory pointing out the far-reaching difference between the two types of the organization of collectivity. In short: nation is constructed politically, that is, nation is a mediated
community by citizenship, it is the community of citizens who are from time to time ready to sacrifice their life for the community. With the nation, and probably “national-humanism”, as the political form of community we have a strong link to universalism, that is, the particular belongingness does not contradict the principles of universalism, for example, Kantian type of “univocal universalism”. Contrary to the standard accusation of the national form as the system of closeness, and as the special frame of exclusion, Schnapper stresses that nation as the political form embeds the refined and complex dialectic between inclusion and exclusion. The act of dismissing the nation as a system of closeness, or as a totalizing and putative view of society, does not account for the constitutive dimensions of the nation. By contrast, ethnicism should be explicated as the anti-universalistic, self-referential system of meaning, as a self-closed quasi-community intertwined with the mixture of egoism, resentments and desire for the authenticity that is coterminal with the dynamic of capitalism. In this sense, ethnicism is not the phenomena of the premodern past but the construction of collectivity in the post-modern epoch and is endemic to the neoliberalized capitalism that rapidly and not surprisingly transforms itself along neoconservative lines.

We have benefited from the Schnappers explications and intend to emphasize the importance of the discrepancy between nationalism and ethnicism concerning our subject. We especially appreciate Schnappers attempt to denaturalize the relationship between the ethnicity and nation: this affiliation is exposed to several transformations and restructuration. Schnapper hopes that civil education will prevent the forming of exclusive nationalism. In reality, her unfamiliarity with the logic of political economy poses certain difficulties. Indeed, there is a fundamental tension between the construction of nation

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6 This term was articulated especially by Derrida (1992).
and ethnicity on the horizon of universalism, but this fact does not mean that the nation could be totally disassociated from the ethnical references. Schnapper’s analysis is reductive in this respect as well.

In fact, we need a theory that articulates the intertwine-ment between nation and ethnicity depending on the complex determinations with the unintended, emergent and complex resultant of different politico-economic tendencies. And we welcome the involving of the politics of universality in the theory of nationalism that is a critical one concerning the current tendencies so inimical to the modern principle of universalism. But the uneasy history of modernity, aggressiveness of national state in relation to colonialism, existing traces of imperialism, existing concurrence-regimes related to the nationalized wealths, warns us to be cautious with the connection between nationalism and universalism. We need a delicate theory of universalism that could reflect the “conflicting universals”, the practice of coercion and violence in the “name of universality” in order to save universality (Balibar 1997: 337-353). There are different theoretical attempts to scrutinize the application and the government practice in the name of universalism. These achievements are highly valuable, their goal is to sensitize us for the strategic and structural factors which determine the pathways of universality. The universality is intensely questioned today and the reflective advocating of the politics of universalism could be an achievement exactly for the articulation of the complex relationship between nationalism and ethnicism.

The dissociation of political economy from culture, language and identity, the repression (Verdrängung) of politico-economical approach reenacts the “metaphysics of substance” — being that a “cohesive, self-identical subject is ontologically (if not actually) prior” (Butler, 1990: 22) to any form of society and social conflicts. The typical “poststructuralist” view that
the subject is itself “always already” a “product of discourse”,
does not overcome the “politics of enmity”. In reality, identity
is changing, it is “slippery”, and any “claim to identity” must
be constituted around a “constitutive exclusion” (Butler, ibid.).
It seems that in these liberal versions of poststructuralist Stim-
mung there is strong critique of metaphysical substance prior to
identity politics: in fact, the process, processuality determines
the outcome, namely, the identity-patterns. The poststructuralist
account is critical to the exclusive affirmation of “our” institu-
tions that are based on the projected “maturity and robustness
of our institutions” (Kymlicka). Who are “we” and who are
“they”, and who are these humans without “mature and robust
institutions”? Who are exactly these failed humans? Of course,
this approach leads us back to ethnicism that should demarcate
the lines of “inside” and “outside” without undermining the he-
gemonic ideology of neoliberal capitalism.

Let us give a brief account of the changes in the politics
of enmity we see today. The basis of neoliberalism is the recon-
ceptualized free trade with its motto: “All would be best of all
possible worlds if nations only allowed the market to works its
magic” (Shaikh 2005: 45). This seems as if the political arena of
the nation-state is “restructured and the old divide between ‘in-
side’ and ‘outside’ is eroded” (Munck 2005: 63). The role of na-
tion in the ongoing neoliberal model of development is simple:
nations should engage in trade according to the principles of
comparative advantage, and the role of the state is “no longer to
restrict and to tax trade, but to use all its powers to extend the

7 Kymlicka optimistically speaks about “the banality of identity pol-
tics”: “Identity politics throughout the West have become routinized
and domesticated as part of everyday process of democratic deliberation
and negotiation. This may make the topic of identity politics less inter-
esting for scholars and citizens, but is arguably a good sign for the ma-
turity of our political culture and the robustness of our democratic in-
stitutions” (Kymlicka 2003: 285).
freedom of trade within and beyond national borders” (Clarke 2005: 50). Thus, there are no enemies, only competitors in the imaginary world market. However, imperialism and wars and enmities still exist, because there is no such thing as a purely economic process (see Smith, 2016). It seems that political and capitalist elite use ethnic differences mostly to persuade their citizens to compete economically with workers from other countries. Thus, the workers identify their interests not with other workers (in class terms) “but with his or her trade, employer, branch of production or the interest of ’the nation’ in competition with other nations” (Clarke 2005: 54). Nationalism is too serious concept to absorb such a thing as a pure economic process, especially because of tragic experiences of world wars. Thus, ethnicism that we often call “neoliberalized nationalism is more useful in connecting the cluster of economic, political, social and cultural processes. Ethnicisms’ politics of enmity hides the fact that real competition “favours the competitively strong over the competitively weak” (Shaikh 2005: 46). Actually, it attempts to revert the lines separating “strong” and “weak” and to persuade the competitively weak that they are still strong enough to play the role on the international stage of capitalism.

Ethnicism does not use the idea of a border and territory in the same way as liberal nationalism. We are witnessing the transformation of the organization of space (see the spatial consequences in the context of “walling”, and “waning sovereignty, erecting walls and weakening the sovereignty, Brown 2017; this includes a strange combination between closeness and globalization-based openness). Society is remodelled by the image of the neoliberalized market and hence the state (even its sovereignty) also has to be marketized. For example, in the last decades, we have witnessed an increased growth in the practice of selling places. This means that the place is presented and sold as a commodity. Every act of place marketing is
a commodification of place. Cities, regions and nation compete in a frenetic selling process, always stressing their comparative advantages of their particular place – often in terms of their cultural capital based on typical ethnicist notions. The ongoing process of selling places undermines the idea of national borders and becomes normalized in the discourses of advertising, public relations, subsidies, development projects, flamboyant architectural and urban design statement, trade fairs, cultural and sporting spectacle, heritage, public art, street festivals (see Ward 1998). Certain mythology purports the selling practices, addressed mainly to two agents, a visitor and investor. Plurality of experiences, cultural differences and multiplicity of meanings are set aside, and new mythology of marketable place is saying that everything is well ordered and ready to accept visitors and investors. Politics out, money in: “our” place is transparent and all problems are played down in the higher interest of its commodification.

But to whom this interest belongs along the friend-enemy line? The sale of the place enters into a complex web of differences and sameness that is typical for capitalism and that welcomes ongoing ethnicism-patterns. In a structural adjustment agenda, capitalist nation-states have been reorganized around the ideology of international competition. The renewed (neo)liberal model of free trade, the neoliberalization of liberalism punishes the weak and rewards the strong in the seemingly preestablished harmony: “once nations engage in international trade, relative prices of commodities are no longer regulated by their relative cost of production” (Shaikh 2005: 46). This is an important fact that undermines not only the traditional rhetoric of economic patriotism, but also inevitably poses the question: can nations “choose their enemies” or they just internally (within the internal power configuration) play on the card of ethnicism? Ethnicism does not actualize politics of enmity, but
acts as an assertive “substitute” for common societal aims, statist goals of power and human “grandeur” (Gorz 1989: 133; however, Gorz still uses the term nationalism). In the Schmittian sense, there is a problem to distinguish friends and enemies in that model, and confusion enters the scene (Muslim terrorism, refugee and migrant crises, gated communities, anti-Russian hysteria, expansion of aggressive rhetoric, privatization of security, etc.). But, as Richard Sennet stressed, behind all this ethnicist revival we probably witness that “[t]he most radical case for the uniqueness of our times would be that nations are losing their economic value” (Sennett 2006: 18). And, this is directly connected to politics of enmity where noisy ethnicism enters as a powerful tool to the (re)production of fear and production of centralized financial, political and military power.

This is the state that counts on the pre-modern sentiment of the people that it disseminates through the media and education. It is true that modernity is based on the development of modern State and the process of industrialization, urbanization, monetary economy, mass production, centralized market, spread of mass media, central dissemination of information, transport infrastructure, increased mobility... The role of State in the regime of ethnicity is quite different: it becomes the combination of emotivity and pathos, it speaks about the dignity and greatness of the ethnos and allows the rage of economic egoism of the members of certain groups. In short, it appears that ethnicism uses the specific neoliberal political economy of fear. In modern society the problem of insecurity has become extremely acute, as from the various parties we hear calls to establish community and belonging in order to win over the “atomisation” of modern societies. Ethnicism tries to reestablish the lost sense of belonging, that is, it reevokes the bygone past which is a mission impossible, or tipically ideological maneuver against the insecure present. Again, our impression is that
this kind of ethnicism remains wedged between substantialist myth and dark nihilism – between the projection of traditional organic community and the lack of any kind of community and communitarian aspects. Finally, this intensified fear does not go outside, it is not located outside, as in Schmitt’s mentioned famous model, but stays “inside” (for inside, internal political use) or “goes” globally as externalized process probably as the commodified and aestheticized enmity that quite successfully hides the fact that neoliberalized competition has never been neutral.

References:


Conflicting Effects of Globalization on Nation States of the Core and the Periphery

Introduction: Conceptual Clarification

The concepts of core and periphery are mostly used by world system theorists metaphorically in order to classify the states with respect to their functions in the world political economy. “The world system can be defined as all of the economic, political, social and cultural relations among the people of the earth” (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 389). According to this definition, a world economy, although it consists of multiple societies and states, is a world system that contains a single economic division of labor (Chase Dunn 1995: 2). It can broadly be said that World System Theory argues that because of the uneven exchange that leads to concentration of capital accumulation in some regions of the world, the capital accumulation process generates a hierarchical relation among the states (Wallerstein 2009a: 52).

Samir Amin argues that the position of states within the international hierarchy is determined by their competitive
capacity in the market (Amin 2000: 3). The character of the production in the core is monopolistic, while in the periphery it is competitive. When these products are exchanged in the market, since the products of core-like production is more valuable than the periphery-like products, the surplus flows from periphery into the core. This process is called uneven exchange (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 396). Even if the positions of the states change within the hierarchy among states, the relations between core and periphery remain constant (Chase Dunn, 1998: 103-111). Besides the monopolistic and competitive structure of production, labor intensive or capital intensive structure of production is another important aspect of capitalism that determines the positions of states in terms of this hierarchy (Chase-Dunn 1998: 203). Accordingly, unlike the periphery, production is capital intensive in the core, where qualified and high-wage labor is employed (Chase-Dunn 1998: 207).

Core and periphery are relational concepts; this means that they are better evaluated as concepts referring to the relative positions of states and regions with respect to each other (Chase-Dunn 1998: 121). According to Amin (1991: 176), the relations between the periphery and the core, with respect to the core, have two functions: profit improvement and market expansion. Moreover, for the maintenance of capital accumulation, as a network of relations that depends on exploitation, core-periphery relations are crucial and essential for two reasons: Firstly, because of the exploitation of the periphery by the core, the core possesses more and more surplus that can be used for more investment or empowerment of the state. Secondly, core-periphery relations reduce the tension among the actors of core (Chase-Dunn 1998: 244). In the semi-periphery, production may be both labor intensive and capital intensive and semi-periphery states or regions balance the core and periphery (Chase-Dunn 1998: 211).
Core-periphery relations are simply the geographical structure of economic mobility (Wallerstein 2009b: 28). However, the implications of these structures are much wider. According to World Systems Theory, the core always possesses more political, military and economic power than the periphery and the semi-periphery (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 396). Five monopolies in the fields of technology, finance, natural resources, media, and weapons of mass destruction are the elements of this competitive capacity of the core (Amin 2000: 4-5). Because of its disadvantaged position in investing with equity capitals, the periphery becomes dependent to the core in the fields of military, technology, and media (Amin 1991: 176). The failure of periphery in the implementation of monetary programs that enhance the welfare of people and the failure of having investments in infrastructure lead to legitimacy loss of governments in the periphery. The semi-periphery is not as powerful as the core and is not as weak as the periphery in economics, politics, and military (Wallerstein 1991: 51). Groups within the semi-periphery generally aim to empower the state mechanisms in order to transform the structure of the production process and consequently the statute of the state (Wallerstein 1991: 57). According to Arrighi (2010: 343), the organic core of the world economy consists of all states that are located in the top positions of the global hierarchy, i.e., North America, Western Europe and Australia.

**Globalization**

Globalization, in general use, refers to “the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction” and “a shift or transformation in the scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of
power relations across the world’s major regions and continents (Held and McGrew 2003: 4).

In the context of World Systems Theory, in the current world system it is possible to argue that there are three main moments of historical geography: The first moment was the creation of the modern world system between 1450 and 1650 which covered most of the Europe (Except Ottoman and Russian empires) and some parts of America. The second moment was the grand expansion, between 1750 and 1850 through which the Ottoman and Russian empires, some parts of East Asia, Southeastern Asia, West Africa and the rest of Africa was included into the world system. The third moment was between 1850 and 1900 and in this period the whole of East Asia, Africa, Oceania and rest of Southeastern Asia were incorporated into the world system (Wallerstein 2009c: 70). This was the first time that the world economy was totally globalized (Wallerstein 2009c: 70).

However, the term “globalization” started to be used commonly in the 1960s and 1970s and beginning from these years, globalization has been introduced as “a ‘golden age’ of rapidly expanding political and economic interdependence” (Held and McGrew 2003: 4). Over the last four decades, “globalization has become a key word for organizing our thoughts about the how world works. The way globalization moved to such a central position in our thought and in our life is worth evaluation (Harvey 1997: 1). In this paper, I would like to make mention of two notions that are interrelated with each other: globalization as a process and globalism as a political project.

**Globalization as a Process and Globalism as a Project**

Although viewing globalization as if it were a phenomenon that had begun in the 1970s is a trend, transnational commodity chains was prevalent since the very beginning of the
capitalist world system and this system has been global in its character since 1850s (Wallerstein 2009c: 70-71). In the early 1970s, the recession in the world economy and the decline of US hegemony lead to two geo-economic conflicts one of which is among different capital accumulation centers and the other is between the core and the periphery (Wallerstein 2003). Following this recession period, the core tended to increase its profits through moving production into more profitable territories and mostly through speculation and financialization (Wallerstein 2003). This process leads to the emergence of new geopolitics that depends on economic and financial laws (Defay 2009: 66).

Within a historical understanding of global capitalism, the essential element that gives its character is capitalism, not globalism. In order to survive, capitalists have to follow the profit, and the necessity in following the profit also necessitates the expansion of capital (Wood 2003: 131). Moreover, even if the financialization of 1970s was the most sophisticated financialization of all times, this sort of financialization, because of the characteristics of capitalism, has been happening since the fourteenth century (Arrighi 2010: 309).

This globalization process is accompanied by a combination of processes and phenomena. One of the most important of them is, without doubt, the development in technology. In the context of globalization, technological developments are crucial at least for two reasons: Firstly, technological developments lead to a great improvement in communication skills and transportation opportunities. Secondly, through technological developments, new production models, such as post-Fordism, and new economic opportunities have emerged (Kazgan 2002: 21). Since technological developments affected capital expansion, technology is crucial in terms of capital accumulation logic and ensures profit maximization (Şen 2004: 210).
The expanding activities of transnational or multinational corporations are also among the important phenomena that accompany globalization. Transnational corporations or multinational corporations that are in cooperation and in competition with each other are the specialized business organizations that function in the specific lines of production and in distribution across several territories and realm of authority (Arrighi 2010: 74). Although cross-border direct investments of transnational corporations go back to even before the 21st century, through the last globalization wave their structure has changed. Currently, every single production phase and montage of the produced pieces can be in a different country. All of these activities, while being arranged by the control of states, currently, are free from the control of the state (Kazgan 2002:162). Moreover, the expanding activities of transnational or multinational corporations of the US and Western Europe generated efficient organizational links between Third World inputs and First World purchasing power (Arrighi 2010: 332)

Besides, technological developments, improvement of communication skills, and transportation opportunities, financialization and increasing activities of transnational corporations spread of neoliberal policies and norms accompanied by this process. When we focused on financialization, privatization, liberalization etc., this is initiated by the core and in favor of the core. Moreover, the way neoliberalism expands demonstrates how is it the case that globalization is a political project of the core. Impositions of neoliberal policies that are introduced as a natural part of globalization deserve closer evaluation.

Economic stagnation in the 1970s resulted in balance of payments problems in the periphery and peripheral states made an effort to take on international debt. As a result, International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided loans. However, these loans were given in the name of ‘structural adjustments’
through which the Washington Consensus principles were imposed on the periphery (Wallerstein 2007: 57). The main principles of Washington Consensus are fiscal policy discipline, tax reform, market determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment liberalization, privatization, deregulation of financial institutions, legal security for property rights, redirection of public spending (Williamson, 1993, 1332-33).

In the 1980s, privatization was introduced as a recipe peripheral states who were not able to repay their debts (Kazgan 2002: 229). While in the 1980s IMF was empowered to act as if it was the World’s Finance Ministry, in the 1990s UNSC was empowered to act as if it was World’s Police Ministry and during the 1980s and 1990s G7 was act to manage the common issues of world bourgeoisie (Arrighi 2010: 342) Moreover, through the Uruguay Round which resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994, free trade principles, which are determined in favor of the core, were imposed to the periphery. All of these adjustments resulted in crucial gains for the core especially following the demise of Soviet Union (Wallerstein 2007: 57).

The collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War created a “perfect” ideological climate for the globalism project. After the end of Cold War and the regime changes in the former socialist states and the expansion of capitalism across the world, discussions about globalization also intensified. Together with the fast improvement in information technology, these developments were widely interpreted as if the world was evolving to a place where social and economic structures are shared (Held and McGrew: 2003: 3).

It was just after the collapse of Soviet Union when President of US George H. W. Bush announced the new world order:
“A new world order can emerge: A new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the world, east and west, north and south can prosper and live in harmony.” (Bush 1990). This new world order is introduced as: “What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace security, freedom and the rule of law, such a world is worthy of our children’s future.” (Bush 1991: internet).

Francis Fukuyama (1992), in his paper published in the *National Interest* had heralded ‘the end of history’ and the defeat of all other regimes vis-a-vis liberalism. Even if the Gulf Wars warned about the future of the world, everything was ‘cakes and ale’ for the core. While ethnic pressures and conflicts were intensifying in the Balkans, Samuel Huntington published his epoch-making book “Clash of Civilizations” and augured that the 21st century’s characteristics of conflicts would be ethnic and religious. The 1990s period was very bloody in the periphery, especially in Balkans, Africa and Middle East. This was the one side of the new global world.

After the Cold War, democracy, which defends “freedom” pluralism and “respect for diversity”, is positioned against communism, which is rendered as the representative of “totalitarianism”, “enemy of freedom”, “backward” regime and these arguments were propagated both by the core states and supranational organizations, which are mostly controlled by the core states. The invasion of Iraq for the sake of democracy and human rights, colored revolutions in the former socialist territory are the striking examples of these arguments.

At this point, I will focus on the human development reports of United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which
obviously show the polarized structure between the core and the periphery. For instance, in 1993 report, it is stated that because of globalization the “nation-state is too small for the big things, and too big for the small” and that decentralization is needed to the human development (HDR 1993: 4). In the same report, additionally, it is suggested that “security should be reinterpreted as security for people, not security for land. Development must be woven around people, and development cooperation should focus directly on people, not just on nation states” (HDR 1993: 1). Moreover, in a report delivered on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, it is stated that for the sake of human dignity nation states must be decentralized, while at the same time, ironically, new responsibilities that are appropriate with the requirements of the new age are also assigned to nation states. According to this, the mentioned responsibilities can be discharged only if states are democratic and maintenance of the democracy is introduced as a “global responsibility” (HDR 2000: 7-18).

In the report of 2005, the shift in the international conflicts is mentioned. According to this, formerly, international conflicts were in the territories of the great powers; however, they are, currently, in the poor and failed states (HDR 2005: 37). This means that conflicts were once between the core states to control the periphery; now conflicts are within the underdeveloped periphery.

Following World War II, a new international order was established in the ground of sovereignty and non-interference to internal affairs. These principles were regulated in the article two, paragraph seven of UN Charter. The only exception was to be when international peace was under threat and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the authority to decide the conditions that threaten international peace and order. Moreover, the UNSC has the decision-making authority to take every measure including military operations, which are called
humanitarian interventions (UN Charter, Chapter IIIV). However, since humanitarian interventions generate discussions in the context of sovereignty and non-interference, a brand new notion namely “responsibility to protect” is developed and this notion became a UN strategy (UN 2009, internet). According to this, the international community has the responsibility to protect other states’ citizens. Some of the important cases that UN referred responsibility to protect are UNSC Resolution 1973 on imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya (2011), UNSC Resolution 1996 (2011) that is establishing a United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, and UNSC Resolution 2014 (2011) that is warning Yemen due to the violations of human rights.

Probably one of the most outstanding arguments about the relation of globalization and nation states is related with the notion of sovereignty. Here, it will be argued that globalization has distinct effects on the core and periphery, which can be considered in terms of two main aspects: internal and external sovereignty of a nation state.

There are some important concepts, which were commonly introduced or propagated after the 1970s and after the Cold War and which are directly related with the concept sovereignty: failed states, weak states, and rogue states. The core describes the different aspects of the failure in the state craft of “some” states in terms of norms and values adopted by the core. According to this, failed states, such as Sierra Leone, Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Congo are mostly the former colonies of the organic core. The main characteristics of them are loss of control and authority over the territory, internal violent conflict, and high level of human suffering (Andersen, 2005). Since it is important in the scope of this paper, it is appropriate to evaluate the concept of “rogue state” or “axis of evil”. These terms were generated and are mostly used by the US. Especially after the 9/11, the references of US officials to these terms
increased. There are some important conditions to be fulfilled in order to be identified as a rogue state: developing weapons of mass destruction, support for international terrorism, posing a threat to the regional or international security, and standing against international values and norms (Hoyt, 2000: 303). However, interestingly but not surprisingly the rogue was not US herself but Iraq, Iran, and Syria. “Failed state” Afghanistan and “rogue state” Iraq were invaded by US, rogue Iran had been subjected to embargos and sanctions for many years and Syria is currently in a violent war which has a sectarian religious base.

Now, it is appropriate to focus on the relation between sovereignty and globalization. The rise of nation state and the rise of bourgeois-capitalist class was simultaneous (Kazgan 2002: 36). According to Wallerstein, since the sixteenth century, sovereignty has been a concept not related with state itself but related with inter-state system: Internal sovereignty is the claim that sovereign pursues any policy that is seen relevant without according any right of objection. External sovereignty on the other hand, precludes any other state to execute directly or indirectly any kind of authority within the given territory. Moreover, the concept ‘sovereignty’ contains the mutual recognition of these claims in the interstate system (Wallerstein 2009c: 71-72). The establishment of nation state depending on the notion of “citizenship” is one of the most important mainstays of the nation state (Şen 2004: 39).

One of the most important theses related with the effect of globalization on nation states is about the general disempowerment of states vis-a-vis non-territorial, supranational, or transnational forces (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 7). It is possible to argue that this argument is related with the external sovereignty of nation states. The thesis is grounded on the argument that globalization leads to erosion of the fundamental functions of nation states that are gained through Keynesian economy-politics
following the World War II (Şen 2004: 226). In order to understand this thesis, the main functions that are attributed to nation states need to be examined. Functions of the state spread on a wide area: to constitute and to defend the common identity, to maintain and to protect the social order, to make regulations and solve potential problems (Tanilli 2006: 121), to arrange the relations between governor and governed, to defend the territory, and to establish the infrastructure for serving the citizen’s economic, social and cultural improvement (Şen 2004: 31).

After World War II, economic growth was created through state intervention and in the controlled financial markets. Because of the globalization, the economic functions of a standard nation state, such as maintenance of economic growth, supervision of public welfare, prevention of unemployment, determination of foreign trade policies etc. eroded (Kazgan 2002: 221). Together with the erosion in these economic functions of states, economic growth left its place to instability.

One of the arguments that challenge the aforementioned “disempowerment” thesis is about the state’s involvement in the globalization process (Arrighi and Silver 1997: 7). According to this, besides the fact states are the active participants in the process of integration and deregulation of national financial markets, this involvement is guided by the neoliberal doctrines of minimalist state that were propagated by the states themselves, especially by Thatcher’s UK and Reagan’s US (Arrighi and Silver 1997: 7). Then, it is possible to conclude that this process is initiated by the core and in favor of core.

Wallerstein argues that, actually, globalization does not lead to any significant erosion in terms of their functions. Nevertheless, internal and external sovereignty of the states have declined for the first time in the last five hundred years but not because of their functions but because people lost their faith
in the liberal reformism and its leftist reflections (Wallerstein 2009c: 86). For Wallerstein, capitalists need a state system consisting of autonomous states. Profit that permits endless capital accumulation can survive only through monopolies, and monopolies can only be established and maintained by the help of the legal framework of the states. Additionally, the core states are generally able to use mechanisms to transform economic processes in the market through trade prohibitions. Moreover, states are able to manipulate the market through mechanisms that lower the cost for the entrepreneur. Besides all, state taxes are effective ways in transferring surplus from working classes and small businesses to larger capitalists. Lastly, the core states prevent other states’ attempts to create monopoles in favor of their nation (Wallerstein 2009c: 75-77, 87).

In the light of abovementioned arguments, it is possible to argue that while the core states have effective instruments that can be used in favor of capitalists and that the periphery is vulnerable to the interventions of both the core and the transnational actors.

Through the effect of globalization, “national identity” which forms political affiliation, has begun to be underwhelmed. It can be seen as one of the most important characteristics of the global world. Erosion in national identity brings about the increase in sub-identities (Kazgan 2002: 246), which consequently pave the way for identity conflicts. This process is affected by the undermining centrist structure of states and replacement of this structure by the locality. From the end of the 20th century, privatizing and liberalizing structures of global economic trends resulted in erosion both in class identities and in national identities, which consequently lead to construction of identity though ethnic, cultural, religious elements. Thus, meanings attributed previously to state are replaced by micro communities (Şen 2004: 246).
However, when we have a look at the regions that are subjected to ethnic, religious and sectarian conflicts, it is obvious that, these conflicts is seen more commonly in the semi-periphery and periphery rather developed core. Middle East, which is a typical periphery region that supplies energy resources to the core, is an important example in this issue. In the Middle East, being one of the most instable regions of the world, there are bloody conflicts between the Shiites and Sunnis, and between the different sects of Sunnism. Moreover, there are confrontations or sometimes conflicts between Arabs and Persians, Kurds and Turks in the region. There are also separatist movements in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Among these movements, the Kurdish separatism is probably the foremost movement and is influential. Moreover, radical Islamism is increasing gradually both in Middle East and in Africa. The conflict between Hutis and Tutsis in Yemen is another example of the ethnic conflicts in the region.

Global trends and globalism as a project, however, affected, even if it is indirectly, the core and the working classes in the core. Free movement of labor, people, and capital consequently has some negative effects on the core. Firstly, capital mobility starting from 1970s affected labor. In the 1970s, capital tended to migrate to lower income and lower wage countries, such as Brazil, South Africa, South Korea (Arrighi 2007: 128). However, even if this industrial relocation contributed to undermine the advantage of labor in the countries experiencing the greatest outflow of capital, expansion of capital-intensive industries generated new and militant working classes, which have disruptive power (Arrighi 2007: 128-129; Arrighi and Silver 1999: 286).

Secondly, since the globalism project supported the free movement of labor, the result was huge migration: labor migration from poorer countries to wealthier countries has posed
a threat to the workers in the wealthier countries more that it posed in the late nineteenth century (Arrighi 2007: 129). However, in the late twentieth century, it is also true that the capacity of workers in the wealthier countries to compete with these new comers mostly through adherence to racist ideologies and practices is far greater than in the nineteenth century (Arrighi 2007: 129). Increasing neo-fascism, especially in Europe, threatens peace and prosperity.

Thirdly, migration to the core is not just because of the free movement of the labor but also because of the increasing instability of the periphery. Legal or illegal immigrants are every day increasingly trying to escape from their countries, which are subjected to bloody conflicts in their homelands. Syrian immigrants and Afghan immigrants are the most outstanding examples of this tragedy. This sort of migration tends to generate social, cultural, economic problems in the receiving countries. The other negative impact is related to international terrorism, which also affect the core. Addition to rising instability of the periphery, since the erosion of the national identities and replacement of them by ethno-cultural, religious identities is resulted in the increase of illegal violence. Benefiting from the technological opportunities of globalization in the fields of communication and transportation, hundreds of militants are creating special webs among themselves and are organizing bloody terrorist attacks in the core countries in addition to periphery.

Lastly, as global economic crises demonstrate, the highly interdependent global economy is also highly risky in terms of the economic crises. Financial crises, which started in the 2007 in the US, had quickly spread to the Europe and other parts of the interdependent world (Helenier 2011: 69). However, when the growing rates of the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery countries during the crises are evaluated, it is seen that
the core is affected more than especially the East Asian states. This also demonstrates how financial capital dominated economies are fragile in comparison with the production dominated economies like Germany, China, India. That global economic crisis is also important because it also affected the social and political prosperity of the core. The mass movements in Europe and US and the contradictions in the European Union because of the recovery packages may be taken as evidence (Occupy Wallstreet 2016 (viewed); Correl 2011; Mulholland 2012).

**Conclusion**

When the expanding structure of the capitalism is evaluated, it cannot be argued that globalization is a brand-new phenomenon. However, starting from 1970s, some specific economy-politic decisions were made in order to reduce economic problems of the core. In this period, starting from the core, neoliberal policies began to implement. This period is named globalization and is propagated as if it were a natural process. However, neoliberalization is a process which is initiated by the core and in favor of the core. Additionally, these policies have been imposed on the periphery and this process is legitimized by the thesis of the globalizing world, and this is why I prefer to name this neoliberalization process as a globalism project. Globalism project together with the globalization itself, affected the nation states of modern world. In this paper, I focused on the negative effects of the globalization and globalism rather than positive effects if any. Considering the uneven structure in the world system, one can conclude that the direct negative effects of the two, namely globalization as a process and globalization as a project, are much more disruptive in the periphery. And economic, social, and political instability becomes almost a common feature of the periphery. The erosion of national identities and substituting them with
ethno-cultural, religious identities deepened the dependence on the core. And the erosion of internal and external sovereignty can be rendered as negative effects of these two phenomena on the periphery. Problems of labor migration increase in racist trends, political immigration and terrorism and the vulnerability of the finance dominated economies may be evaluated as the negative effects of globalization on the core.

References


Ercan Gündoğan

A Re-evaluation of
Lenin’s and Stalin’s
Nationality Policy and
Self-Determination Right
of Nations and People

Introduction

Among the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and of Yugoslavia later, “national question” featured prominently in addition to economic and political ones (Kalashnikov 2011). The 1990s demonstrated that the “national question” had not been solved but somehow frozen under the communist parties. It was already argued that in the case of the Soviet Union, the nationality policy aimed to “control” and “channel” the likely destructive nationalist politics and to “drain nationality of its content”, to “promote the long term withering away of nationality as a component of social life” (Brubaker 1994).

Some also argued (Khazanov 1993) that the final collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable because of the rising nationalism, “ethnic competition” between the “core” and “periphery”, uneven development of modernization processes, “national mass movements”, “radical anti-communist” attitudes in the Baltic and Caucasian regions. In the period of collapse,

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ethnic language was widely used and all ethnic groups from Nagorno-Karabakh to other regions, had territorial disputes with each other (Khazanov 1993). I can suggest that the causes of final collapse mentioned by Khazanov, save “uneven development of modernization” can also be seen as the direct products of the “collapse” of the socialist system rather than the system itself which collapsed at the end.

Here, I deal with Lenin’s and Stalin’s theory of national question and their instrumentalism, which stems from Marx’s and Engels’s initial conceptualizations of the national liberation movements in their time. The article starts with Marx and Engels and goes towards Lenin and Stalin. Outside of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other “real socialist” countries also at least officially adopted a more or less a Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy. Thus, the article can be read for other socialist experiences as well. It also tries to determine whether the Leninist-Stalinist understanding of the “national question” has theoretical and ideological drawbacks for our day in particular.

**Marx and Engel**

For Marx and Engels (and for Lenin and Stalin), the real dynamic of historical social change is the class struggle. Any other dynamic has a secondary or derivative status, or is sometimes seen as a “question” or “anomaly”, such as the “national question” and “peasant question” (or indirectly “agrarian question”). Marx and Engels approached the “national question” instrumentally for the interests of socialist struggle and revolution. For example, Marx supported the Polish national movement against the reactionary Russian Empire. For the Irish Question he suggested that it should be considered in relation to both likely unity of the Irish and English working classes and the possible English revolution, which could start the world revolution. For colonialism, Marx could think that British control
in India as a progressive, “civilizing” contribution to the Indian economy and society. Marx in this case, indirectly and covertly, saw something positive in British colonization of India (Buecker 2003). Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that Marx as a socialist and dialectical thinker, did not neglect the hindering impacts of British colonialism for the native development of Indian society and economy (Buecker 2003). He saw history, and the development of capitalism, in its negative and positive sides. The former implies to alienation processes, the later to the development of the forces of production and the destruction of old and traditional, outmoded, social relations. Andrew Linklater held that for Marx the spread of capitalism and industry throughout the world destroyed the divisions among nation states and would create “a world capitalist society”, and colonialism also carried capitalism into traditional societies. All these developments prepared the conditions of socialist system all around the world. However, Linklater argued that Marx did not see the important results of “nationalism as he thought that such differences would disappear due to capitalist development (Buecker 2003) also refers to Erica Brenner who argued that Marx’s indifference to the question is related with the “class reductionist” approach. This indifference is also seen in their usage of the concepts. Connor (1989 observed, there is an ambiguity and a “peripheral”, unsystematic interest in Marx and Engels’s writings over the question. They used the concept “nation” synonymously with “country”, “state”, “ruling class of a country” and “society”. Meanwhile, described Marx’s position as not only anti-nationalism, but also an “anti-patriotism” (Löwy 1976).

For her, this approach “places class in the center of analysis and blames class struggles for national conflicts”. Nonetheless, she added that Marx differentiated different forms of nationalism such as “working class patriotism”, “bourgeois nationalism”, “romantic nationalism”, and “separatist and anti-colonial nationalism” (Buecker, “Karl Marx’s Conception of International Relations”, Theories and Methods of International Studies.
Buecker also argues that Marx differentiates “separatist” and “anti-colonial nationalist movements” in terms of their contribution to communism as well as “historical” and “historyless” nations like Czechs and Slovenes, which are thought to be small and weak to survive on their own. Marx saw the unification of Germany and Italy positively since after unification they could get rid of the Tsarist and Hapsburg interventions (Buecker 2003). Connor (1989) argued, for Marx and Engels, the self-determination right was “a slogan”, not “a principle”, used against “the enemies” and a call to “allies”. Therefore, they are “selective” in supporting the Poles and in rejecting the cause of the Czechs. However, as Löwy correctly stated, Marx’s conception of the self-determination right is dialectically connected to “the proletarian internationalism” (Löwy 1976).

**Lenin, Stalin and the Soviet Union**

Connor suggested three stages in Lenin’s approach to the nationalities. His pre-power period promises self-determination rights; when the party came to power, the right is rejected and assimilation and cultural autonomy is accepted; the third stage is to keep the party away from any nationalism. As we shall see, Connor’s first and thirds stages are correct, but not the second stage.

Löwy stated that the conception of the national question formulated by Marx and Engels and then adopted by the Second International culminated in “Lenin’s formulation of a realist revolutionary theory of the right of nations to self-determination”. Not nationalism but a progressive solution to “the national questions” was considered by international communists and Marxists (Löwy 1976). We should remember that “nationalism” as an ideology had already begun to lose its “progressive” and somehow left oriented characteristics towards the last decades of the 19th century (Hobsbawm, 1995, 125-56, 146).
However, in the 19th century and in the early 20th century, many nations and people still struggled for liberation and self-determination rights. These people were concentrated in outmoded monarchical empires of Europe and Asia Minor: Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In parallel to the changing nature of the nationalism and hence, national question, capitalism also acquired imperialist characteristics. Since Marx, Marxists observed that not only the working class, but also many peoples and nations were oppressed. Therefore, these parallel developments required a new strategic and theoretical synthesis between the question and socialist struggle.

It may perhaps seem paradoxical that Lenin propagated the *originally* liberal principle of self-determination right or nations and peoples more or less in the same period with liberal American president Woodrow Wilson. However, for Lenin, the connection among “nations”, “peoples”, and “classes” implied the connection between anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. National liberation movement could be linked to the socialist revolutionary struggle of the workers. Bolshevik’s land policy provided another tactic linkage between the national question, which is here connected with “peasant question” and socialist revolution of the workers.\(^3\) To use space efficiently here, I choose the significant passages from Lenin’s (1993) and Stalin’s (1994) selective writings on the question. They cover the years from 1903 to 1923 for Lenin and from 1912 to late 1940s for Stalin.

*Lenin and Stalin before the revolution*\(^4\)

In several articles written before the revolution (Lenin 1993, 1994), Lenin rejected any coercive measure against the

\(^3\) It should be remembered that Bolsheviks propagated land distribution to the peasants, to their soviets, before the October 1917 Revolution (Lenin, 1992, 46-8; 159-60).

\(^4\) From now on, otherwise expressed, all quotations from Lenin (1993) and Stalin (1994) are my translations from Turkish editions.
use of the self-determination right and opted that for a peaceful coexistence of the nations or their separation from each other to form different states. Further, Lenin did not believe in individual solutions, but rather in collectivity and centralism in the organization of revolutionary struggle. For the case of Russia, he argued that a struggle against autocracy called for unity and “central war organization”. Success of the proletariat of all nations was possible only with “centralism” against autocracy and “the international bourgeoisie which became far more united in time” (Lenin, 1993, 20). The demands of the political war against autocracy can be met only by a real alliance with the Russian proletariat; “a complete political and economic emancipation can be secured only by such an alliance” (Lenin, 1993, 19). His words about the Polish question are valid for all national questions (Lenin, 1993, 19-20).

A “complete democracy” as understood by the working class, is “absolutely required”, without any privilege to any nation or language, and there is no place for the oppression to or injustice for, any national minority. He said, “class-conscious workers” want a “complete unity among the workers of all nations” (1993, 71). Similarly, Stalin said, a national equality in its all forms (language, schools, etc.) “was the necessary base for the solution of national question. Here is the real, not “imagined” guarantee for the minority rights (Stalin 1994: 72). Stalin rejected the organization of the proletarian party through national lines. He said, “the type of national organization is the school of national narrow-mindedness and national tradition” (1994, 74) and added that “the principle of international unity of the workers is the necessary foundation for the solution of national question” (1994, 75).

5 In this article, Lenin observed that “the workers of all world construct their internationalist culture” (1993: 72).
Connor (1989) stated that the official Soviet policy of nationality gained its first formulation with Lenin in 1914 when the “ultimate fusion of nations” was envisioned. Around this year, Lenin seems to have preferred “federalism” for unity, with autonomy to constituents such as Ukraine, and believed in “the voluntary ties rather than coercive ties” (Lenin 1993: 148): “Class-conscious workers do not advocate *secession*. They know the superiority of a unity of great state and large working masses. However, the great states can be democratic if there is a complete equality among national communities, this equality includes the right of secession (Lenin 1993: 136).”

The national question is “only one of the problems of democracy”. He said that “anti-capitalist revolutionary struggles against capitalism” should be combined with a revolutionary program which included all democratic demands such as republic, militia, and election of official personnel by people and equal rights to be granted to women, and self-determination right of nations (Lenin 1993: 198).\(^6\)

After the February 1917 Revolution, in the “Speech on National Question”, Lenin says that they aim at solving the problems left unresolved by the bourgeois revolution. Against secession, they were neutral. There was no problem for them if Poland, Finland and Ukraine seceded from Russia. He asks, why was secession a problem? (1993, 268). If they see that they created a Soviet Republic, they will not secede, but if we have a different republic, they secede from us (Lenin 1993: 270).

Stalin’s seminal article *Marxism and National Question* (Stalin, 1994) was his first systematic formulation of the question and was also referred to and appreciated by Lenin (Stalin

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6 Lenin says, as long as capitalism continues, those demands can be exceptionally realized even in “deformed formed”. Democracy under capitalism cannot fully realize itself (1993, 198).
Theses and definitions here can be seen as the theoretical base of the Marxist-Leninist (and Stalinist) theory of national question in general and the foundation of the Soviet nationality policy in particular. Stalin here defines the nation as “a spiritually established unity which emerges in history and has a stable language, land, economic life and expresses itself in a common culture” (1994: 15).

Stalin also argues that in the conditions where the bourgeoisie rises, national struggle is a struggle between the bourgeois classes. If the proletariat participates in that struggle, national war seems like a “general popular movement”. However, “in its essence”, national struggle is bourgeois and meaningful only for the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the interests of the workers demand a complete development of their comrades’ mental powers (1994: 24). For this reason, “social-democracy of all countries declares the self-determination right of nations” (1994: 25). The solution of national question varies country to country (1994: 31). In Russia it depends on the solution of the land question, that is, the abolishment of feudal ruins, in other words, democratization of the country (1994: 33). Therefore, “complete democratization of the country is the foundation and precondition of the solution of the national question” (Stalin 1994: 69). The only solution, given the drawbacks of national-cultural autonomy thesis, is “regional autonomy”, applicable to Poland, Ukraine and the Caucasus etc. (1994: 70-1). The superiority of this form was based on a population living in a certain land. Moreover, it supports the development of economy, the forces of production, with more efficient use of natural resources. Regions are not homogeneous containing national minorities. However, Stalin says, under a complete democracy, minorities do not need to be concentrated in a certain nation. They do

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7 He adds, despite such full support for this right, there is no necessity to support all habits, demands and institutions of a nation. (1994, 26).
not need such an “artificial unity”, but, need “real rights in the places they are living” (1994: 71).

*Lenin after the Revolution*

After the Revolution, Soviet Congress adopted the “Declaration of the Rights of National-Communities in Russia”, on 15 November 1917. In March 1919, Lenin responded to Nicolai Bukharin’s argument that the self-determination right of a nation meant that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were together, and also meant the self-determination right of the bourgeoisie. Here, Lenin points to the “differentiation of the proletariat” (Lenin 1993: 301-2). Lenin says, this approach ignores difficult and complex ways of “the differentiation of the proletariat within nations” (1993: 303). National self-determination will facilitate the self-determination of the working masses. In a 1919 speech addressing the Eastern communist organizations, Lenin revises the following Marx and Engels’s thesis from the *Communist Manifesto*: “Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.” However, Lenin said, it turned out to be that the world socialist revolution, which was close for all the world, was not limited by the victory of the proletariat of each country over their bourgeoisie. The imperialist world would not allow this. And, all countries were armored against their own Bolsheviks. Socialist revolution would be “the war of all colonies and countries oppressed by imperialism and all dependent nations against internationalist imperialism” (1993: 319). Lenin observed that the “imperialist war” included the Eastern peoples to international

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8 It was signed by the President of the Council of the Commissaries of the People, V. Ulyanov (Lenin) and Peoples Commissar of the National Communities, Jozef Çugaşvili (Stalin)
politics. The Soviet republic had to gather all people of the East and with them to wage a war against “the international imperialism” (1993: 321).

Finally, in his 1920 *First Draft on The Theses on National Question and Colonial Question*, presented as 12 theses to the Comintern, Lenin says that the communist party has to see the difference between the interests of oppressed classes and the general national interest, i.e., interests of the dominant class. The war of 1914-18 demonstrated that a peaceful and equal co-existence of nations under capitalism is “a petty bourgeois nationalist dream”. Federation is a “transitional” form before the complete unity of the working people of different nations. The Comintern (1919-43) has to examine, develop and test new federations following the Soviet example. Federation is also a transitional form prior to “a single world economy”, which is expected to develop further under socialism. Only the soviet system can protect real equality of nations, and further struggle against the petty bourgeois nationalism is needed for the necessary transformation of the proletarian dictatorship as a national dictatorship to “international dictatorship” (1993, 332-8).

**Stalin after Lenin**

In the 1924 conference on “The Principles of Leninism”, Stalin said that, within twenty years, the national question had undergone significant changes. In the past, the self-determination right was the “autonomy rights of nations”. This understanding did not see the question politically and left all “political power” to the hands of the dominant nation, and was satisfied with cultural autonomy and cultural institutions. By doing so, the self-determination right even legitimised the occupations and annexations. Leninism, said Stalin, “extended the concept” by interpreting it as “a complete secession right of the oppressed people of dependent countries and colonies from
the hegemonic state” (1994: 223). In Leninism, it was understood that the “real” equality of nations could be realized with the “direct support of the proletarian parties” to the oppressed nations in anti-imperialist struggle. In the past, the question was considered independently from the “power of capital”, “the overthrow of imperialism” and “the proletarian revolution”. It was thought that the proletarian revolution in Europe was possible without a link to the liberation movement of the colonies, and it was held “indirectly” that the “national question, “colonial question”, could be solved independently from a proletarian revolution and “a revolutionary war against imperialism” (1994: 224). However, he says, now, “the national question is a part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part of the question of the proletarian dictatorship” (1994: 225).

In 1929, Stalin expresses his ideas which contradict the recent two well-known writers of “nationality”, “nation”, “nationalism”, Benedict Anderson (1995) and Eric Hobsbawm (1995), whose famous thesis was that the nation-state comes before the nation and nationality, in other words, nation and nationality were the products of nation-state building process. Stalin in “National Question and Leninism”, exposes an altogether different thesis. He says that not only nations which had a state could be seen as a nation, but that other oppressed nations which did not have an independent state could not be seen as nations. Accordingly, their struggle against oppressor nations and anti-imperialist war of the colonial people could not be seen as national liberation movements or national movements. Upon this, Stalin said, for example, the Irish could not be seen as a nation before the establishment of the Free Ireland or the Norwegians before Norway seceded from Sweden, and similarly, Ukrainians not as a nation when they were a part of the Tsarist Russia, or not so when the Soviet Ukraine united with the other soviet republics within the USSR. The suggestion
is not scientific and not right in terms of theory, practice and politics (1994: 295). He says, the imperialists too do not see the nations without state as “real nations” and this justify national and imperialist oppression (1994: 296).

Stalin says that “the theory of nation of the Russian Marxism is the only correct theory” (1994, 296), according to which there are no nations in pre-capitalist era (1994, 296-7), but “a people kept in divided form” (1994, 297) in that the elements of nation, such as language, had existed “in embryonic form”. The nations which developed with the rise of capitalism can be called “modern” nations (1994, 296) such as French nation, English nation, Italian or North American nations. Similarly, the nations before the October revolution, Russian nation, Ukrainians, Tatars, Armenians, Georgians and others were “bourgeois nations” as such. The “fate of this form of nations is linked to capitalism.” After capitalism, they have to disappear (1994: 298).

Stalin also refers to “new nations”. In Russia, once the revolution overthrew capitalism and after “the liquidation of the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties”, “the soviet nation” emerged and developed “on the ground of the old bourgeois nations.” These sort of nations “should be called as socialist nations.” The socialist nations of the Soviet Union today are completely new (1994, 299-300). Hence, “the liquidation of the bourgeois nations in general does not mean the liquidation of nations”. New nations had no “antagonistic class contradictions which divided the bourgeois nations” and were more united than the bourgeois ones. They also have “far more universal populist characteristics” (1994: 300).

For the future of nations and languages, Stalin says, socialism in one country is different from socialist victory all over

9 These elements are seen by Eric Hobsbawm in the stage or period of “popular proto-nationalism”(1995; 64-101)
the world, and thus “socialism in one country” cannot create the conditions for all nations and national languages to fuse into a whole (1994: 302). Socialism in one country and the world-wide victory of socialism refers to two different periods (1994: 302-3). He also said that he did not believe in single universal language. But, he added, only in the second, a developed stage, with the “establishment of a united socialist world economy”, this period of world dictatorship of the proletariat, and only after the nations understood the superiority of a common language through experience, a common world language which everybody speaks, national differences would disappear (1994: 307).

Until then, he says, socialism did not decrease the numbers of languages, rather, it increased, because it put forward many ignored nations. In the old Tsarist Russia, nobody did know there were at least fifty “nationality” and “ethnic minority”. They came to the surface after the revolution (1994: 303). Hence, socialist victory did not provide the conditions of the fusion of different languages; it created good conditions for previously oppressed nations to develop (1994: 304). Shcherbak likewise (2013) stated that the Soviet Union was not a “melting pot”, but “the incubator” of new nations. A good example he gives is the alphabets the Union introduced for more than 20 ethnic groups.

Stalin referred to Lenin of the “Left-wing Communism” (Lenin 1999), saying that even after the world-wide victory of socialism, the national and political differences among peoples and countries would not disappear for a long time (Stalin 1994: 304). He said, Lenin thought that the fusion of nations and disappearance of national divisions were possible only under the socialist world economy to be created by “the victory of socialism in all countries” (1994: 305).

Stalin said, referring to Lenin, socialism wants to gather nations and integrate them and by reminding old russification
policy of the Tsarist Russia, he added that “an assimilationist” policy could be used only by counter-revolutionaries and had “no place in Marxist-Leninist ideology” (1994: 306). He reminds that the nations and national languages already strictly resisted assimilationist policies (1994: 307). Stalin also says, new nations, socialist nations, are ruled by the “internationalist party of the working masses” (1994: 310). The party is against “anti-Leninist” elements. It “nationalizes economy and state apparatus”, makes them “nation in terms of content” and “trains national cadres”. The “national culture of our soviet nations are socialist cultures in content”. However, Stalin says, in cultural matter, they are not trained well. Therefore, there must be a “cultural revolution”. Without it, they cannot develop economy, agriculture and cannot organize “national security” (1994: 311).

In the period of socialist construction, 1930s, Stalin wrote the deviations on the national question and defined two of them: “Great Russian chauvinism” and “local nationalism” (1994: 313). The former wants to “put aside” all national, local languages and cultures and “prepares the abolishment of national republics and regions”, and rejects “the principle of equality of nations” and also the nationalization of state and economy, and party, schools and media in the name of socialist policy of fusion on the part of nations and languages (1994: 313-4). Stalin reminded that Lenin had never said that the abolishment of national oppressions and national divisions meant the abolishment of national culture, language and national traditions. This meant that the people could not participate in “socialist construction”. This deviation was against “the proletarian dictatorship” (1994: 314) under which “the task of the party was to help non-Great Russian working masses “reach the central

10 He asks how this could be done in a country where there were still peoples without alphabet and in some parts of it, the rate of illiteracy reached to 80% and 90% (1994: 312).
Russia” which put them behind. These people needed to develop their culture and compulsory education and a help to emancipate themselves from “moral slavery of reactionary nations”. Stalin said, Lenin saw that under bourgeois domination, the slogan for national culture was reactionary (1994: 317). It was a culture, which is, “bourgeois in content and national in form”. However, “the aim” is culture, which is “socialist in content, national in form”, “to train the masses for internationalism and consolidate the proletarian dictatorship”. Stalin said, Lenin attacked the “bourgeois content” of culture rather than its “national form”. The USSR adopts this approach. “The backward nations” could “participate in their socialist construction… only with the development of national cultures” (1994: 318).

Stalin also pointed to a “contradiction”, which appears between socialist demand for “a fusion of national cultures” with “a single common language” and “single common culture” in the future and the proliferation of national cultures “under the proletarian dictatorship”. It is not a contradiction, Stalin said. For their final fusion, first they had to develop “to express their all internal power”. This is the Leninist dialectical thinking. The same contradiction could be seen also in “the state”. The Socialists want the final demise of state, but now they construct the most powerful state which had never been seen before, i.e., “the proletarian dictatorship”. Before its final demise, it must develop towards its highest level (1994: 319).

Finally, in his 1936 report on “A Draft of the USSR Constitution”, Stalin claims that the Soviet Union had succeeded in establishing a socialist multinational state. In the union, “the exploiting classes”, which were responsible for conflicts among nations and exploitation that created mutual distrust and provoked nationalist tendencies, were absent, and the working class existed as “an enemy of all kind of slavery” and “the advocate of
internationalist thoughts”. In the union, friendship among people and mutual help were realized (1994: 328).

**A Re-evaluation**

The nationality policy of the Bolsheviks before and after the revolution was to grant self-determination right to all nations of the Russian Empire. The right also included secession right despite its all practical difficulties. Accordingly, at the end, after the dissolution of the socialist systems (in addition to Soviet Union, East Europe and Yugoslavia), all nationalities would reappear, as well as old “national” conflicts. Yet, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, following a sort of Stalinist nationalities policy, did not solve the *bourgeois* “national question”. The Soviet Union, it can be said, perhaps resolved it in terms of national oppression and conflict to a large degree, but, it could not go further to solve bourgeois national question to create a socialist fusion of different peoples and nations.

Leninist and Stalinist nationalities policy were instrumental to start and maintain the revolution in a multination-al imperial historical territory. Herein we see the limits of the

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11 Connor reminds that in the Soviet Union, the principle of self-determination and right to secession of the union republics was theoretically recognized while it was not in Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia (1989).

12 Such as for Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the war between Chechnya and Russia and recently, conflict over Crimea between Russia and Ukraine. Yugoslavia dissolved with various wars, among Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo. And China has always problems with Tibet and East Turkestan or to say Uyghurstan

13 This explains why, as Robinson (2010) stated, the Soviet Union’s dissolution was not violent compared to tragic dissolution of Yugoslavia. For the peaceful dissolution of the Soviets in contrast to Yugoslavia. Brubaker (1994) suggested that in the former, the successor states had already “quasi-nation-state” units and had fixed territories and governmental systems.
instrumentalist conception of the national question. Without *free* and centrally integrated nations around the socialist Russia, the revolution would be opened to capitalist offenses in all kinds and this would clearly mean an early collapse of the socialist revolution. The geopolitics of the Soviet revolution, too, for this reason, led into instrumentalism.

Connor stated that the language policy of the Soviet Union was composed of three subsequent stages: “Pluralist”, “bilingual” and “monolingual”. The last stage was not achieved (1989). Similarly, upon all national identities, a new supranational identity, sovietness, would emerge. (Brubaker: 1994). As Brubaker also observes, in the 1960s and 1970s the regime saw the “Soviet people” not as a Soviet nation, but as a “supranational”, “a new historical community”. However, a contradiction of this policy appears, as Connor (1989) claims, there is a close connection between language, identity and being a people and a nation. As he said, “language is not just a form.” In addition, Lenin’s nationality policy required the territorial divisions of the autonomous units and thus institutionalized “ethnonational divisions”. Moreover, the policy was not always implemented in a standard form. In the Caucasus, the party unified the different republics while in the Central Asia, it established new republics (Connor: 1989).

Shcherbak (2013) argued that the center of the Soviet Union aimed to sustain inter-ethnic peace and to produce a “supra-national” identity while it tried to prevent any secessionist movements. Despite those aims, he argued that the Soviets failed in all their aims. He claims that for the Marxists, the principle of the self-determination right was nothing but a “trick” as after the final global establishment of communism, a classless and “nationless” “communist republics of the workers and peasants” would emerge. It was after 1919s shock of the
Ukrainian peasant revolts, the Bolsheviks realized the political power of nationalism” and tried to “marry communism with nationalism.” Brubaker (1994) argued that the Soviet nationality policy aimed to “control” and “channel” the likely destructive nationality politics and to “drain nationality of its content”, to “promote the long term withering away of nationality as a component of social life.” Therefore, in addition to instrumentalism, we also see that Lenin’s and Stalin’s nationality policy also aims at pacifying nationalist politics and psychology.

We have to ask here whether the notions “self-determination”, “internationalism” and “federation” are suitable for socialist form of society and states. Let us start analyzing each concept and try to see their initial, historical meanings. The “self-determination” as a liberal principle can be seen as the counterpart of individual freedom at the political level for people and nations. The notion was a product of the liberal Enlightenment in Europe and manifested itself at political level with the formation of the United States of America. Although it was adopted and applied to socialist politics with and after Marx, it was meaningful only in the bourgeois democratic stage of socialist revolution. This stage was completed in a period starting at the end of the 1920s when the alliance of workers-peasants was broken through the rapid and intensive industrialization-collectivization programs of 1930s in the Soviet Union. Despite these dramatic changes regarding the construction of the base of socialist system, the only meaningful change under Stalin was the compulsory introduction of Russian in schools and public offices (a part from vernaculars taught and spoken in the republics and autonomous units). The stage of bilingualism was assumed to be followed by the third stage of “fusion” of cultures in a higher unity and with a sort of “uni-lingualism” (Connor: 1989). It should be noted that the meaning of people and nation were still assumed to be the same as before the revolution even
though Stalin differentiated old bourgeois nations and new socialist nations.

Another problem we have to emphasize is that Lenin understood “people” under bourgeois society as the totality of workers and peasants in main and he and Stalin did not identify it with a “nation”. In the socialist system, after the 1930s, the Soviet society was no longer composed of national communities, but peoples, the workers in all kinds, industrial and agricultural workers along with public workers or servants, learning and speaking their own native languages along with Russian. In this sense, “national communities” under socialism, were reduced to national territorial and cultural identities, in other words, only autonomous cultural regions and only individual cultural identities. I can go further by saying, socialism was composed of only workers in all strata and hence, did not have any nation in it theoretically. The legal and political holders of the self-determination right had changed and kept only their local cultures along with and below the socialist Soviet culture. It can be suggested that the liberal democratic principle of self-determination right had to be turned into a socialist principle for socialism. Stalin called “new nations” “socialist nations”. But, he had to say the same for essentially liberal democratic principle of self-determination right.

Federalism, for Lenin and Stalin, was seen as a transitional form of the political organization before the real unity of the Soviet nations. Probably for this reason, Lenin rejected federalism before the revolution of 1917 (Yazkova: 2008). The fact that USSR was a huge federation that was composed of federations, was one of the direct results of the long civil war, which erupted after the revolution. Federalism turned out be the only realist solution given that the revolution needed the supports of the “free” nations and people outside the Russian core, hence their self-determination right, as well as new revolutionary
governments in the old imperial territory, leaving aside revolutionary prospect in Europe. Therefore, federation just meant the continuation of the old imperial political geography under socialism. For this reason, it should have been seen that “federation” was not only transitional before the socialist union or fusion, but a form of state organization moving between a confederation and a unitary system. What is implied here is open to political creativity. For example, the Soviet Union could have established con-federal relations with the territories that had already “bourgeois nations” and a unitary one with “new nations” or “socialist nations” to use Stalin concepts above.

Another substantial problem is the concept of “international”, which is still one of the unique characteristics of the Marxist socialism. Internationalism is also a phenomenon that developed after capitalism began to spread to the other parts of the world in the 16th century. It is also a principle and a characteristic of capitalist development from its beginning. Meanwhile, even Stalin’s “socialism in one country” model of socialist construction does not contradict “internationalism”. Socialism had already been an international movement since the 19th century. The movement, also, under the leadership of the Soviets, became an international system and a block opposing capitalism. But, what is significant here is that the term “international” obviously assumes an existence of “nations”. The objective phenomena we have faced since 1960s is a tension between “international” and “global” processes, which was unknown by Marx, Lenin and Stalin.

“Inter-nationalism”, in Marxist socialism context, is based on the idea that can be traced back to the Communist Manifesto. Therein, the last words are the famous call: “Working Men of All Countries Unite!”14 (Marx and Engels, Manifesto of

14 Here, note that the Manifesto says “countries”, not “nations” or “states”.
In this article, we saw how Lenin revised the slogan for his own revolutionary program. Socialist victory in each national context was assumed to be integrated to a higher internationalist victory. However, even this internationalism assumed the priority of the isolated national struggles over and before the general struggle of the workers. Surely, the meaning of “international” also refers to the rejection of pure national interests of the working-class movements. It is correct, but, this definition implies a pure “ethical” problem as none of the nationally organized working classes can be expected to ignore their own nationally based class interests unilaterally. For the working class, it can be suggested, ethical problems can be reduced to the ideological context and the calculation of the class interests for different terms. In the “international” paradigm, which is based on the “national” paradigm, there is no necessity for a collective “global” struggle.

Lenin and Stalin recognized differences and tried to create a unity as well. However, at this point, we have to take into account unequal development inherited into the new society. It is inevitable that historical and geographical differences are maintained in same or different forms and contexts. The only solution to close the gaps caused by inequality of the past is to adopt Lenin’s notion of “the consciousness from without” (Lenin, 1998) in material sense as well. The criticisms on alleged Russification of other nations under the Soviets or on even so-called colonization of people and peasants, during the collectivization period of 1930s (Gouldner, 1978) ignore the legacy of the past and “unequal” “historical-geographical development” (to use Marxist geographer David Harvey’s terms, and also for his “spatial” contribution to socialist theory, briefly see Gündoğan, 2014, 240). One of the main tasks of socialism is the elimination of the dynamics of uneven “historical-geographical” developments. Ironically even a socialist country obviously adopted
economic and administrative policies as if it wants to increase inequalities of the past and to provoke uneven development further.\textsuperscript{15}

References


\textsuperscript{15} In Yugoslavia, self-management and market socialism exaggerated the already existed national competition and differences at the expense of unity (Gündoğan, 2009). There were already economic imbalances or income gap between the two countries, Croatia and Slovenia, and the rest of the federation. Political results of this inequality would be seen immediately during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Croats and Slovenes as the most developed parts saw the less developed republics in the federation as economic burden over themselves (Gündoğan, 2009, 61-3). These policies are one of the most significant causes behind the national conflicts and nationalism which would come to the surface after 1990s. Similarly, Guzina (2000) stated that with the 1974 Constitution, the self-management policy decentralized the system further and led to nationally oriented decisions for capital investments and employment. Ironically, Tito’s balancing policy (for Croatia and Serbia Guzina means) created adverse results on the direction of further imbalance between the two republics.


The present, flagging campaign of globalism is not a new phenomenon. Humanity has been subjected to varieties of globalisms since ancient times. The most recent before our current one is identical in form. I refer to the 100 years prior to World War I which “saw the emergence of new international political bodies, the rise of a human rights framework, and attempts to construct a self-regulating global market” (Orum and Dale 2009: 90). Karl Polanyi’s description of it fits our own period of globalism:

That system developed in leaps and bounds; it engulfed space and time, and by creating bank money it produced a dynamic hitherto unknown. By the time it reached its maximum extent, around 1914, every part of the globe, all its inhabitants and yet unborn generations, physical persons as well as huge fictitious bodies called corporations, were comprised in it. A new way of life spread over the planet with a claim to universality unparalleled since the age when Christianity started out on its career, only this time the movement was on a purely material level (Polanyi 1944: 130).

That proud globalism collapsed into world wars, fascism and desolation. In defense of the globalism that resulted in
such devastation, A.J. Toynbee wrote in 1931 that “the local national state, invested with the attributes of sovereignty — is an abomination … Our political task in our generation is to cast the abomination out, to cleanse the temple and to restore the worship of the divinity to whom the temple rightfully belongs” (Toynbee 1931).

A decade later, Professor Toynbee found himself working at the British Foreign Office in order to save his “local national state” and his own life from the Nazi attack known as “the Battle of Britain.” His 1931 comments may nonetheless warrant consideration when we see so many wars seemingly driven with nationalist enthusiasm and xenophobia. Surely, cosmopolitan globalism appeals to many with its fashions, smart phones, and anywhere air travel and vacation. Here I consider whether Toynbee is right that the “local national state [is] an abomination,” or whether the last century or so has rather shown that globalism has itself earned that epithet with the austerity, wars, genocides and famines that it produces sometimes openly, sometimes concealed under its cosmopolitan veneer.²

To begin to address those questions, I cast you back in time to ancient Greece where the ideas of the nation state and of democracy were born. Whatever temple Toynbee had in mind should have existed there. There was, however, no temple of peace or of globalism on the Acropolis. The only relevant temple there is the one dedicated to “Athena Nike,” in English, “Athena Victor,” the deity after whom Athens is named, but in her capacity as leader of Athenian military power. The temple sits atop the Acropolis in Athens in commemoration of Athens’ defeat of invading Persian ‘globalism’ in 480 B.C. (cf. Image 1). Xerxes’ words to his commanders before the invasion outline the threat Athens, and all of Europe, faced:

I will bridge the Hellespont and drive my army through Europe to Greece, that I may punish the Athenians for what they have done to the Persians and to my father [in repelling Darius’ invasion of Greece—RG]… If we subdue them, and their neighbors who live in the land of the son of Pelops, the Phrygian, we shall extend the Persian territory as far as the limit of Zeus’ sky. For the sun will look down upon no land beyond our borders; for I will pass through Europe from one end to the other, and with your aid make of all the lands which it contains one country…then there will be no city of men nor nation among mankind left that shall be able to come to battle against us, once these people [the Athenians] are destroyed. So those who are innocent in our sight and those who are guilty will alike bear the yoke of slavery (from Herodotus 1987: 7.8 rev.).

**Image 1:** Temple of Athena Nike, Acropolis, Athens. Credit: Acropolis Museum.

Had the Athenians not defeated this second Persian invasion, European history would have taken a difficult turn.
In producing their victory, the Athenians demonstrated something important to understand about purposeful nationalism: They went so far as to abandon their territory, their earth, the very land on which their nation state persisted. They took to the ships of the Athenian Navy. From this seemingly weak position, the Athenians mounted a counterattack on the invading Persian force (cf. Herodotus 1987: 7.140-144, 8.40-41, 56-64). Their behaviour shows that national identity is not necessarily based on a piece of territory, refuting the notion that “blood and soil” are the bases for nationhood. Indeed, the Athenians threatened their difficult allies that if they fled battle with “the barbarian” at Salamis “we will straightaway gather all our households (οἰκετάς) and take them away to Siris in Italy,” which the Athenians were prophesized to colonize (Herodotus 1987: 8, 62).

The Athenians triumphed. After the Persians devastated Athens and its territory, they engaged the Greeks at sea. The Persian defeat in the Battle of Salamis is famous for the Athenian-led Greek naval task force which sank every Persian-allied vessel. The rout of the Persians and their allies out of Europe followed, with the loss of most of Persia’s five million-man army (cf. Herodotus 1987: 8.101-103, 9.16-88). These events puzzle us: How could the Athenian people maintain their national identity without their land, and with their homes, their farms, through which their nation reposed destroyed? What was it that the Athenians were fighting for, if it wasn’t their land?

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3 References to ancient texts follow the format (Author Year: Book number. Section number and/or Page number). References to modern texts follow the format (Author Year: Page number). The format for ancient texts enables readers with different editions or translations of works of Aristotle, Herodotus, etc. to follow the citations with their own text. Page numbers used for Aristotle are the traditional Bekker page numbers, and for Plato, the Stephanus page numbers, which are both used in competent contemporary translations.
εὖ ζῆν

In the *Politics* Aristotle answers the question by saying that the purpose of a state is to enable its citizens to experience εὖ ζῆν (cf. Aristotle 1957: i.2.1252b28). εὖ ζῆν means “living well,” or “the good life.” It names the Athenian way of life during the Classical period. Polanyi, quoting Aristotle’s Greek, says “the good life (*eu zên*)” is “the ways in which men seek a life over and above the elementary requirements of animal life (*zen*)” (cf. Polanyi 1959: 3). That accords with Aristotle’s account, for he says that there cannot be a city-state of animals since animals cannot experience the good life (cf. Aristotle 1957: i.2.1252b28-9, iii.9.1280a31-2, b39). Polanyi describes εὖ ζῆν as experienced by Athenians in the Classical Age to include: “the elation of day-long theater, the mass jury service, the holding in turn of [government] offices, [political] canvassing, electioneering, great festivals, even the thrill of battle and naval combat” (Polanyi 1957: 98).

εὖ ζῆν means experiencing a life of culture and participation in the affairs of one’s city-state, which Aristotle defined as “a community for households and families to live well (εὖ ζῆν) together” (Aristotle 1957: iii.9.1280b33). If the purpose of a city-state were not to enable its citizens to experience the good life, Aristotle argues, then there could be a city-state of animals, when in fact there is not, because animals share neither in happiness, nor in a life guided by deliberative choice” (Aristotle 1998: iii.9.1280a31-2). εὖ ζῆν defined Athenian identity. Pericles in his famous funeral speech, motivates his people to fight the Spartans, in defense of unique Athenian εὖ ζῆν (cf. Thucydides 1954: 2.33-46). In ancient Athens, all citizens participate in jury service, hold government offices in rotation, and stream to the

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4 Aristotle used two phases to name the good life, εὖ ζῆν, which literally means “to live well,” and ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν, which literally means “the good life” (Aristotle 1957: i.8.1256b31-2).
theatre to witness the tragedies presented at the festival of the Great Dionysia. Those of military age defend the city-state. The great playwrights Aeschylus and Sophocles and the philosopher Socrates were all soldiers: Aeschylus fought in the Persian wars, and Sophocles was elected to be a general due to the acclaim he received for his play Antigone. Socrates fought in the Peloponnesian Wars and on one occasion saved the life of his commanding officer. Those poets and that philosopher all fought, as did those at the Battle of Salamis, to preserve their way of life, their unique Athenian εὖ ζῆν.

The Normativity of εὖ ζῆν

Polanyi proposes that the Aristotelian concept of εὖ ζῆν serve as a “normative principle” for societies (Polanyi 1959: 2.),⁵ that is, he suggests that we rate or judge societies by whether, and how well, they support the good life for their citizens. “A concept is normative when it provides a benchmark against which to assess actions, events, or states of affairs,” explains Frega. “Its basic intuition is that a normative concept provides a standard against which a portion of reality can be assessed” (Frega 2017: 2). If the compared portion of reality complies with the norm, it is said to be “norm compliant.” Below we discuss what Polanyi means when he proposes the concept εὖ ζῆν as a “normative principle.” We then apply εὖ ζῆν as a standard to assess contemporary states.⁶

Polanyi explains that Aristotle “reached the conclusion, that the broader concept of the good life is the key to the solution” of the problem of political economy (Polanyi 1959: 5).⁷ In other words, for Aristotle, according to Polanyi, the ‘dos and

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⁵ The essay is a review of Galbraith (1958).
⁶ Acknowledging that εὖ ζῆν is not a benchmark in contemporary political thought.
⁷ emphasis in original.
The don’ts’ of political economy are drawn up in reference to policies that make the good life easier or more difficult to experience. For Polanyi, the key policy of the Athenian city state that sustained εὖ ζῆν for its people is redistribution, so that all, including the less-advantaged, may enjoy the good life (cf. Polanyi, 1957 and 2014b). Note that I am not endorsing Polanyi’s account of redistribution in Athens. Rather, I am using it only to understand what he means by εὖ ζῆν as a normative principle and what states can and should do to support εὖ ζῆν for their citizens. I leave judgment of the accuracy of Polanyi’s account to historians, though much of what he says has been independently corroborated (cf., e.g., Pritchard 2015).

Polanyi’s overall conception is that community creates the good life:

Aristotle’s concept of society...is that of a community which creates the good life, that is, which satisfies not only the requirements of bare animal life but more than that. Community (koinonia) and good life (eu zen) are then the pillars of the theorem. Koinonia – on whatever level we meet it – is the essence of the human group in its positive aspects. It is maintained by a kind of good will (philia) obtaining between the members. Every Koinonia has its philia. It is expressed in reciprocating, that is, doing things “in turn,” sharing the necessaries as well as carrying the burdens mutually (Polanyi 1959: 3).

The key concept here, embellishing that of community, is “sharing,” or in Greek metadosis, translated literally as “giving of a share” (cf. Aristotle 1924:v.5.1133a2-4; Gallagher 2012, 2014). Through this, the community achieves reciprocity (to antipeponthos) (Aristotle 1957: ii.2.1261a30-1), i.e., each citizen cooperates in meeting the needs of each other citizen (cf. Gallagher 2012), for reciprocity is necessary to preserve city-states (Aristotle 1957: ii.2.1261a22-31). Obviously, sharing mutually
calls for some redistribution of the wealth of the *polis* among the citizens. Polanyi explains that redistribution involves the return of all, or of a substantial amount, of the social product to a center, from which it is distributed (cf. Polanyi 1944: 47-53). In the case of Athens, Polanyi explains:

[R]eciprocity and redistribution were the forms of integration that originally dominated the economic life of Attica... the redistributive forms of tribal life did not disappear...The *polis* took over much of the redistributive inheritance of the tribe. The distribution of land (*klēroi*), of booty, of a lucky strike in the Laurion mines—similarly, of the gold mined on the isle of Syphnos; the claim to maintenance or to corn distribution in an emergency; the claim to participation in public displays or to payment for the performance of citizens’ duties—all this is a very real tribute to the strength of the redistributive factor in classical communities. The basic economic organization of the *polis* was redistribution of the proceeds of common activity, share in booty and tribute, share in conquered land and in colonial ventures, in the advantages to be gained from third-party trade (Polanyi 2014b: 157-8).

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8 Attica is the peninsula which ancient Athens dominated and where it was situated.

9 The population of ancient Athens was originally divided into four large kinship groups known as tribes (Howatson 1989: 579).

10 Cartwright 2013: “War booty, although not always the primary motive for conflict, was certainly a much-needed benefit for the victor which allowed him to pay his troops and justify the expense of the military campaign. Booty could come in the form of territory, money, precious materials, weapons, and armour. The losers, if not executed, could expect to be sold into slavery, the normal fate for the women and children of the losing side.”

11 Howatson 1989: 366 tells us: “The silver mines of Laurium ...were the source of great wealth to fifth-century Athens.” Cf. also Thucydides 1954: ii.55, vi, 91.
In other words, according to Polanyi’s account, an Athenian could sustain his household to a large degree as the recipient of a variety of distributions, whether that of land,\(^\text{12}\) or of payments for serving in offices or for involvement in festivals,\(^\text{13}\) or of episodic distributions of booty, of precious metals, or emergency distributions of corn.\(^\text{14}\) The Athenian was not left to his own resources to care for his household. That is the distinguishing mark of redistribution, and it highlights the way that redistribution supports εὖ ζῆν, namely, the citizen is not on his own to support his household, as s/he is today, but can rely on support from the city-state. That enables the citizen to involve himself in the affairs of the polis, in political deliberation, in cultural exhibitions and festivals, and in its defense. As Polanyi says, “community creates the good life.”

The highpoint in Athenian policies of redistribution occurred during the Penteconteitia, the interval of 45 years between the defeat of Persia and the onset of the Peloponnesian Wars.\(^\text{15}\) Aristotle describes those distribution policies in *The Constitution of Athens*:

12 Aristotle speaks of distribution of klēroi in Attica to citizens (cf. Aristotle 1957: ii.6.1265b3-4), but often allotments were in recently conquered foreign territory, e.g., Lesbos, where the new Athenian owners would continue to live in Athens, but retain the former owners as tenant farmers (cf. Liddell and Scott 1897: 814 comment on klērouxia; Thucydides 1954: iii.50; cf. Herodotus 1987: vi.100 on the case of Chalcis; Plutarch 1916: 34).

13 Pritchard 2015: 52ff says that “In the 450s the Athenians voted to introduce misthos (“pay”) for jurors. In the 440s or the 430s they began to pay councilors and magistrates. By the 390s the dēmos were drawing pay to attend assembly meetings.” On pay for assembly attendance, cf. Aristophanes 1967: l. 378-9. On payment for jurors cf. Plato 1997a: 515e, Aristotle 1998: 1294a37. Pay was raised from 2 to 3 obols by Cleon early in the Peloponnesian war.

14 Cf. F. A. Paley 1921.

Aristides... seeing the state growing in confidence and much wealth accumulated, advised the people to lay hold of the leadership of the [Delian] league, and to quit the country districts and settle in the city. He pointed out to them that there would be sustenance (trophē) for all there, some by service in the army, others in the garrisons, others by taking a part in public affairs...This advice was taken... They secured an ample sustenance (trophē) for the mass of the population (hoi polloi) in the way which Aristides had pointed out to them. Out of the proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the contributions of the allies more than twenty thousand persons were maintained (trephesthai). There were 6,000 jurymen, 1,600 bowmen, 1,200 Knights, 500 members of the Council, 500 guards of the dockyards, besides fifty guards in the Acropolis. There were some 700 magistrates at home, and some 700 abroad [Sum = 5250]. Further, when they subsequently went to war, there were in addition 2,500 heavy-armed troops, twenty guard-ships, and other ships which collected the tributes, with crews amounting to 2,000 men, selected by lot [4500]; and besides these there were the persons maintained at the Prytaneum, and orphans, and gaolers, since all these were supported by the state. Through these measures sustenance (trophē) was provided for the people (demos) (Aristotle 1984a: 24-25).18

With the use of such phrases as hoi polloi and dēmos Aristotle tells us that the common people were the ones who received these distributions, not the wealthy. “Through these

16 Athenian statesman, a general at the battle of Marathon, held a command at Salamis, and led Athenian forces at Platea; apportioned tribute among members of the Delian League (Howatson 1989: 54).
17 The League was the alliance formed to prosecute the war against Persia (Howatson 1989: 173).
18 Translation revised. Greek text in Aristotle (1920).
measures sustenance (*trophē*) was provided for the people (*demos*),” Aristotle concludes.\(^{19}\) With this passage, he grounds his policy for support of citizens in the ideal state which he describes in the *Politics*, where he says “No citizen should be at a loss for sustenance” (*trophē*) (Aristotle 1957: vii.10.1330a2). By “twenty thousand persons” Aristotle means 20,000 heads of households.\(^{20}\) In 431 B.C. at the height of Athenian population before the Peloponnesian Wars, there were in Athens 25,000 men of hoplite rank or above, and 18,000 labourers (Cary 1933: 224-5). Thus if 20,000 “were maintained”, as Aristotle says, that would constitute roughly half the households of Athenian citizens. Aristotle’s account confirms Polanyi’s claim that *redistribution was a central feature of Athenian social life that supported εὖ ζῆν*. For the distributions enabled the people to involve themselves closely in the cultural and political affairs of Athens, which they would not have been able to do, had they to work a farm or craft. Subsequently, Pericles, in his famous funeral speech, could claim with some justification that poverty in classical Athens was no barrier to political participation (cf. Thucydides 1954: 2.37). The aim here is not to make an historical argument for how distribution occurred in ancient Athens, but rather to understand what Polanyi means when he proposes εὖ ζῆν as a normative principle.

In conclusion, I summarize the various distributive policies that Aristotle and Polanyi list as actually having occurred

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19 We might object that the Athenians lived off of tribute paid by the allies whom they had freed from Persian domination, but Pritchard shows that the Athenians supported their democracy and grand festivals from internal funds, and only used the tribute for alliance and military expenditures (2015).

20 For, if we add up Aristotle’s figures, the number of those directly employed through the few measures that Aristotle lists was over 9750 men. The 20,000 includes those 9750 plus others similarly employed.
in fact, and by which the city-state (polis) particularly assisted the poor so that they could participate in its political life:

1) Those who served on juries, or served in various government offices such as magistrates, or served in the military, or garrisons, were paid for it. Since all public offices rotated by lot through the citizen body, this assisted the poor. Moreover, in this way, the city provided work for the poor.

2) The city provided public assistance to invalids, orphans and indigents.

3) Emergency distributions of grain.

4) Distribution of land.

Moreover, such policies seem part of Aristotle’s own conception of εὖ ζῆν, for Aristotle incorporated such measures of redistribution into his outline of an ideal state in the Politics, so that all could share in the good life (cf. Aristotle 1957: 1252b28). Accordingly, in the Politics and in his ethical writings, Aristotle makes a variety of concrete proposals. Among those are:

1) that the poor be exempt from providing for the common meals that he recommends be established (cf. Aristotle 1998: vii.10.1330a1-8),

2) that the state provide block grants to the poor for the establishment of homesteads or for starting a trade or farm (cf. Aristotle 1998: vi.5.1320a35-b2, 7-9), and

3) that the wealthy pay for the attendance of the poor at obligatory meetings of the assembly (cf. Aristotle 1998: vi.5.1320b2-4).

4) Perhaps his most radical proposal, however, is that the well-off accept terms of exchange that benefit the needy (cf. Aristotle 1991: 1242b15-21, Gallagher 2012).
All in all, the policies of the Athenian city-state and those proposed by Aristotle illuminate what Polanyi means when he proposes εὖ ζῆν as a normative principle, for the purpose of a state is to enable its citizens to experience εὖ ζῆν (cf. Aristotle 1957: i.2.1252b28). In conclusion:

*For a state to be compliant with the good life (εὖ ζῆν) as a normative principle, it must enact policies of redistribution sufficient to enable all citizens to involve themselves in the cultural and political activities of their nation.*

States that sustain εὖ ζῆν support their citizens’ abilities to participate in political and cultural life with a variety of distributional measures. In this way, they fulfill the purpose of a state and meet the normative requirements of statecraft. States that enact such policies sustain εὖ ζῆν and are *norm compliant*, states that do not, are not.

We promote the ability of each and all to experience the good life, not out of fairness but rather for the stability of the polis, for citizens who are able to experience the highest level of culture that their community offers, are thereby bound more closely to the community, and remain willing to defend it from aggressors. Therefore, the Athenians manning the ships at Salamis (most of them poor) fought to preserve this good life, this liberty, of social cooperation and political participation.

The Greek social policy of εὖ ζῆν is not restricted to small states, such as the Athenian city-state. In the United States and in the Soviet Union, there have been periods of state policies of redistribution that supported the life of working people, not only materially but also culturally through the New Deal, the state support of culture in the Public Works of Art Project (PWAP), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Department of the Treasury Section of Painting & Sculpture, the Works Progress Administration’s Federal One, and
other programs. An example of Soviet sponsorship of culture for working people are the ballet classes *en pointe* that it organized for children on collective farms (cf. Image 2). New Deal support for the arts continued until Watergate, after which it was shut down under the new era of the free market.

![Image 2: Ballet class in World War II Soviet Union. Notice the pointe shoes. Credit: TASS.](image)

Clearly, εὖ ζῆν can serve as a “benchmark against which to assess actions, events, or states of affairs” (Frega 2017: 2). We can evaluate any governmental policy in terms of whether it does or does not sustain εὖ ζῆν. For example, a decision to reduce Social Security benefit payments to retirees is contrary to sustaining εὖ ζῆν and is not norm compliant. Furthermore, the decision by U.S. banks to foreclose on homes after the financial crisis that they caused, made it difficult or impossible for home owners to pay on their mortgages, that decision was not norm compliant.
Friend-Foe Antithesis

εὖ ζῆν defines a friend-foe antithesis: States promoting and sustaining εὖ ζῆν are friends, states that do not, are their foes. As the social and cultural opposite of Greece, the Persian Empire took many measures to repress their denizens, and prevent them from associating with each other whether at common meals, or in political clubs, or at schools and other gatherings connected with learning (cf. Aristotle 1998: v.11.1313a38-b10.). The king employed spies against his own people. But when the Persian Empire came to attack tiny Greece twice in the 5th cent., the Greeks’ superior culture triumphed each time. Aristotle explains that the Persian ruler had oppressed his people so that they lack spirit (cf. Aristotle 1998: vii.7). They had no identity from which to fight.

The case of Persia and Greece exemplifies how εὖ ζῆν as a normative principle separates states into those that are norm compliant and those that are not, for Athens by enabling their citizens to engage in political debate and action and enjoy classical culture is clearly norm compliant. While Persia in deliberately acting to prevent their subjects from engaging in any kind of political collaboration is obviously not norm compliant. Let us apply the principle now to contemporary states. I choose the U.S. and Ukraine. In the U.S., since especially the Reagan administration, there has occurred a shift away from sharing and redistribution. Taxes on the wealthy have been cut from 70% in 1980 to 30% in 1990 (cf. Figure 1). The U.S. federal government has dismantled many of the redistribution programs of President Roosevelt, has deregulated all forms of investment and economic activity, and has allowed firms to relocate manufacturing facilities overseas and lay off American workers, without

21 Schmitt 2007 has written about the concept friend-foe, but I do not accept his interpretation. Cf. sections 2, 3, 6.
any federal government penalty, even when they import into the U.S. goods they have produced elsewhere with cheap labour.

The Reagan administration presided over the shutdown of most of U.S. basic industry, as more and more U.S. manufacturing jobs were sent overseas, eliminating sources of well-paying employment for many in the lower two quintiles. At the same time, the U.S. has eliminated or cut back cultural programs. The result of these policies is that the U.S. exhibits the highest rate of income inequality in the world. The ratio of the income share of the lowest quintile of the U.S. population to that of the highest quintile ($) has fallen from 9.8% in 1974 to 6% as of 2013 (cf. Gallagher 2018). The descending curve in Figure 2 shows the nose-dive in the personal incomes of the lower, or poorer 20% percent of the U.S. population in ratio to the richest 20%.

**Figures 2.** Descending graph show ratio of income share of lowest quintile to highest in percentages ($). Ascending show GDP per capita in constant 2005 dollars (World Bank data). Sources for quintile data: U.S. Census Bureau. First appeared in Gallagher 2018. Copyright © Robert Gallagher 2018
The crash begins in 1976 after Watergate, in the Gerald Ford administration, and was sustained by the Reagan and subsequent administrations. The U.S. deploys police violence against anyone who protests against this turn in policy and its draconian effects on the common people. Notable is the famous case of a decorated Iraqi war veteran who was shot by police and hospitalized in critical condition for participating in an Occupy Oakland demonstration (Daily Mail 2011). It would appear that the U.S. is not norm compliant in regards to εὖ ζῆν. In fact, it seems to have become an enemy of εὖ ζῆν.

Contrast that attack on working class living standards, with the status quo in Eastern Europe in the mid-1980s. Table 1 shows that what Reagan called “the evil empire” of the Soviet Union wasn’t so bad for working people after all.

**Table 1:** Redistribution as Degree of Income Equality, mid-1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>( \frac{Q_5}{Q_1} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: \( \frac{Q_5}{Q_1} \) = ratio of income share of lowest quintile of population to that of highest, percentages. Sources: for \( \frac{Q_5}{Q_1} \) data is from World Bank, 2010, and U.S. Census Bureau, 2011. Copyright © Robert Gallagher 2018.

The degree of income equality (\( \) ) in Eastern Europe was three to four times greater than in the U.S. After the collapse of the Soviet system, the degree of income equality in Eastern Europe also collapsed (e.g., to 8% in Russia, 13% in Ukraine—still higher
than the U.S.) and most countries have remained close to the low levels reached in 1995, except Ukraine. By contrast, Ukraine recovered by 1999 to 23% and by 2011 had climbed to over 29.3%, close to its value of 31% in 1988 (cf. Figure 3). This improvement in the degree of income equality in Ukraine bespeaks policies of redistribution, such as support for pensions, government services, and other policies. This data indicates that Ukraine, from 1995 to 2013 has been compliant to the norm εὖ ζῆν.

Figure 3. Ratio of income share of lowest quintile of population to that of highest (). Figures on abscissa in percentages. Source for raw data: World Bank. First appeared in Gallagher 2018. Copyright © Robert Gallagher 2018.

This contrast between the U.S. and Ukraine shows that the two countries are socio-economic enemies, for the U.S. has been hostile to εὖ ζῆν, while Ukraine has been supportive of εὖ ζῆν, at least up to 2013.22 In early 2014, however, a pro-Western

22 Beyond the specific case of Ukraine, Europeans overall enjoy εὖ ζῆν more than Americans, for European countries practice redistribution of national wealth. The tax rates on the wealthy—in France and Germany
government came to power in Kiev; in response, a portion of eastern Ukraine based in Donetsk and Lugansk sought autonomy. The two Ukraines have been at war since mid-2014. Shortly after taking office, the new Kiev government accepted conditions set by the International Monetary Fund, policies of severe 45 to 48%—are significantly higher than those in the U.S. (cf. Figure 1). As a result the lower classes are better off (see Table 2):

**Table 2: Redistribution as Degree of Income Equality, U.S. & Europe, 2010/2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\frac{Q_5}{Q_1}$ (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.A.</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: $\frac{Q_5}{Q_1}$ = ratio of income share of lowest quintile of population to that of highest, percentages. Sources: for $\frac{Q_5}{Q_1}$ data is from World Bank, 2010, and U.S. Census Bureau, 2011. Copyright © Robert Gallagher 2018.

The value of the degree of income equality in France, Germany, Ukraine and Serbia was more than three times the U.S. in 2010, and in the UK, Italy, Greece and Spain, it was more than twice the U.S. value. So, redistribution is practiced in those countries with the result that there is more support for εὖ ζῆν. Compared to the U.S. they are norm compliant. This is an irritant to U.S. globalists, for these redistribution policies in Europe block the formation of an international free labour market and therefore undermine the global free market that globalists wish to dominate the world economy. In other words, the U.S. and Europe today, and since at least 1981, represent contrary cultural and socio-economic principles, such that they are cultural and socio-economic foes. This situation could lead to conflict.
austerity against many forms of redistribution established by previous Ukrainian governments.

The austerity measures include a five-fold increase in the price of natural gas introduced in steps from 2014 to 2017, and a shift to a flexible exchange rate for the hryvnia (Economist 2015). The value of the hryvnia fell 33% in one week in February 2015 (Economist 2015). The pre-Maidan government had kept the price of gas at about 25% of the cost of supplying it (Economist 2015). Letting the hryvnia float is producing price inflation, as merchants attempt to recoup losses due to a falling domestic currency. Post-Maidan inflation is reported to run at 30% in 2015 (Economist 2015). Other cuts include a 10 percent reduction in pensions for former government employees, and decreased benefits for families with newborns (Luhn 2014a). At the same time, the Kiev government is imposing a policy of de-regulation, i.e. a free market, privatization of state industries, layoffs of 10% of all public employees, and other measures.

The Economist headlines that the IMF “bail-out programme may do more to hurt than help its economy.” These austerity measures will depress Ukraine’s values for degree of income equality. Clearly, under the current regime, Ukraine, 23

23 Why this mad rush to reduce Ukrainian living standards? Alex Luhn in the Nation regards “the IMF program as part of a larger strategy to alleviate economic crises in the West. According to New School University professor Richard Wolff, austerity in countries like Greece and Ukraine will ‘concentrate [economic] decline...in order to slow or disguise it elsewhere.’ This decline is caused by companies moving production from North America and Europe to Latin America and Asia” (Luhn 2014a), which has produced high unemployment or underemployment in the U.S., for example. Luhn adds that “the neoliberal polices promoted by the EU and IMF will remove trade barriers for European companies in Ukraine and encourage the flow of cheap Ukrainian labour to Western Europe, cutting wages [in Western Europe--RG] and increasing corporate profits” (Luhn 2014a).
at least the portion ruled by the Kiev government, is not norm compliant. The Kiev regime is reported to have cut off pensions for residents of Donetsk and Lugansk. The Donetsk and Lugansk regimes, however, announce that they are not only paying pensions due under Ukrainian law but are increasing them by 10% (Donbas News 2015, 2016). Such an attempt to maintain pensions and other public services at 2014 levels, suggests that Donetsk and Lugansk are norm compliant, at least as much as possible under the circumstances.

Whatever the soldiers of the Kiev government might think, they are not fighting to preserve the good life for their relatives, for behind the lines there is inflation of 30%, pensions are being cut and other services closed down. Moreover, they fight alongside militia such as Svoboda, the Right Sector, and the Azov battalion, which are widely regarded as neo-Nazi or neo-fascist (cf. Jerusalem Post 2012, 2014, 2016; Le Monde Diplomatique 2014; Ukraine General Newswire 2012; Luhn 2014b).24 On the other hand, insofar as the soldiers in the East are fighting to maintain the policies of redistribution that characterized previous regimes, they can be said to be fighting for the good life that Ukrainians enjoyed in the past. As Luhn puts it, “Within Ukraine, the strongest counter to the EU-IMF agenda seems to be the largely pro-Russian separatist movement” (Luhn 2014a). So, there are two kinds of nationalism in Ukraine today, one supporting εὖ ζῆν, the other undermining it.

Reflecting on the austerity imposed by the last free-market utopia, Karl Polanyi explained that in response to that austerity three sorts of nationalisms arose: fascism, the U.S. New Deal of Roosevelt, and Soviet collectivism. Fascism enforced that austerity, while the U.S. New Deal and the Soviet collectivism

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24 Svoboda has allegedly threatened Poland, for attempting to influence Ukraine’s internal affairs (Donbas News 2017).
both established national programs of reconstruction. So, when we observe a nationalist movement arise in response to globalist austerity or military adventures, we need to ask, which one of these types is it closest to—the ones that enforce austerity and destroy the good life, or the ones that sustain the good life as much as they are able. The latter type shows that nationalism can be meaningful insofar as it sustains the good life for its citizens as did ancient Athens in its struggles with Persia.

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Data was downloaded as follows: Quintile data: for Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Iran: 3 April 2016; for all other countries (exc. U.S.A.): 7 Aug 2015 5:34PM; GDP per capita data: 3 Mar 2016 4:30PM.
Raul Hilberg, Holocaust History and the German National Stereotype

Raul Hilberg was born in Vienna in 1926. As his parents were Jewish, they suffered persecution after the Nazi German annexation of Austria in March 1938, and fled to the USA via Cuba in 1939. Hilberg returned to Europe as an American soldier during World War II. When stationed in the former Nazi Party headquarter in Munich, he caught a glimpse of the paper trail left by the Third Reich when stumbled across Hitler’s private library. After the war, he decided to write a master’s thesis in political science on the German civil service, which he then expanded into a PhD thesis. In the early 1950s, he was briefly employed at the War Documentation Project, as one of a number of scholars tasked with investigation captured German documents. (Hilberg 1996: 42-80)

In 1961, he published *The Destruction of the European Jews*, which would later be recognized as a milestone in the history of Holocaust historiography. Hilberg is mostly famous for the universalistic implications of his depiction of the Holocaust as an administrative destruction process, carried out by faceless bureaucrats. He was interested in the general – universal in the sense of modern Western society – implications of the

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Nazi genocide. It is that interpretation of his work that has inspired knowledgeable scholars like Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman (Arendt 1963; Bauman 1989). However, national character played a crucial, and often overlooked role in his understanding of the Nazi genocide, that will be analyzed and contextualized in the present article.

Hilberg’s analysis of what he called the destruction process contained three principal conclusions that constitute his singular contribution to early Holocaust research. First, he argued that the persecution and killing of European Jewry did not proceed from a plan. This was no premeditated operation. In his view, there was no central guideline. Secondly, there was no single actor driving the process, but a multitude of different sectors in Nazi German society. This implied that all of organized Nazi German society was involved. As he put it:

There was hardly an agency, an office, or an organization which did not, at one time or other, have an interest in anti-Jewish measures. If we were to enumerate the public and private agencies which may be called the “German government” and those agencies which may be called the “machinery of destruction,” we would discover that we are dealing with identical offices. (Hilberg 1961: 32)

Hilberg placed the bureaucracy at the center of his analysis of the Holocaust. Questions regarding the development of society, the destructive capacity of the modern state, and the detached technocratic bureaucrat was at the heart of his understanding of the Holocaust. For Hilberg, the Nazi genocide signaled a new era in which it was easier to overcome the potential obstacles for mass killings. In his doctoral dissertation, he claimed that:

Killing is not as difficult as it used to be. The modern bureaucratic apparatus has facilities for rapid concerted movements
and efficient mass killings. These devices not only trap a larger number of victims; they also require a greater degree of specialization, and with that division of labor, the moral burden too is fragmented among the participants. The perpetrator can now kill his victims without touching them, without hearing them, without seeing them. He is sure of his success and safe from its repercussions. (Hilberg 1955: 399-400)

This was a textbook expression of the impersonal nature of bureaucratic authority. Hilberg’s decision to connect the Holocaust to the phenomenon of bureaucracy affected his understanding of the identity of the perpetrators, which he regarded as no different from Germans in general.

The universal scope of Hilberg’s conclusions carried meaning for the Western world as a whole, and the technological advancement of the twentieth century. As he expressed it: “This ever growing capacity for destruction cannot be arrested anywhere” (Hilberg, 1961, 760). Hilberg wanted to issue a warning regarding the implications of the Holocaust for the future. From his perspective, a destruction process could potentially happen in any modern state and ought to prompt a reconsideration of discrimination and segregation everywhere. From this perspective, the question of German national identity would appear to be of secondary importance. After all, a scholar attempting to show the general significance of a specific event would do better by not emphasizing the importance of the cultural and national identity of the historical.

At the same time, the event Hilberg studied had not just happened anywhere, and his understanding of the Holocaust was informed by an acute sense of German particularity. The Holocaust was, from Hilberg’s perspective, firmly grounded in German culture and thinking. He was impressed by “the fact that Germans had reached out farther in the range
of destruction than any other nation on earth” (Hilberg, 1961: 680). In his view, the Holocaust carried far-reaching implications for the German nation, and German history.

He contrasted the proverbial German thoroughness with the lack of dedication of more or less reluctant collaborators, and made a distinction between the behavior of German bureaucrats, intent on going as far as possible in terms of annihilation, and other nationalities that went along grudgingly, or demurred. The French Vichy regime, for example “recoiled from the idea of adopting measures which were unprecedented in history” (Hilberg, 1961: 389). In another typical formulation, he stated that: “The Germans wanted to make history; the Hungarians wanted only to annex territory” (Hilberg, 1961: 511). As one of his conclusion, Hilberg wrote that the German administration:

never resorted to pretenses, like the Italians, it never took token measures, like the Hungarians, it never procrastinated, like the Bulgarians. The German bureaucrats worked efficiently, in haste, and with a sense of urgency. Unlike their collaborators, the Germans never did the minimum. They always did the maximum. (Hilberg, 1961, 644)

As this quotation shows, Hilberg subscribed to the familiar stereotype about German efficiency and thoroughness, which is often presented in positive terms, as in the saying that Germans are punctual and know how to get things done. There was thus nothing particularly original about his conception of German group character. However, it would be too easy to dismiss his use of this stereotype as a gratuitous anti-German remark. It was much more than that, since Hilberg used it to explanatory effect in several different ways. What, then, was the function of German national character in Hilberg’s analysis of the destruction process?
Hilberg’s German Stereotypes in Context

How is Hilberg’s use of national stereotypes to be understood? First of all, it should be noted that his autobiography contained a plea of sorts for the study of national character; a field he claimed had been developed in Europe but had failed to take root in the USA (Hilberg 1996:126). His use of a stereotypical understanding of German character thus reflected a wider interest in the meaning and implication of group identity as a structure shaping, and perhaps prompting human action. As seen above, The Destruction of the European Jews contained numerous claims about the group character of various nationalities. Furthermore, Hilberg’s autobiography is replete with assertions about groups ranging from Puerto Ricans and English to Americans, Europeans and Jews (1996: 53-55, 98, 126).

There is clearly a biographical aspect here, which cannot be disregarded. Hilberg was torn from his childhood environment of Vienna when he was thirteen years of age, a critical period in character formation. As one who had moved between worlds in his formative years, Hilberg pondered group identity, his own and that of others. National character became a way for him to make sense of himself and the world around him and would later find expression in his work on the Nazi genocide. This kind of stereotyping is understandable from a psychological viewpoint, given that we rely on general assumptions about groups and phenomena about which we have no direct knowledge, especially when we find ourselves in new situations. However, it does not explain its scholarly role or function within his work.

The connection established by Hilberg between perpetrator psychology and German national character was a logical consequence of his conception of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. As noted above, he regarded the organizations involved
in the Holocaust, the destruction machinery, as being no different from organized German society as such. It followed that the generic perpetrator was not different from any other German. This decentralization of the perpetrators implied that perpetrators as a group were not distinct from the rest of the German population (Hilberg 1961: 646-662). They constituted, “a remarkable cross-section of the German population” (Hilberg 1961: 649). In other words, there was no tangible difference between perpetrators and Germans in general.

This perspective was first of all a reaction to the approach taken to Holocaust perpetrators during the two consecutive series of Nuremberg trials. The first, the so-called International Military Tribunal focused on the upper echelons of Nazi Germany. Prosecutors and judges from the three Allied nations and France indicted twenty-two defendants between November 1945 and October 1946 (Marrus 1997: v). Since the IMT focused on former high-ranking leaders in Allied custody, leaving aside those who had served the regime in low- and midlevel positions, the American occupation authorities held a second series of trial, the so-called Nuremberg Military Tribunal (held in civilian courts, but in areas under military occupation). The NMT took a broader approach to Nazi German society compared to the IMT. It comprised twelve trials taking aim at organizations, professions and spheres of power such as the Einsatzgruppen, the medical profession, and industry (Priemel and Stiller 2012: 2). Both series of trials still gave inordinate attention to Nazi party organizations, such as the SS, for the origins and execution of the so-called Final Solution. Therefore, Hilberg’s perspective represented a departure from the fixation on Hitler, the Nazi leaders and the SS, dominant during the 1930s and in evidence in the early Nuremberg trials.

His insistence that Holocaust perpetrators were no different from Germans in general should also be seen in relation to
a debate in the USA, during the early postwar period, regarding the understanding of prejudice, bigotry, antisemitism, and totalitarianism. The confrontation with Nazi Germany did not only play out on the battlefield, but also in the form of political debates and research regarding prejudice in the social sciences. American social scientists, often of German-Jewish origin, and many of who were connected to the Bureau of Applied Social Research, attempted to provide a scientific rejection of and plan of action against prejudice. They argued that these phenomena should be understood with reference to a specific personality type.

In other words, they set out to prove that the problems related to xenophobia had its origin in a character flaw, or that it only pertained to certain groups of people (Himmelhoch 1947: 277-284). The most influential of such studies was of course the volume *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1950). In Hilberg’s view, this was an insufficient approach when dealing with Holocaust perpetrators. As he expressed in an interview with the German historian Alfons Söllner, “such structures of character exist in every society” (Söllner and Hilberg 1988: 183). In his view, they did not suffice to explain the actions of Germans working with train transport or the Aryanization of Jewish property.

The Nuremberg trials and studies on the xenophobic personality are two contexts that can explain Hilberg’s insistence that his conclusions applied to Germans in general. He sought to implicate Germany as a whole in the Holocaust, because he had found that much more than a clique of Nazi leaders and SS had been involved. Yet, this universalization of the perpetrators was at the same time a particularization. In Hilberg’s view, the perpetrators could have been any German, but they were still German. His attempt to balance the universal and the particular comes across with clarity in the following
quote: “The German perpetrator was not a special kind of German. What we have to say about his morality applies not to him specially but to Germany as a whole” (Hilberg 1961: 649). There was thus a limit to the universality of Hilberg’s notion of the generic perpetrator. This concept never dissolved into the abstraction of universal man.

However, the German identity of the perpetrators had a wider cultural resonance. The question of the relation between Nazism and German culture played a prominent role in debates among members of the German and German-Jewish exile in the USA. Hilberg sided with the author Thomas Mann – a solitary figure among the German exile in his uncompromising insistency that German culture as a whole needed to be reevaluated against the background of the Nazi period. He referred with approval to Mann’s 1945 (1945, 3) lecture in Washington D.C., in which the latter had claimed that there was no “other Germany.” For an intellectual like Mann, there was simply nothing to be salvaged from the past of German history.

Hannah Arendt, by contrast, claimed that Nazism did not derive from German culture, or even from any tradition whatsoever. In an early postwar text she described Nazism as a radical rupture with all forms of traditions, both German and European. As she put it:

Nazism owes nothing to any part of the Western tradition, be it German or not, Catholic or Protestant, Christian, Greek, or Roman. Whether we like Thomas Aquinas or Machiavelli or Luther or Kant or Hegel or Nietzsche—the list may be prolonged indefinitely as even a cursory glance at the literature of the ‘German problem’ will reveal—they have not the least responsibility for what is happening in the extermination camps. Ideologically speaking, Nazism begins with no basis at all. (Arendt 1945, 108)
As becomes evident in this quotation, Arendt was reacting to the notion of a “German problem,” that is the notion that Nazism was a clear-cut expression of German history. There were undoubtedly quite a few such attempts to draw a straight line between the very beginnings of German cultural developments and the Third Reich, in accordance with the so-called Luther-to-Hitler thesis (McGovern 1941). Arendt was one in a group of German-Jewish exiles who pioneered the view of Nazism as a combination of backward and forward oriented elements; what Jeffrey Herf later described as “reactionary modernism” (Herf 1988). Contrary to others who perceived Nazism as an atavistic resurgence of barbarism, a regression to a benighted era, Arendt described it as a fundamentally modern phenomenon. As shown by the quote above, this was clearly one result of the strict rupture that she posited between Nazism and European history. However, this intellectual position had further and more personal implications for Arendt.

There was also obviously an apologetic element at play here for her, in the sense that she could not draw a straight line between European and German history and Nazism. Doing so would have implicated the tradition of Bildung and German philosophy to which she remained committed (Aschheim 1996: 111). This created a conflict between Mann, on the one hand, and Arendt and other émigrés who, according to Mann: “hold it against me that I feel that through this catastrophe everything German, German history, German intellect, has been made complicit” (quoted in Rabinbach, 2003: 53). An intellectual like Theodor Adorno (1974: 57) castigated the position taken by Mann as a crude attempt to profit from the German collapse by claiming to be the sole spokesperson for German culture. Adorno dismissed the claim that the Hitler phenomenon had brought the entire German culture into disrepute as “an advertising stunt of those who want to rebuild it from their telephone desks.”
Hilberg, as has been shown above, had no qualms about implicating German culture and tradition as such. The difference between him and Arendt in this regard was one of generation and cultural identification. Since Hilberg had not been educated in Germany and left before he had reached maturity, he could not make German culture his own. The Nazi upheaval, which forced him across the Atlantic, occupied a central part of his identity in a way that was impossible for Arendt, as well as for other members of the German-Jewish exile of her age group. Heinz Wolf (1988: 185-186) has noted that the older generation of exiles was generally much less hostile to Germany, and more open to renewing ties after the. In her correspondence with her teacher and mentor Karl Jaspers, in the mid 1960s, Arendt (1985: 586) expressed harsh criticism of the introductory chapter of Hilberg’s magnum opus – in which he made a connection between the anti-Jewish diatribes of Martin Luther and the antisemitism of the 19th and 20th centuries. Such a historical exposé must have appeared to her as reminiscent of the Luther-to-Hitler approach mentioned above. When Hilberg (1996: 156-157) discovered this letter decades later, he responded in kind by accusing Arendt of harboring “a personal need to insulate the Nazi phenomenon.”

Although Hilberg understood the Holocaust as a break with previous history, he posited a German cultural continuity. What was the meaning of this continuity? Hilberg (1961: 649) argued that the perpetrators overcame the “struggle” with (universal) moral scruples “with the employment of the most complex psychological tools fashioned during centuries of German cultural development.” When taken as an argument regarding the singularity of the destruction process, this represents in my view, a weak part of Hilberg’s historical perspective. The most central claim of the message of warning that he derived from the Holocaust was that modern bureaucracy was a factor
facilitating the implementation of large scale killing operations. As he put it, the “perpetrator can now kill his victims without touching them, without hearing them, without seeing them” (Hilberg 1961: 760). Given this assessment of bureaucracy, the conclusion should have been that the chasm between morals and actions had never been so easy to bridge. In other words, the bureaucratic act of killing to diminished rather than augment the moral dilemma involved.

Hilberg stood on firmer ground when basing his historical interpretation of the Holocaust on the industrial and total character of the operation, but this argument speaks volumes regarding the importance he accorded to the German cultural background. The Holocaust appeared to him as an attempt to go beyond that cultural legacy. To his mind, the Holocaust was the response of a culture that had exhausted its artistic and philosophical aspirations, and as a result veered toward destruction on a monumental scale:

Inevitably, at this point the German machine of destruction had to attempt the ultimate, for when a generation seeks to accomplish more than its scientific and artistic heritage has equipped it for, its path to fulfilment [sic] lies only in destruction. The process of creation is tedious and long; destruction alone is both swift and lasting. (Hilberg 1961, 639)

Hilberg then did not avoid the question of the relation between the Holocaust and German national identity, but tried to explore it by looking at German history and culture. He developed his line of thought in a 1965 article dealing with motivations for the Holocaust, in order “to probe in the German collectivity for the mainsprings of the destructive upheaval” (Hilberg 1965: 28). He described a people who were not pathological but exhibited certain exaggerated psychological peculiarities, such as megalomania and projective accusation
Politics of Enmity

(Hilberg 1965: 33-35). Hilberg saw a connection, however faint, between the Holocaust conceived in esthetical and philosophical terms, and German literature and philosophy:

Hegel had spoken of a world-historical unfolding and of world-historical men who comprehended that which was ripe for their time. In Goethe, there is a pact of blood with a ‘demonically intoxicated’ professor to delve into experiences never before witnessed by man. Nietzsche preached transcendence and Heidegger intoned ‘Become what you are’ *(Werde was du bist)*. We know, of course, that Hegel had no ‘Führer,’ Goethe no ‘special treatment,’ Nietzsche no ‘subhuman.’ . . . But when the imagery of German philosophy, poetry, mythology, and music is lined up against the totality of the German destruction process, there is nevertheless a resemblance. (Hilberg 1965: 33-35)

This “resemblance” pointed to cultural context. However, Hilberg’s attempt to elevate notions of group character to the same analytical level he applied to the bureaucratic destruction process proved difficult. It is, in this regard, instructive to compare Hilberg’s analysis of the German background of the Holocaust to the work of other refugees turned historians who grappled with the Nazi phenomenon at the same time. Like them, Hilberg looked for the causes of the upheaval in German culture and history. Heinz Wolf (1988: 90) has observed that most refugees turned historians displayed a “relative determinism,” in the sense that they saw Nazism as a consequence of German culture; not inevitable, but nonetheless as a tendency within that culture which proved conclusive.

Fritz Stern (1961) and George Mosse (1967) approached Nazism through the prism of ideology, which served as a way of relating the origins of the Third Reich to the specific political and intellectual developments in Germany during the late
19th and early 20th centuries. Yet, Hilberg stands out among this group in the sense that he was more interested in culture than ideology. For him, Nazi ideology and antisemitism were merely ways of rationalizing the destruction process, which had other causes. Hilberg paid little attention to Stern and Moses’s research. Instead of *Völkisch* ideas and extreme nationalism, he compared the destruction process to the greatest work of German literature and philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries. In this sense, he adduced pseudo-philosophical parallels masquerading as intellectual context. His approach to ideas in history was not unlike the free-floating abstractions decried by Quentin Skinner (1969) in his programmatic article regarding the discipline of history of ideas.

As seen above, Hilberg took the importance of German cultural background very far. Reading his speculation regarding this dimension of the Holocaust would invite the conclusion that the perpetrators not only took action as Germans, but more fundamentally because they were German. That essentialized form of what might be called cultural determinism would be foreign to his understanding of the Holocaust, but such implications point to the difficulty of doing more with the cultural identity of the perpetrators on an analytical level than merely pointing it out.

**Conclusions and Summary**

To sum up, although seldom noted, the connection established by Hilberg between perpetrator psychology and German national character was a logical consequence of his conception of the identity of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. As noted above, the generic perpetrator was not different from any other German during the Nazi regime. Hilberg tried to strike a balance between understanding the Holocaust as a “German deed,” a product of a specific German culture and thinking
but not of a specific kind of German individual – and as a portent for human society in general. In other words, ordinary Germans carried out the Holocaust – there was nothing pathological or fanatical about most of them – but ordinary Germans were not like, for example, ordinary Italians.

One might, in conclusion, pose the question of why Hilberg was so adamant regarding the German identities of the perpetrators, and the Holocaust as a product of German culture. From a certain perspective, he was merely stating the obvious when calling attention to the aspect of the genocide. Every genocide, war or revolution, when perceived as a cultural artifact, has a specific cultural and local context. Indeed, the opposite would have been nothing short of surprising. In a certain sense, writing the chronicle of the Holocaust implied for Hilberg to remain true to its German dimension, but this was important for him for more pressing reasons than historical accuracy.

This article has analyzed Hilberg’s use of German national stereotypes as part of a rejection against two specific discourses. First, the interpretation that Nazi Germany consisted mainly of a criminal leadership imposed upon a people, at times prevalent during the Nuremberg trials. Hilberg, by contrast, wanted to show that the entire German society was implicated in the Holocaust. Secondly, he reacted against the attempt to divorce Nazism from German culture and history by German-Jewish intellectuals like Hannah Arendt. Unlike Arendt, Hilberg had no interested in leaving aside German culture from the implications of the Nazi era and the Holocaust.

While this article might tell us more about perceptions of Germans than it does about the Holocaust, it is worth recalling how central such notions were during a time when the Nazi genocide first emerged as a major historical event. National stereotypes were of instrumental importance in recognizing the
Holocaust as being of universal significance. It is perhaps, from this perspective, not a coincidence that it involved two peoples, Germans and Jews, that more than many others have been perceived as symbols for universal culture and civilization.

One should, in conclusion, add that Hilberg’s interest in German national stereotypes cannot be separated from his personal experience as a victim of persecution in Nazi Vienna, and later as a refugee. The challenge for an aspiring scholar like Hilberg was to both show the general significance of the Holocaust to a lay and scholarly public that had become inured to images of Nazi fanaticism and brutality, and to remain true to the German character of the genocide. As this article has attempted to show, he met this challenge but at the prize of accepting and perpetuating stereotypical thinking, not only regarding Germans but also concerning other European nations and groups.

The decades separating us from the Holocaust have shown that genocides and processes of persecution reminiscent of the Nazi genocide can occur in any country. Scholars continue to interpret such events, but the optimistic notion characteristic of Hilberg’s work that such humanitarian catastrophes can be avoided by scholarly work and education would seem to have disappeared, especially in an era when politicians are at a loss regarding the question of who would be willing to pay the price for protecting others. Most of those events are covered by the news media as they transpire, but they do not gain the same prominence or reach the level of historical consciousness in a way comparable to the Holocaust. As this article has attempted to show, the process whereby certain events are translated from political tragedy to historical significance is partly dependent on the cultural identity of perpetrators, victims and the scholars attempting to save the dark past from oblivion.
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Roma nation: escaping pariah people’s stigma?

Introduction

Not so long ago, few Roma families somewhere from the Balkans came to live in Spain. When they arrived, parents had instructed their children to be very careful and keep their ethnic identity hidden. Yet, when somebody asked the children, who were forbidden to declare as Roma or gypsies, who they are, children replied: “We are Gadje!” For those who are not familiar with Romani language and culture, “Gadje” is a Roma term which denotes non-Roma persons, and comes from the noun *gav* (“village”). This anecdote, even though it might have never happened, reveals lot about social dynamics of Roma’s ethnic identity. Being Roma can be perceived as stigma which should be casted away, but even the act of discarding it can actually reaffirm this stigma. For those children not identifying as Roma automatically implied that they should declare themselves as non-Roma – there was no third option. Their world doesn’t represent multifaceted mosaic of many nations. It is divided in two halves of “Us” and “Them” (*gadje*). Somebody is either *Rrom* or *Gadjo*. This dualistic approach to identity is only the tip of the large iceberg this article tries to explore. Even more important, the question “Who we are” remains contested among Roma. Are they a

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2 British Roma use term *Gorgio* with the same meaning.
despised social group, struggling for recognition? Or are they a nation on its own right? And if they are a nation, are Roma native to India, Europe or to particular countries they are living in?

This article has neither the purpose nor scope to explore ethnic or national identity from theoretical perspectives. Still, the case of Roma’s ethnic identity represents a challenge even for most prominent theories of ethnicity. If the modernist approach (Gellner 1983; Hobzbaum 1996) is the right one to tackle this problem, and the modern state with its institutions, ideologies, actors and procedures is the prima causa of ethnic affiliation, how could the Roma nation came to existence without state of their own, and even without possibility to form such an entity? Even more importantly, how did it manage to remain as a valid ethnos during the long asymmetric struggle with European nation-states, always hungry for taxpayers, workers and military conscripts?

If the rivaling, ethno-symbolic approach is applied, a completely different set of problems will arise. Roma people lack most of the important ethnic traits mentioned by Anthony Smith (2000; Smith 2003), or more precisely – didn’t had them up until recently. First of all, they didn’t have a single homeland in the conventional sense; epic poetry or other narratives about nation; they don’t have a common religion, nor speak one common language. Even more important, many Roma are trying

3 Although many Roma can speak Indo-Aryan *Romani* language (sometimes referred to as *Romanes*), many of them don’t. Socio-linguistic situation of Roma people is quite complex, and we can detect at least six cases: (1) today very rare case where they use and know only Romani; (2) case where they only speak official state language (Spanish, French, Serbian, Bulgarian…); (3) case in which they are bilingual (L1 Romani, L2 official language); (4) case in which Roma are interchangeably using two languages even at home (Romani and Turkish); (5) case of multilingualism (some Roma in Banat used to speak Roma and Romanian at home, but knew also German, Serbian and Hungarian) (6) case in which
really hard to discard (or at least hide) their identity. How can it be possible to retain such an undesired ethnic consciousness?

The same question troubled Serbian ethnographer Ti-homir Đorđević more than a century ago: “What keeps gypsies as a single people [narod: ethnic nation]? They don’t have common religion or single specific language, they don’t help each other – yet they have remained to be gypsies. Only ethnic characteristic they all have in common is their trade, and the lifestyle determined by it” (Đorđević quoted by: Petrović 1993: 140). In that sense, (ancestors of) Roma could be described as “pariah people”, in a way Max Weber used this concept⁴. Yet, how did this pariah status affect the ethnic identity of Roma?

**Who are the pariahs and what are they escaping from?**

Since their very arrival to Europe, which was attested in Byzantium in the 11th century and in Central Europe in the early 15th century, ancestors of modern Roma were perceived as ultimate aliens (Lucassen et al. 1998). Unlike conventional proto-ethnic communities, the Roma were alienated both on spatial and temporal level. Even though many pre-modern “na-tions” have claimed migratory past, usually in form of conquests, ancestors of Roma were in a different situation. They

Roma speak minority language, with some competence in official language as well (Albanian or Romanian in Serbia, Romanian in Croatia and Hungary, Slovak in Czechia…). To make situation even more complicated, Romani language has many different varieties which differ significantly and only a small educated and self-aware elite is fluent in standardized version.

⁴ “The purest form of this type is found when a people in question have totally lost their residential anchorage and hence are completely occupied economically in meeting demands of other settled peoples – the gypsies, for instance, or, in another manner, the Jews of the Middle Ages” (Weber 1958: 13).
Andrej Kubiček did not belong to any particular country, and nobody knew for sure where they were coming from, or where there were going. They were not tied to the land, neither as owners nor as serfs. Ancestors of Roma were bound to their professions, which mostly played ambulatory role in the host societies, and to the roads which they traveled in order to find customers for their goods and services. Living such lives, ancestors of modern Roma had a strong sense of belonging to groups of their immediate fellows – relatives and clansman (especially if they also shared the same trade) and to the local territory in the geographic sense (Marushiakova and Popov 2012: 179). Again, identifying primarily with local, face-to-face groups such as villages or cities was typical for people in premodern times. Still, pariahs were different in one important trait. By Weber’s definition, pariah peoples are economically dependent from settled peoples, which also typically exert much more political power then small and peaceful groups of nomads (of course, situation is reversed in case of pastoral nomads who could organize effective military forces).

Considering cumulative effects of economic and political inequalities, it is useful here to apply Benedict Anderson’s distinction between “race”(ism) and nation(alism). First of all, nations are historically defined groups, and they can’t exist without (presupposed) common historic fate, no matter how recent it is. “Races” aren’t defined in the same chronological scope, but are believed to have roots in natural history (phylogeny of biological species or in mythical time). Finally, racism is based on class ideologies, and can be compared to obsolete aristocratic ideals of social hierarchy, while nationalism is typically

5 India as a country of Roma’s origin was outside of medieval European’s mental maps. Yet, for Arabs and Persians, or at least for their educated man of letters, it was widely accepted that ancestors of Roma came from subcontinent (Digard 2002; Wink 2002; Mujić 1953).
(but not always) interested in legitimizing foreign policies (An
derson 1991: 141-154). Nation is – as many authors who use dif-
ferent approaches agree (Smith 2008) – a matter of self identi-
ty and self consciousness. It is a basis for one activist principle
in social and especially political life. People are sometimes
ready to die for their nation, but dying for one’s “race” is an un-
common concept. Sadly, dying because of presupposed “racial
traits” isn’t unheard of even today. Even if ethnicity has some
kind of external roots, such categorization has to be acknow-
ledged and accepted by its supposed members. Processes of ac-
cceptance of course, always include some reinterpretations. Nar-
ratives formed by nationalistic discourse need to be positively
(re)valued.

Still, what happens when group identity is externally
imposed to its members as a stigma? When it is used to exclude
certain group of people on bases of their belonging which is
presupposed by some other group? In this case we are speaking
about a complex process which can be named *racialization*. 
Outcomes of this process are *racialized groups*, which are typi-
cally believed to have some visible physical dispositions6. In this
manner, name “gypsy”7 will be used to denote racialized group

6 Those dispositions can incorporate innate traits: skin color, fa-
cial features (nose, lips, chin, forehead and eyes), hair color and tex-
ture, but they can also include some features which are acquired: body
smell, health of teeth, look and condition of clothes and so on. This oth-
er group is even more important part of the process of racialization, be-
cause it can lead to self-fulfilling *prophecies* – *exclusion of the racialized
group from the rest of the society is legitimized on the basis of their “un-
tidy look”, which is a consequence of their exclusion.*

7 Even though most Roma are descendants from such racialized
groups of Indian origin, it is quite possible that their ancestry includes
other nomads of Europe (landless peasants, remnants of Turkic nomads
from Eastern Europe?). Also, we can find “gypsies” who don’t have In-
dian origin: Gaelic Travelers in Britain and Ireland, and similar groups
in Switzerland, parts of Germany and Netherlands.
of pariahs, while the ethnonym “Roma” will mean members of modern, yet very peculiar nation. They are a nation which is emerging without state support, and which have members who are mostly powerless and unprivileged in many ways.

Cases of racialization of gypsies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe have many peculiarities. First of all, they were commonly represented in similar fashion as “natives” of Western European colonies. Still, this is only an illustrative comparison. Historical phenomenon which has crucial importance here is the systematic exclusion of gypsies from status of citizen. It was partly caused by an unfortunate coincidence: gypsies have arrived in central Europe just before the Protestant reformation, the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia which defined the modern conception of the state\(^8\). Protestant interpretation of Christianity didn’t hold people without constant residence and profession in highest esteem, and even pilgrimages went out of fashion. Yet, the situation become even worse during and after the Wars of religion when robbery of vagrant landless peasants and nobles alike became very common and widely spread. In that context, nomadic lifestyle became associated with criminal activities, and was ruthlessly eradicated by the emergent states (Lewy 2000: 2).

In that sense, gypsies have become “ultimate aliens” – a group which represents a fundamental opposite to the category of citizenship. Unlike other unwanted people who had a country of origin – a territory where they could be sent back! – gypsies were perceived as eternal wanderers. They weren’t just some “foreign citizens”; they impersonated “non-citizens” by definition (Lucassen et al. 1998: 60). While, according to modernist

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\(^8\) Their ancestors might have been present earlier – and probably were – but it is evident that they become an object of systematic policy measures at that time. Before that, they could be considered only as one of the many disadvantageous groups which formed vast majority of population.
theorists of nation, emergent states created new nations of equal citizens, in the case of gypsies they have created excluded racialized group (Gellner 1983).

**External (quasi)ethno genesis: criminalization and romantic essentialization**

The fate of gypsies remained intertwined with the development of the state, and especially with one particular institution which would become paramount for the enforcement of law – the police. Some authors (Lewy 2000; Lucassen et al. 1998) have presented facts which confirm that modern police in many European countries systematically labeled and persecuted nomadic groups as “les classes dangereuses” or “anti-socials” from its very beginnings. Actually, they were the first people to be recorded in special files, and to have their fingerprints stored (Lewy 2000). Even though professional criminals constituted only a small part of nomadic groups, generalizations have emerged quickly. Probably the best examples of this discourse can be found in works of Cesare Lombroso: “They [gypsies] are the living example of a whole race of criminals, and have all the passions and vices of criminals” (Lombroso 1911: 39). Description goes even further, because whole families are described as being criminals: “The women are very clever at stealing, and teach it their children” (Lombroso 1911: 40). Finally, Italian criminologist Lombroso (1911: 39-41) claims that gypsies are cowardly and cruel, while at the same time, that they are glorifying crime, living lives as professional thieves and deceivers, selling sick horses and poisoning cattle.

Yet, Lombroso (1911: 42) in light of his well-known theory that criminals and genius individuals show some similarities tells us that gypsies in Hungary have created marvelous music. This points to a second type of external group socio-genesis of gypsies. Again, since their appearance in Europe,
gypsies were known as musicians and magicians (Soulis 1961; Pyn 2007; Trygg 1973). Still, images of all gypsies as one singular entity, “a race” originating from India who have preserved their language, customs and knowledge intact (Lucassen et al. 1998: 5-6) is just another form of racialize them, only this time in romantic context. Such deception led to the emergence of new groups of stereotypes about special nature of gypsies as individuals, or belief that they as group have some sort of secret knowledge.

“The Milliet” – assimilation of gypsies

The Ottoman Empire has formed different social frames for genesis of many ethnicities, including that of gypsies. The Empire, and this was not an exception, didn’t took much care about ethnic identity of its subjects. “The Milliet” system recognized inhabitants of the state through their religious affiliation: (Sunni) Muslims enjoyed privileged status, but orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews also had fixed legal rights and responsibilities. During that time, many gypsies adopted Islam, even thought they were typically not accepted as Muslims by state bureaucracies, and had to pay “haraç” (Jizya tax), reserved for non-Muslims only (Mujić 1951).

Still, settled gypsies who lived in towns and adopted Islam would also embrace the non-ethnic identity of Muslims as their preferred identification. Because they were engaged in trade, it was necessary for them to learn and use Turkish as the language of urban commerce. This status of partial assimilation in dominant religious group became unsustainable with great changes which swept the Empire during the 19th century. Ottomans lost large parts of their territory to national states such as Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, and in the end had to turn into a Turkish nation-state. This meant that Milliet identity slowly became redundant, and that turkophone Muslim gypsies had to
adopt new identity. It was logical for them to start identifying as Turks, but the centuries old process of racialization could not be undone. Surrounding populations – Turks which were now a minority and non-Turks alike – still regarded them as gypsies (*cigani*) (Marushiakova and Popov 2012: 184).

Even though some groups of gypsies retained this pre-modern type of identity well into 20th century, especially in Bulgaria and Greece (ibid.), *Milliet* still represents a paradigmatic case for many gypsies who are halted somewhere in the middle of the way to full assimilation. However, the difference brought by modernity is that the goal of this assimilation isn’t affiliation to a religiously defined dominant group anymore. Now preferred groups have ethnic or national names—Serbs, Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians. For some gypsies who have managed to overcome all obstacles and assimilate completely the question of their ethnic identity was solved. Yet, for most of them who couldn’t or wouldn’t achieve this, the quest for identity has just begun.

**I case of ethnic reappropriation: the Roma nation**

Lacking a clear ethnic identity seems to be only one of the many problems Roma communities are facing across Europe. Yet, poverty, discrimination and violence are connected with their identity. As it was demonstrated earlier, all those problems could be alleviated, only if Roma could be accepted in host societies. Even though some of them manage assimilate, Roma people as a whole have never been integrated as citizens with the same rights as others. Citizens live in national states, and are recognized as members of nations, either as majority or minority. Roma couldn’t be recognized as members of any nation state, due to their different look, social differences and historically accumulated disadvantages. So, the only valid strategy was to form new nation.
First step in this endeavor was to reject old exonyms “Gypsy” and “Cigan/Tzigane/Zigeuner”⁹. Many Roma intellectuals proposed alternative self-designating terms instead, as Dragoljub Acković, Roma leader and journalist from Serbian explained: “The First World Congress of the Roma, which took place during the April 1971 in London represents a milestone in our [Roma] history. Up until then we were Gypsies in the eyes of others, as well as in our own eyes, with all connotations this name carried. Since then, our true name is Roma. It is sacred for us, and it is our torch. Please, do not call us Gypsies”¹⁰. The World Congress of the Roma has also adopted a national flag with blue and green stripes and a red chakra wheel in the middle, and national anthem Gelem, gelem¹¹.

According to a set of interviews I conducted during the summer of 2014 with few members of Roma elite in Serbia, most of them cited language, customs, heritage and tradition as something which is crucial to their identity. Sample was rather small (6), so all presented data should be taken as mere illustrations, given without any ambition to offer generalized conclusions. One Roma women answered:

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⁹ This name in English comes from noun “Egyptian”. Even though other pejorative name which is used all across the continental Europe (Cigan/Tzigane/Zigeuner) originally probably didn’t had pejorative meaning (“untouchable”) (Soulis, 1961), and may have origin in Iranian word Čangar (Mujić, 1951), it is a sound symbolic strategy to start struggle for recognition by choosing a new name. Rrom means “man” in Romani language.


¹¹ “I travelled, travelled long roads”, song composed by Žarko Jovanović during the II World War in Serbia. Main themes of anthem are nomadism, suffering (particularly from Croat Ustaša militias) and hope for better future.
You can’t declare that you are something which you aren’t! I know the language; I respect customs… some things which are forgotten long time ago are completely normal for me”. For example, she spoke about feast day of Saint George (6 May by Gregorian calendar) as common tradition of all Roma, regardless of their religion: “Đurđevdan [lit. George’s day] is celebrated all around the world. In the same way. Spring is celebrated, purification of the organism, sacrifice is offered in form of the lamb, which should take away everything which is bad, and celebrate new beginning. We are bound by nomadic life and by great commitment to family.

Still, interpretations of role of language and tradition can diverge from common romanticist understanding of ethnos. Another Roma women said: “I do consider Romani language as constituent of Roma community, even though me and my family don’t know it, we speak Romanian. But, I still think that Romani is part of mine identity, because I know why my family adopted Romanian”. She also disagreed with the opinion that all Roma have the same customs, citing that Roma in Macedonia or Bulgaria have customs which are unknown to her, but she still considers them as part of her people. A third Roma women who participated in the research had an even more broad and idealistic concept of ethnicity when she defined her group. She mentioned freedom and rebelliousness as traits which are characteristic for Roma, as well as capacity to fell pain (“dert”), which she also attributed to Serbs.

Roma are aware of their Indian origin, but it is not understood as a defining ethnic characteristic. Most of Roma I have spoken to have stressed the “nomadic lifestyle” or poverty as more important. One Roma, however, demonstrated a high degree of inventiveness when it comes to (re)constructing the ethnic past. He has claimed that Roma people lived in Balkans since the ancient times, and that even Homer mentioned
them in the Iliad. Also, he has offered alternative etymology of ethnonym “Rom”: “Word Rom doesn’t mean what leaders of our Roma community say it means – a man. It draws roots directly from Ramayana epos, because god Rama lost his beloved wife Sita. Roma people followed him, so they adopted his name, just as Christians are named after Christ and followers of Muhammad are Muslims”. The same participant denied that ancestors of Roma were members of “lowest castes” and claimed that their ancestors came from “caste of Rajput, which is somewhere in between Brahmins and Kshatryas”. Talking about symbols of Roma nation, he has also contested interpretation of the wheel as part of the wagon which alludes to travelling: “This is not true, this wheel denotes the fact which dr Vainer de Kochanowski talked about – that Roma used to have 22 empires in India before from 7th to 12th century, when Prithviraj lost his great empire. If you look closely, you will see 22 spokes, and every spoke denotes one state. This wheel doesn’t label Roma as vagrants”. Later he added that this wheel also represents 7 chakras of human body, and that it is derived from Buda’s philosophical teachings.

This ethno-historic narrative contains many elements listed by Anthony Smith (1991; 2008): longevity of nation; common religion (parallel with Jews); lost fatherland, myth of “golden age”; heroes. Basically, Roma people are represented as Indian diaspora who inherited an ancient civilization of the subcontinent, and brought it to Europe.

The tragic fate and national martyrology are also common themes which can be found in many answers of Roma elite. Yet, one difference is especially important, because it leads the specific status of Roma nation. Martyrology in Roma case isn’t competitive one, as it is in the case of other (Balkan) nations (Kuljić, 2002). The Roma were exclusive victims of others, both in organized wartime massacres and in events of everyday
violence committed by “ordinary people”. This brings us to peculiarities of Roma nation, as they are expressed by participants in interviews.

First clearly noticed difference between Roma and all other nations is their pacifism. Group which never had any considerable political power have not been able to engage in armed conflicts, and this fact is morally valorized by its members. Words of one participant illustrates this point: “I greatly appreciate that I belong to a community that has never led any wars”. Merging of ethnic identity and socio-historical position of Roma reflectively is the other unique trait of Roma nation. “Roma can’t feel anywhere like bosses (“gazde”), for they are newcomers. And that’s why they try all the time to imitate their social surroundings. Because of this, again, they are set apart from others by their improvisations, which make them original and authentic”.

II case of ethnic reappropriation: the (Balkan) Egyptian nation

As it was demonstrated, Romani language forms a strong basis for Roma ethnic identity. Still, how does this affect other racialized groups who have forgotten Romani, or maybe never even knew it? One Roma participant mentioned this problem: “Safeguarding of language is the most important... You see, today there are those groups who declare as Egyptians, as Ashkali...”. Yet, who are these people?

Claiming that gypsies have Egyptian or Palestinian origin should be interpreted as another example of their exotic depiction by settled peoples. Egypt was a perfect candidate for their supposed homeland, since it was the most mysterious land in whole Biblical geography. Many Western European sources were (re)producing this narrative (Pyn 2007; Soulis 1961), but stories from the Balkans are even more illustrative
and indicative. One narrative claims that Roma descended from pharaoh’s army who pursued Moses, another that a once mighty gypsy empire ruled by Firaun was destroyed by God as punishment for Firaun’s pride (Duijzings, 2000: 132). Palestinian origin stories have typical moral disqualifications, saying that Roma denied shelter to the Holy Family during their exodus (Trigg 1973: 5); that they have forged nails for Christ, or that they stole the nail which would be pierced through Christ’s forehead. That’s why it should come as surprise that in many countries gypsy communities are simply referred to as “Egyptians”\textsuperscript{12}.

Deeper ethnographic and sociological analyses show that ancestors of modern population referred to as Egyptians became distinct from other gypsies in one crucial aspect – they have abandoned nomadic lifestyle and settled in villages or towns (such as Ohrid and Bitola), usually near their central or markets parts (Mariushakova et al. 2001: 21; Delić 2012). Although they retained typical pariah professions (blacksmithing and music), they have also started to engage in agriculture. By living in sedentary manner, Egyptians have adopted many cultural traits of surrounding Albanians and (proto)Macedonians.

It seems that this exo-ethnonyme was accepted by them without further reflection for many centuries. Valtazar Bogišić, southern Slavic pioneer of social sciences, noted in 19th century Montenegro that Egipčanin is used as euphemism for pejorative term Ciganjin (gypsy) (Bogišić quoted in: Duijzings 2000: 141). This probably reflects a better social standing of those groups; hence it is important to note how this exo-ethnonyme became valorized. As Vesna Delić showed, main components of their traditional identity included Islam (they took great pride in their faith and considered it to be purer than that

\textsuperscript{12} In Montenegro: Mađupi (Delić, 2012: 268); In Albania: Gjup, Egjup, Mangjup, Jevg, Evgijit; in Macedonia: Gjupci, Egjupci, Jupci, Ojupci; in Bulgaria Agupti and in Turkish Kiptı (Mariushakova et al, 2001: 21).
of Muslim Roma’s), craftsmanship and the fact that they are traditionally settled urban-dwellers (Delić 2012). This remnant of the Ottoman Empire survived long afterwards, and continued to exist in Yugoslavia. This should not come as a surprise, as Ger Duijzings justly remarks, because they used to live in real, face-to-face communities, which does not have any need to construct imagined communities (Duijzings 2000: 128). Dissolution of multiethnic state and ethnic conflicts which were a part of this process demanded old identities to be redefined, and small minorities were no exception. As one Montenegrin Egyptian described their situation: “We didn’t know who we are, but we knew very well who we aren’t” (Delić 2012: 270). They didn’t want to be gypsies, but they didn’t accept Roma identity either – partially because they considered it as stigma, and partially because they couldn’t speak Romani language. Also, and this is crucial – especially if the historic context is taken into account – Egyptians from Macedonia and Kosovo didn’t wanted to be Albanians. One of the most prominent publicly announced goals of their newly founded associations in 1990 was to “bring a halt to the process of Albanization taking place in western Macedonia and Kosovo” (Duijzings 2000: 134). Because of that, Egyptians were sometimes perceived as political construct (“artificial creation”) of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević (Mariushakova et al. 2001: 4; Duijzings 2000: 137).

The strategy for the reconstruction of Egyptian ethno-history is a common and straight-forward one. Because continuity with a long lost and highly prestigious civilization (“nation”) is established on the basis of the same name, cultural resources of Ancient Egypt are appropriated. Rubin Zemon (2010), Egyptian ethnologist from Ohrid, claims that many legends, written sources and archeological findings confirm that Egyptians

13 “In some cases, they can meet on the ornaments that represent ethnic symbols of Balkan Egyptians while associating to the Ancient Egypt,
were living in the Balkan area since classical times. Those Egyptians used to be well integrated craftsmen until the Council in Chalcedon (451 A.D.), after which they become persecuted and excluded from society, because they supposedly were Monophysites loyal to Alexandrian patriarch (Zemon 2010: 3).

Rubin Zemon (2010: 4) interoperates historic connections between Roma and Egyptians as consequence of Roma’s ethnic mimicry: “Bearing in mind that Roma people were excluded from the Balkan and European societies even in that period, some of Roma people and tribes preferred to declare themselves as ‘Egyptians’ for greater prestige in society, covering their Indian origin.”

**III case of ethnic reappropriation: the Ashkali**

Ashkali population, whose name probably originate from the Albanian word for charcoal-burners (Mariushakova et al. 2001: 21, Delić 2012: 271), shares many similarities with Egyptians. In a sense, they both represent a specific case of partial assimilation under *Milliet* system in areas where cultural Ottoman influence was weaker then local Albanian (in parts of Albania, modern Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija). Pariahs/strangers (gypsies) living in those parts adopted many Albanian cultural traits – language, names, music\(^{14}\), dress, and strict patriarchal patterns of family life\(^{15}\). One more thing they all have such as pyramids, sun with the eight rays, wings of Osiris etc.”, http://www.irdk-kosova.org/Repository/Docs/Doc/Socio-Cultural%20Anthropology%20of%20Balkan%20Egyptians.pdf viewed 20. February 2017.

\(^{14}\) One Roma sad to me: “They, who call them Ashkali, they are different. They have different music, like Albanians, it is very… aggressive, you know? It is like – U! HA!” gesticulating while almost taking some sort of fighting stance in order to illustrate how does this kind of music “looks” like.

\(^{15}\) “I remember when I was visiting displaced families from Kosovo – you can clearly see the difference between Roma and Ashkali home.
in common is that members of majority nations (Turks and Albanians) refuse to accept them on grounds of social (poverty) and sometimes visible physical differences (darker complexion).

Still, what is different between Egyptians and Ashkali, alone from their name? Ashkali’s social position was historically less favorable than Egyptian’s (and sometimes Roma’s). They didn’t work as free craftsmen, but were tied in some kind of servitude to large agricultural çiftlik estates of Albanian lords (Duijzing, 2000: 140). Since Roma people were loyal to Serbs, they have suffered some of the most severe repercussions from Albanian paramilitary groups. This was the reason for some groups like Ashakli to distance from Roma in order to be (at least partially) accepted by Albanians.

Both communities, Egyptian and Ashkali, are also constantly claiming that the other side is trying to assimilate them. Questioning the validity of “ethnic genuineness” of the other side, and proclaiming them as “invented nations” can be interpreted as reproduction of patterns seen in larger Balkan nations (Serbs, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Croats; Bulgarians and Macedonians; Romanians and Vlachs etc.).

Nationalist narratives of the Ashkali elite take a completely different approach than Egyptian’s. Instead of adopting a long-established ethic name and ethno-history surrounding it, they have started to construct totally a new ethno-history since 1999. First of all, they adopted two versions of national flag, something Egyptians have never done. The older version is clearly inspired by the Albanian flag, because it consists of black two-headed eagle on a red field with green disc. The new version distances symbolically from Albanians and has

When you enter Ashkali house, all women and children go to another room, and you can only speak with oldest man of the family”, as one young Roma from Kosovo explained to me.
pan-Iranian tricolor (green, white and red), with golden bird in middle (possibly eagle).

There are also several dominant versions of Ashkali’s ethno-genesis. Older version connected them with ancient city in modern Israel, Ashkelon (and thus they used alternative, descriptive name “Balkano-Palestinians”). Abedin Toplica, prominent Ashkali leader from Novi Sad (Serbia), claims that their name comes from the “city” Ashkal in modern northern Iran: “Ashkelon, Ashkabad, Ashkenazi… All these places of the Ashkan [Arsacid] dynasty… The Kingdom of Ashkelon. All these places are from ancient Persia. And, like Ashkenazi – we are that people, Ashkaliije. This is that mentality, that identity which is recognized by us and others”\(^\text{17}\). So, Toplica tries to connect the past of Ashkali people with ancient Persia as their homeland, and uses similarities between their ethnic name and the name of Arsacid dynasty which ruled over Parthian empire until 3rd century A.D. He denies that Ashkali people speak Albanian language, but claims that it still has some elements from their homeland: “Persian literature is so large, that even to this day – 
\textit{pishman} [sadness, regret] – and many other words we use, I can’t mention them all, but they are here where they are. And this is the speech of Ashkali.”\(^\text{18}\) It is true that most Balkan languages have notable number of Iranian words, thanks to influence of Ottoman language which was persianized, but this historical fact is interpreted in an innovative way. Toplica, among few other members of Ashkali elite, claims that their ancestors


\(^{17}\) Interview with Abedin Toplica on TV Kanal 9.

\(^{18}\) ibid.
have settled from Iran to Balkans during the reign of Alexander the Great, making them one of the oldest nations in the area. Persisting narrative also claims that they have adopted “Illyrian language” (i.e. Albanian), while the Albanians have received Islam from them in return (nine centuries before Muhammad) (Mariushakova and Popov 2001: 475). This is also different from Egyptian ethno-history, which is based on Christian past and Afro-Semitic language (Coptic or Arabic) which was forgotten.

Ashkali leaders, as well as Egyptian, are taking great effort do distance from the Roma, as Dino Toplica explained: “Absolute difference between the Ashkali and the Roma! Before everything, in Ashakli tradition reverence of the elder people is very important, as well as not taking away other’s property. On the other hand, concerning elements of culture, really, everybody knows who the Ashkali are. That they represent higher degree of culture. That they can’t beg, and don’t know how to do it, and to do things which Roma people are doing. They live different kinds of lives, other than Roma”\textsuperscript{19}. In this case, referring to stereotypes about Roma as still being “gypsies who beg and steal” is used to present their own group as virtuous and morally right.

\textbf{Conclusion: reincarnation of pariahs?}

Many young Roma who are well integrated in Serbian society had one similar experience – one situation in their everyday lives – which is very illustrative. When well-dressed and nice-looking Roma girls or young man sit in bars, waiters will sometimes greet them in English. For people who work in bars it seems unlikely to see a person with dark(er) complexion who is a Serbian citizen, so they assume that they must be foreigners. The last thing they would expect is that they have their

\textsuperscript{19} ibid.
fellow citizens, people who were born in the same city and grew together with them, who are also Roma by chance. The same could be true for their fellow Egyptians and Ashkalis.

Social causes of this paradigmatic story are described in this article. Roma nation may be young, but it is burdened by prejudices which are 1000 years old. This load is so heavy, that many Roma try to get released from it and escape: spatially to different countries, or symbolically to different identities. This is why Roma national program is different. Speaking from modernist perspective (Gellner 1983), Roma seems to be a rare example of nation without nationalism. For them, it is impossible to have even territorial autonomy, let alone state of their own – Roma ethnicity and their political community seem like will never overlap. As one interviewed Roma said: “Do you know how much Roma are losing because they don’t have a clearly defined status, when this world is composed of ethnic groups and nations? Roma are missing this. Roma cannot be a nation, because they have lost their home country, so they can’t be national minority in the classical sense”.

Yet, absence of political component doesn’t mean that Roma national program could be described as incomplete. Humanistic goals which strive towards social integration should replace political aspirations. One Roma observed that clearly: “We have placed a human in the center as something that is the most important. We have no need to seek the nationhood. For us it is outdated thing to have the status of a nation or a national minority”. Without the care for social development and well-being of the Roma, their national program will became an elitist ethnic discourse produced and employed by a small minority, and probably ridiculed by non-Roma. The same is even truer for Egyptians and Ashkali. As one young, educated and successful Roma woman pointed out, cherishing of Roma identity is very
important, because it can encourage others in their endeavors to be different and equal at the same time. That is how the nation possibly can be emancipatory.

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The Republic of Moldova is a Parliamentary Republic that borders on Ukraine to the North, East and South and Romania to the West. The territory is usually referred to the region of Eastern Europe. There were many historical changes of the contemporary Republic of Moldova’s state name and state borders. Thus, the country that is known as the Republic of Moldova has been existing since 27th August, 1991 when it declared its independence. Before 1991 Moldova was a part of the USSR and was called Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, which existed from 2nd August, 1940 till 27th August, 1991. Since 28th March, 1918 till 28th June, 1940 the Democratic Republic of Moldova was a part of Kingdom of Romania. Earlier there were other changes, but the important part is that considering the historical past, contemporary Republic of Moldova has no established discourse about its borders.

Today the Republic of Moldova is usually conceptualized as a nation-in-the-making (Berg, Meurs 2002), a “delayed nation” (King 2000), or “sandwiched” / “landlocked” territory. It is described as a state stuck between Ukraine and Romania, or, in a broader sense, between Russia and the EU or even more,
between the East and the West. This makes the analysis of Moldovan ways of creating the state borders a benchmark case.

The Western historiography raises quite a limited list of issues concerning Moldova but the issue of borders and the factors that influence them is one of such issues. Thus, Ch. King (1999: 5) mentions high degree of interconnection of cultural and political borders of the country during the whole 20th century: “Throughout this century, nationality among the Moldovans has been a decidedly negotiable proposition, a protean yet powerful conception of community in a region where the mutability of cultural boundaries has been matched by the fluidity of political ones. The territory of present-day Moldova has been a classic borderland, fought over and divided by outside powers eager to remake the Moldovans in their own image.” It is important to emphasize the accepted role of outside powers that will be also widely reflected in media along with negotiable nationality.

D. Hamilton and G. Magnott (2007: 5) define Moldova together with Ukraine and Belarus as a part of so-called new Eastern Europe and claim close correlation between borders of these states and geopolitical shifts: “Historically the object of fluid and volatile geopolitical shifts, none has ever existed as a state within its current borders, and none enjoys consensus on its respective national identity. All are located along key military, transportation and energy corridors linking Europe to Eurasia.”

These concepts of being influenced by outside powers and being locked between uncertain and blurred but the powerful East and West are the key concepts both for Western researchers and for Moldovan media. So placing Moldova between so-called geopolitical East and West is the dominant way to draw the borders of Moldova, that is why this paper deals with the analysis of concepts of East and West in two popular Moldovan news agencies: pan.md and enews.md. These agencies claim their open-minded approach and neutrality, but the
fact that they are Russian-speaking implies they are biased concerning state borders and the evaluation of Russian impact in Moldovan history. Each text that mentioned East or West (or both) and was published since January, 2010 till January, 2016 was analyzed, giving 152 texts in sum.

It was easy to notice that all the publications in Moldovan media that are about East and / or West show Moldova in a passive role. Moldova is not active in all the texts, the only activity it implements in some texts is choosing between West and East, but even in that case the choice is declared as a fear of consequences or a desire to get some advantages in economy, not a declaration of a free willingness. At the same time the most frequent way the question is put is still passive, Russia and the East can often pay active role: “Chisinau returned to the field of view of the major political players again. There is nothing new. Rather than something new we are dealing with yet another attempt of East and Russia to force Chisinau to choose between East and West.” (Grozavu 2012: enews.md/articles/view/2473/)

It is also important that there is no consensus either in the internal perception of identity nor in the external one. At the same time it is identity that marks off Moldova’s bounds that can be seen from the analysis of newspapers focused mainly on ethnic and cultural topics (see Dusacova 2016, pp. 103-107). Thus, the problems of identity and borders massively overlap and influence each other in both directions; which is shown in many academic works. In his paper “The New Russian Diaspora – an Identity of Its Own? Possible Identity Trajectories for Russians in the Former Soviet Republic” P. Kolsto (1996: 611), speaking about Moldovan identity, expresses the idea that the Dniester border plays an important role as it splits ethnic Russians into a core group and diaspora. As for the agents that influence the borders, the author pays attention to the Russian diaspora that manifest loyalty towards historical borders. This
diaspora can also have some irredentist sentiment according to this work (Kolsto 1996: 615). Larger overviews of historiography on these issues can be seen in papers of N. Dusacova (2015: 135-139) and T. Zemba (2010: 101-122), but the common idea for many researchers is that the definition of Moldovan borders can depend on the acceptance of the idea of outside powers’ influence or identity of different ethnic groups living in Moldova or nearby.

The analysis of the construction of these two factors by means of media will be provided in this article. The basic axiomatic idea is that the created categories that people use to realize space can shape the borders in different senses: cultural and linguistic, economic, political and geopolitical. The role of media and their connection to borders and territories were considered from different disciplinary positions. Our approach is based on works by A. Filippov and I. Savelieva (sociology of space) and D. Yanow (interpretive policy analysis). Thus, Filippov’s (2008: 17) sociology of space shows the connection of space with the problem of identification of the boundaries of the society as any identity is pegged to some specific characteristics. At the moment we claim specificity we should be able to answer the question where the described “something” is specific. Considering the geopolitical and political context of this research it seems relevant to mention that there is a conviction in the modern historical communities that each member of the post-soviet society should feel “inextricable connection with the past and include him/herself in historical, axiological and geographical space both of his/her country and the whole world” (Savelieva et al. 2008: 19).

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2 At the same time we realize that the category of territory is primordial and modern social theory criticizes the definition of society through territories. The same tendency can be seen in media studies, see Bird 2007, Bird, Barber 2007
Yanow and Haar (2013: 227) conducted a research project on the terms that were used for the categorization of populations. In the Dutch case there were categories connected to the birthplace that substitute explicit “race” or “ethnic” discourse, in the Moldovan case we will see that categorization based on what can be seen as geographic regions substitute cultural and political categorization. If in “present Netherlands discourse, as in other Western European states and the EU, revolves around ‘integration’” (Yanow and Haar 2013: 230), in the Moldovan case the discourses about East and West are not about inner social integration, rather about global ideas of integration into geopolitical areas. Even more, they often lead to inner social disintegration. As D. Yanow and M. Haar define this, categories can work as framing devices.

Media can also play the role of framing devices as they not only convey information, but determine what subjects or events are newsworthy and who can play the role of a newsmaker or a news trigger. The process of choosing the topics is a mechanism of coercion (Chilton et al. 1997: 212–213), and looking at media as at the source of information we should realize that they try to create a narrower framework of understanding (Moore et al. 2011: 5-9) forming everyday agenda. It refers to the fact that representations transmitted by media are limited by discourse and are interpreted depending on the context. As Hall (2005) writes in his article “Encoding / decoding”, an event cannot be broadcasted in its initial form; it becomes significant only when it is transmitted in discursive forms. ³ That’s why it is necessarily limited by discourse.

As it was mentioned before, the agenda of Western researchers partially coincides with the one reflected in media.

³ S. Hall investigates the processes of encoding and decoding in terms of television, so, describing discursive forms, he writes about audio-visual form of TV discourse.
Thus, Moldovan media reflect attempts to realize the state borders creating them this way at the same time. To analyze the way this issue is reflected in Moldovan news agencies the theory of discourse and methodology of Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 112) are used. The notion *nodal points of discourse* mean the core ideas of a discourse. The nodal points of discourses analyzed in this paper are East, West as well as two concepts that are connected to the role of these regions, – power and culture. The other notion used in this paper is *the chain of equivalents* understood as different concepts meaning the same thing. This notion was the main methodology of revealing the borders of the nodal points of the analyzed discourse. The coercion function mentioned before can be explained through the term *discursive space* understood as a reservoir for additional meanings that appear in articulatory practices i. e. meanings that each sign has or had but which are excluded by a certain discourse for the sake of consonance of significance.

Based on the theoretical ideas mentioned above I tried to answer two main research questions:

1) What are the boundaries of East and West? Do they include or exclude Moldova from the regions?

2) What is the role of both regions? What is their impact on Moldova?

**Boundaries of East and West**

There are different territories that are called “East” in Moldovan media. The first meaning is a part of Russia which includes Far East and Siberia, but it doesn’t influence Moldova at all. There were also some texts that used this term meaning eastern neighbors of Russia. Another region also meant by East is Middle East, it doesn’t have any impact on Moldova either, and there was only one text that connected Middle East with Moldova through the problem of migrants. The issue claimed
that Moldova became a platform for migrants from Middle East on their way to the West and included northern part of Africa and western part of Asia and the Muslim world. The third variant of using the term “East” is the south-eastern part of Ukraine, the frequency of this variant of East is much higher, since the conflict began there in 2014. It’s worth mentioning that partial synonymic usage we could find before 2014 when in media issues dedicated to Ukrainian elections we could read about split of the country into East and West. These texts almost never mention Moldova, so these three meanings exist but are irrelevant for Moldova. It is still interesting that all of them have more certain geographic boundaries.

All the texts that are connected to Moldova use the term East in two meanings. The first one is Eastern Europe which is not Europe itself but the eastern neighborhood of Europe. In this case Moldova represents itself as a part of East and this so called “easternity” gives it a chance to become a part of West, a chance for European integration, because the connection between Moldova and West becomes most obvious when media speak about Eastern Partnership or about European eastward motion. For example, “Poland as a member of the EU supports the idea of Moldova’s European integration. Our country, together with Sweden, proclaimed the idea of the Eastern Partnership, which helps to fulfill all obligations related to EU accession.” (Dashevsy 2012).

The second meaning of East is mentioned is a geopolitical region with less certain reference to any specific borders. We cannot trace its exact boundaries, but it is obvious that in most cases it means Russia first of all and more rarely includes Belarus and till 2014 included Ukraine. It is also represented by the Customs Union and, which is less frequent, EuroAsian Economic Community: “Former head of the Information and Security Service and former Defense Minister Valeriu Pasat stressed
at a press conference that the reorientation of the Republic of Moldova to the East to be held in two stages. First it should be at the economic level. “We are for our country’s entry into the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. The second step will be political integration.” (pan.md 2010).

This East is represented in details through its influence and the representation of the role of the geopolitical regions, but the territory is not specified.

As for the West, it is much more specific and almost all the texts about West are relevant to Moldova. There was only one storyline not relevant to Moldova about Europe that consists of two parts: the “Western part” and Russia. In this case we can say that it implies on the fact that Russia is also a part of the West, just another variant of western civilization.

As for the dominant meaning of the concept, there are some elements constantly understood as parts of the West. They include EU, countries like USA, UK, Turkey, Romania, Lithuania, cities – Brussels, Washington, and international organizations NATO, the COE, OSCE, the European Commission, IMF, UNIDO, USAID, etc. These two examples can show the way these equivalents work in the media texts: “After President Yanukovych’s removal from power, the West kept persisting in the victory of democracy and justice in Ukraine. US, EU, the IMF immediately accepted the new – “temporary revolutionary” – authorities” (enews.md 2014) or another issue published: “China and Russia are flexing their muscles, and the West obeys. Berlin and Brussels mutter inarticulate objections when the Kremlin sends magnate Khodorkovsky for many years in prison, but voice of outraged concerning the trial of ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko” (Bruggmann 2011).

It is easy to notice that these terms are used like contextual synonyms, which makes them create this equivalency for the key concepts.
It is worth emphasizing that the defined boundaries of both the West and the East are changeable. Thus, Ukraine was seen as a part of East until 2014, when its belonging changed. Since 2015 it is constantly characterized as a part of West. In a brighter way this change is reflected in texts that describe the process of the inner dissolution of Ukraine and the appearance of Eastern and Western areas of the country. For example, on 11-12 May, 2014 pan.md published a text with the title “East of Ukraine Holds a Referendum on Independence” (pan.md 2014a) and “South-east of Ukraine Chooses Independence” (pan.md 2014b).

In general, we can conclude that Moldovan media do not identify Moldova as a part of West. It is also clear that East and West are seen as regions with blurred but changeable boundaries and the meaning of the concepts can be different even if media use the same term, especially it is valid for East. There is a good example of relativity of borders of the regions, given in an interview with the ideologist of the left movement in Moldova for the analyzed period, Mark Tkachiuk: “If you truly profess European values, then you simply must welcome such a project as the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union. And let this project come alive to the East of the European Union’s borders. There is nothing wrong in it. For Moldova, the West has often been in the East” (Astakhova 2013)

It is important that Moldova is seen as a part of East but in some cases it is the way to be included in the Western region if the discourse about European vector of integration appears.

**The Roles of East and West**

The analysis of roles of both actors revealed some common features characteristic of West and East. At the same time, we can trace the idea that West also has some “inner levels” in Moldovan politics. Thus, some Moldovan parties are associated
with western influence, such as all the parties that founded the
Alliance for European Integration. These parties are associat-
ed with the West: “…For everything that happens in Moldova
the West has direct responsibility. Chisinau is in the power of
its people. They carry out the policy of the West, are fed from
there, getting from Brussels and Washington’s political and ide-
ological (anti-communism) and geopolitical (Russophobia) ad-
vice.” (Grek 2013).

As for Western activities as a geopolitical player, they
are always connected to the future and reforms. Thus, in 2014
there were some issues that wrote about big sums of Western
donations to Moldova: “The European Commission is the only
donor that will provide funding in 2014 in the form of external
grants to support the budget. These funds will be used in the
field of justice reform (224.8 million. Lei), to stimulate the econ-
omy in rural areas (209.8 million. Lei), the health sector (105.8
million. Lei). In addition, funds are allocated for the implemen-
tation of the action plan on visa liberalization (105.8 million.
Lei).” (pan.md 2014c).

One of the most frequent topics is the fight against
corruption, interference with the relationship between Moldo-
va and Transnistria4. The West also influences the inner social
and political relationship between different parties and ethnic
groups. This topic overlaps with the topic of values and anti-val-
ues that are traditionally associated with West.

As for Eastern activities, they don’t correlate that much
with the inner processes and media transmit information about

4 Renato Usatii, one of politicians became e newsmaker delivering
a talk on one of Moldovan TV channels about the danger of American
military forces in Moldova because they will interfere with Moldovan
relationship with Transnistria, published on 4th September 2014, enews.
md and many other Moldovan media like kp.md or point.md or ru1.md.
general influence that is not specific, but usually connected to historical past. A usual example is the Second World War when East made the world (and Moldova) free of fascism. Another significant characteristic that unites Moldova with the East and its glorious past is the orthodox belief, but the discourse becomes aggressive in connection to this topic: “The more Washington Regional Committee and Bucharest jackals will try to offend the Moldovan people and its Orthodox Church, to humiliate his dignity and destroy their culture and language, the greater the likelihood that they themselves will collapse and fall to pieces.” (Mazur 2012). It is also important that in some cases the East was mentioned through conjunction “and” with Russia.

Both West and East are displayed as forces that make Moldova choose between them, and Moldova loses a lot in this situation. There are many storylines about Moldova being doomed to Eastern integration, but obviously two options are open to Moldova. It seems that according to media texts Moldova would rather choose both options but is not allowed to by both actors.

They both give money for some reforms in economy and they are significant trading areas. But there is a big difference between these two partners: The West is a partner that requires a higher quality of products. There were some issues that described the East as an area where you can sell absolutely everything, even if it’s not good at all. The newsmaker for this idea was the president of Estonia who was quoted many times: “Pressure from Russia, first of all, opens up new possibilities for Moldova. If you have a blocked export of Moldovan goods to the East where you can sell all their manure, the domestic manufacturers will search for new markets and improve the quality of their products, making them more competitive, and will focus on the Western market, where standards are very high. You know that in the East you can sell all kinds of crap, but if you
want to sell in the West, it must meet certain quality requirements, – Ilves said.” (pan.md 2013).

This information was given by both analyzed agencies. At the same time as the East is presented as a more reliable and stable partner of Moldova, we could find references to long stable relationship between East and Moldova. Sometimes wine embargos and the oil prices re-emerged in this context though.

There was also another line in the description of East: sometimes it was displayed as a very poor region versus the rich Western region. In this case there were some accusations concerning the West in dishonest financial dispositions. In other words, the media say it is West to blame that East and Moldova are poor. Thus, on 19th December 2011 an article with a screaming title “Adevarul: European Gayduchestvo\textsuperscript{5}. Poor East is Forced to Pay for Illusion of West Prosperity” (Patritshi 2011) was published. It blamed political bureaucrats from the West that they destabilize the world and destroying the idealistic picture of the West. This discursive line met another contradictory one that tried to claim that Russia and the East are not that poor as Western media represent them, for example, this motif can be seen in the article “Why West is Hostile to Putin” (enews.md 2012).

The West is seen as a player that acts against Russia and the context of sanctions is the most frequent here. It is also mentioned that these sanctions correlate with the geopolitical role and the leverage of power.

Of course, this topic overlaps with geopolitical and economic topics, but there were also some issues dedicated only to civilizations. Thus the West is described as a region where the central values are comfort, individualism, freedom, rights

\textsuperscript{5} Gayduchestvo is a national movement against Turkish domination in the Balkans, including Moldova.
of individuals, at the same time it is described as practical. A bright example gives the article published in enews.md: “In Paradise people did not know the hard work searing the brain and the soul. West on its own practical businesslike way stubbornly chose to become closer the lost paradise. The liberation of people from the daily often painful domestic work was done not by Confucian China, not by India with its pantheon of 40 thousand gods and Buddha, not by spiritual Russia, the liberation was achieved by West that is pragmatic and thousand times accused of lack of spirituality.” (Polikovskiy 2015).

As for the East, it is described as region with values that are traditional for Moldova. The strongest connection is created by the shared orthodox belief that becomes an argument contra European integration: “Today the Orthodoxy is the only serious obstacle for the success of western expansion in our space”, pan.md cited a political scientist Victor Zhosu in the article “Victor Zhosu – The attack on the Orthodox: the West imposes Moldova religious chaos” (Zhosu 2015).

The opposition of the West and East is also transmitted through the attitude to money that is more important for Western culture that leads to a higher quality of life, including advanced gadgets and techniques, and to collectivism that is more important for the Eastern region. The ability to sacrifice your life is the line that draws the distinction: “This is the very desire to build a fair world that have people from the Russian space. It is within us, that feeling. It is difficult to describe in words, it can only be felt. It is only the Russian army soldier who may close the embrasure. Western troops will not do it ever” (enews.md 2015).

Moldova is seen as a part of eastern region in this dimension too.

To sum up, we can say that the two agencies represent Moldova as a part of East that also wants to become a part of
West. The situation that it is a part of East gives it a chance to become a part of West through the European Eastern Partnership. At the same time Moldova is represented as a country that wishes to keep the balance between these two powerful players but is not allowed to. It is always influenced by one of these actors and is not active in its movement to West or East as Moldova’s passive role shows in all the analyzed articles. The interesting thing is that we cannot say what the boundaries of East and West are, because they are blurred, but we can see that they are not geographic. These borders are drawn to show the distribution of power of big outside forces, geopolitical actors that influence Moldova’s position. The borders that media reflect and create also show the advantages and disadvantages for Moldova in economic area in case it chooses one of these directions. The third meaning of the borders we can see in media is cultural one, which makes Moldova’s choice between these regions connected to values and makes it even more symbolic and ritualized.

There are many articles that describe the difficulties of this choice between West and East in the analyzed sample. It is represented that in both cases there are some arguments pro and contra, but both regions have their leverages in political, economic and cultural life of Moldova. Any choice made by Moldova is described as the one that has hard consequences for the country, but also makes Moldova believe that there is a struggle for Moldova between East and West and this is a reason to be proud of the country. This way it becomes more significant in the world and maybe even has its specific role in the world politics.

These two actors are seen in the same roles, but they also have some differences. It can be seen in values, the requirements to the quality of goods sold in the trade area. West embodies connections to the future, while the East is connected to common past.
In general, the representation of West and East is quite narrow and does not reflect positive experience of collaboration with both sides. The analysis of media texts has demonstrated the lack of neutral information channels regarding both West and East.

References


Sources
Politics of Enmity


Yet unapproachable states: Cavell on America, Makavejev on Yugoslavia

Tertium Non Datur: Gellner on Wittgenstein and The Habsburg Dilemma

In his posthumously published book, *Language and Solitude*, Ernest Gellner writes about two different and fundamentally opposed visions of knowledge, but also of culture and the human condition. The first of these two he names atomism and recognizes it in such otherwise disparate intellectual figures as Descartes, Hume and Kant. The second he calls organicism, and recognizes it in British conservatives such as Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott, but also in romantics such as Wordsworth and Coleridge. (Gellner 2004:9)

The first vision starts with a solitary individual seen as an impartial seeker of truth – a sort of epistemological Robinson Crusoe. This solitary figure is impervious to all kinds of conformisms embodied in local customs and traditions, and guided by pure reasoning aims at seeing and describing the

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world as it really is, stripped of all sorts of cultural and historical biases. In epistemology it aims for objectivity, in politics – for, culturally unmediated, universalism. (Gellner 2004:17)

The second vision starts not with an individual, but with a community, with its specific ways of life and standards of correctness. In epistemology it breeds cultural relativism, in politics – conservatism, traditionalism and nationalism. As Gellner writes:

Cultures freeze associations, and endow them with a feel of necessity. They turn mere worlds into homes, where men can feel comfortable, where they belong rather than explore, where things have their allocated places and form a system. That is what a culture is. By contrast, atomistic philosophy loosens and corrodes these linkages. Atomistic individualism is custom-corrosive and culture-corrosive. It facilitates the growth of knowledge, and of productive effectiveness, but it weakens the authority of cultures and makes the world less habitable, more cold and alien. Deeply contrasted with the atomic theory of knowledge, there is what one might call the organic vision. First of all, this vision repudiates the individualism of its rival. No man, least of all when he endeavours to know and understand the world, is an island unto himself. Knowledge is essentially a team game. Anyone who observes, investigates or interprets the world, inevitably deploys concepts which are carried by an entire cultural/linguistic community. He cannot on his own understand the rules of its operation, if indeed he can understand them at all. They work through him, rather than simply being his self-created tools. Their wisdom is greater than his own. No single individual is capable of excogitating the system of ideas required to make a world: only the unconscious cunning of a culture and a language is capable of
such an achievement. Man cannot act on his own, but only when sustained by and interacting with other participants in this collective game. The ideas of a culture, of a historic tradition, of an ongoing community, work through him. He is their agent, and cannot be their author, or even, perhaps, their critic. (Gellner 2004:6)

According to Gellner, the dividing line between the two visions does not have to turn into a political division, but the historical and political situation of the Habsburg Empire, however, has put the two visions firmly at odds with one another in the political arena, and has finally led to the Empire’s dissolution. On the one side, Gellner notes, where the universalist and individualist liberals, often Jewish, who embraced and defended the cosmopolitan and pluralist character of the Empire. On the other, where the nationalists, speaking in the name of the many ethnic communities which composed the Habsburg Empire, the Hungarians, the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Croats – and their right to homogenous national states, based on ethnic specificity, and communal traditions of peasant communities. (Gellner 2004:11) Gellner writes:

The opposition between individualism and communalism, between the appeal of Gesellschaft (“Society”) and of Gemeinschaft (“Community”), a tension which pervades and torments most societies disrupted by modernisation, became closely linked to the hurly burly of daily political life and pervaded the sensibility of everyone. Hence the deep irony of the situation: an authoritarian Empire, based on a medieval dynasty and tied to the heavily dogmatic ideology of the Counter-Reformation, in the end, under the stimulus of ethnic, chauvinistic centrifugal agitation, found its most eager defenders amongst individualist liberals, recruited in considerable part from an erstwhile pariah group
and standing outside the faith with which the state was once so deeply identified... There were also, of course, the opponents of the liberals. The ethnic groups on the margins of the Empire were not quite so interested in their own absorption into the cosmopolitan culture of the centre or in winning places in its pervasive bureaucracy, as were the nouveaux riche and newly emancipated. They could do better when in control of their own closed unit than when competing in the cosmopolitan centre... The peasant culture did not merely need to be explored, it had to be advertised and glorified; its charms and that of the milieu in which it flourished had to be extolled. And this was indeed the characteristic stance of the romantics-populists, the opponents of the universalists individualists. They rhapsodised about the charms of the village green and of the idiosyncrasy and earthiness of its folk culture. They explored it, but they also loved it and sang its praises. They defended it against bloodless cosmopolitanism. What mattered was its specificity, its distinctiveness, its roots. These theorists could not be universalists. (Gellner 2004:12)

According to Gellner, the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, although not self-consciously political, presents an important illustration of this all-pervasive clash of visions: Wittgenstein’s early work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is an almost ideal representative of the first vision of knowledge, and his later work, *Philosophical Investigations*, represents an ideal example of the second. As Gellner argues, the *Tractatus*, “is a poem to solitude. It is also an expression of the individualistic-universalistic, atomic vision of knowledge, thought, language and the world.” (Gellner 2004:46). Guided not only by Humean empiricist strivings, but also by his particular Jewish experience of rootlessness and loneliness, Wittgenstein has carried the atomistic vision to a previously unseen level. Where
Hume found a way to temper his skepticism by his joviality and sociability (his skeptic worries subside the minute he goes back into society, specifically into a company of men playing backgammon), Wittgenstein persists until he builds a picture of the world consisting of nothing else but cold, indifferent, dead facts, which are not open for a multiplicity of perspectives or interpretations. Gellner compares this picture of the world with a prison, from which, Wittgenstein assures us, there is no escape. (Gellner 2004:54) Conspicuously, as Gellner notes, this world is completely devoid of culture and cultural diversity. He writes that the *Tractatus* could be summarized in only one sentence, “There is no such thing as culture”:

> What the book in effect does is to explore, in a formal and a priori way, the relationship between a single mind and its world. It also says, as we have stressed, that this relationship is the same for all minds. Its central features are predetermined by the very conditions of the encounter between any mind and its data, or a world constructed, or rather just accumulated, from its data. Alternatively, and this is the crucial duality of theme, it is predetermined by the very possibilities of the encounter between any language and any world, and it makes no difference whether that language is used by one, two, many individuals, or none at all. Underneath the surface, it is and must be the same language. As for the diversity of what we normally call ‘languages’, this is entirely superficial: genuine referential content has the same form in all of them. (Gellner 2004:68)

According to Gellner, it was only in *The Philosophical Investigations* that Wittgenstein has found a way to escape the prison he has built for himself in the *Tractatus*. But, as Gellner notes, this was a *joint escape*: not one, but two prisoners were escaping their cell in a joint effort. The first of these was
the solitary ego from the *Tractatus*, and the other was a rootless, alienated, cosmopolitan Jew, whose predicament was in the meantime further aggravated by the fact that the cosmopolitan Empire which protected him had been dissolved and replaced by national communities that provided no place for rootless individuals such as himself. The first of these prisoners, Gellner claims, had a means to escape – the rope that would enable him to flee his cell, and that rope was language. Alas, he had nowhere to go – the language of the *Tractatus* was destined only to reflect the dreary facts of the world, and could not help him rejoin the human community. The other prisoner, however, had no means of escape, but he had an idea of where he could escape – to the rural communities celebrated in the other horn of the Habsburg dilemma – the homogenous ethnic communities on their village green. If only he could join them, he could escape his solitude. But, his identity precluded this. He had no roots and no specific culture to rejoin. He was destined to lifeless universalism, and therefore to solitude. (Gellner 2004:81)

But, Gellner notes that the two prisoners, who were of course one and the same person – Ludwig Wittgenstein – were able to help each other. If language was not what it appeared to be in the *Tractatus*, not just a reflection of the facts, but unavoidably embedded in communal practices and forms of life, then by the very fact of using language, Wittgenstein could escape his solitude. And this was, according to Gellner, Wittgenstein’s motivation (if not his reason) for writing the *Philosophical Investigations*, the book that aims to demonstrate exactly that language is inevitably communal, and regulated by communal standards and practices. If *Tractatus* could be summarized in the sentence “The is no such thing as culture”, then the *Investigations* could be summarized in the sentence “Culture is everything” (Gellner 2004:83).
According to Gellner, Wittgenstein’s turn was, although probably unbeknownst to himself, guided by the Habsburg Dilemma, which led him to believe that there was no third option between rootless universalism and rooted cosmopolitanism. As Gellner puts it, Wittgenstein believed that in this choice *tertium non datur*, and that if he wanted to escape the solitary confinement of universalism, he had to embrace communalism, which he did. Gellner claims that the third option, “which would preserve the wider and liberal state and at the same time satisfy the nationalist craving”, and which would “turn nations into non-territorial cultural associations, which would leave the political and economic order to a non-ethnic central agency” (Gellner 2004:79), actually did exist, even in Wittgenstein’s own time. However, it remained neglected and marginalized by the much louder proponents of the two dominant visions. Therefore, this third vision remained invisible to Wittgenstein who was, albeit unknowingly, guided by the aforementioned dichotomy. Either high culture, or folk-culture; either rootedness, or rootlessness; either universalism, or communal particularism; either bloodless cosmopolitanism, or nationalism, these were the only choices that he was aware of, and in the *Investigations*, he opted for the second option in each of them.

However, national-romanticism and ethnic communitarianism that were set against the “rootless cosmopolitanism” of the Habsburg Empire were, as Gellner notes, “fraudulent” – in the name of folk-culture, they were building a high culture of their own. In the name of communal intimacy and closeness, they were establishing impersonal bureaucracies and free markets. Or, as Gellner puts it: “The enthusiastic consumers of the idea of ethnic *Gemeinschaft* were those who found themselves in a *Gesellschaft* which, owing to the exigencies of a modern economy, had to organize itself around one standardised high culture or another. Rival cultures, struggling for the control of
the commanding bureaucratic heights of a given society, did so in the language of communal ethnicity, which was totally alien to the actual reality of the situation. Gemeinschaft was now the ideology of a particular kind of Gesellschaft, namely, the modern chauvinistic nation-state.” (Gelner 2004:185) Or, put differently, “The irony was that they preached the good life of the old village, and the eager consumers of their doctrine were mobile anonymous members of the new society, anxious to identify with one ethnic but codified and school-transmitted culture, and anxious to bring political units into line with this identification.” (Gelner 2004: 76) However, since he never explicitly engaged with sociology and politics, and since he was never fully aware of the sociological and political undercurrents of his thought, Wittgenstein remained unaware of this irony, or at least, so claims Gellner:

This is the real essence of Wittgenstein’s development: the populist idea of the authority of each distinctive culture is applied to the problem of knowledge. In answer to (say) Hume’s question, what justification is there for inductive inference, the answer would be: the peasants on our village green have always done it and we, as loyal sons of Ruritanian culture, will defend Ruritanian customs (including induction) to the death! Our cosmopolitan enemies, eager to dominate us and to assimilate us to the bloodless civilisation of their metropolis, are trying to deprive us of our customary dances, music, and induction. But they underestimate our resolve, the bravery and resolution of our young men. We shall fight in our mountains and forests, and we shall preserve our culture, our customs (induction included, especially in its distinct Ruritanian forms, which have many charming nuances, quite distinct from those tedious standardised inductive procedures of the metropolis). (Gellner 2004:73)
Cavell on Wittgenstein, Emerson and Finding as Founding

However, there is a very different reading of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, and its political implications – one offered by American philosopher Stanley Cavell. Unlike, Gellner, Cavell sees Wittgenstein’s later work not as a defense of unreflexive communalism and uncritical acceptance of everyday practices, but on the contrary, as showing way to a new community or, as Cavel says, the eventual everyday. Commenting on a famous line from the *Investigations*, “the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated about the fixed point of our real need” (Wittgenstein 1958:46), Cavell writes:

Wittgenstein’s formulation about having to accept the given plays its part, I feel sure, in conveying a political or social sense of the Investigations as conservative. This was the earliest of the political or social descriptions, or accusations, I recall entered against the *Investigations*. Writers as different as Bertrand Russell and Ernest Gellner greeted the book’s appeal to the ordinary or everyday as the expression of so to speak *petit bourgeois* fear of change, whether of individual inventiveness or of social revolution. Now I think Wittgenstein must leave himself open to something like this charge, because a certain distrust, even horror of change – change that comes in certain forms – is part of the sensibility of the *Investigations*. But simply to say so neglects the equally palpable call in the book for transfiguration, which one may think of in terms of revolution or of conversion… Wittgenstein’s appeal or “approach” to the everyday finds the (actual) everyday to be as pervasive a scene of illusion and trance and artificiality (of need) as Plato or Rousseau or Marx or Thoreau had found. His philosophy of the (eventual) is the proposal of a practice that takes on, takes upon itself, precisely (I do not say exclusively) that scene of illusion and
loss; approaches it, or let me say reproaches it, intimately enough to turn it, or deliver it; as if the actual is the womb, contains the terms of the eventual. (Cavell 1989:46)

What, according to Wittgenstein, has to be accepted as given are forms of life. However, distinguishing between what he calls the ethnological, or “horizontal”, and the biological, or “vertical” sense of Wittgenstein’s forms of life, Cavell claims that the latter sense can be taken to contest the charge of Wittgenstein’s political and social conservatism. Far from the nationalist decree that Gellner accuses Wittgenstein of having implicitly accepted in the *Investigations*, “that cultural roots alone, and nothing else, can make you human”, that “the only qualities which are echt human are those imposed compulsively by an ethnic background, those which well up in your bosom in a surge of irresistible, authentic feeling” (Gellner 2004:82), Cavell claims that Wittgenstein is primarily interested in “the difference between the human and so-called ‘lower’ or ‘higher’ forms of life, between, say, poking at your food, perhaps with a fork and pawing at it, or pecking at it.” (Cavell 1989:42) Cavell concludes:

Cavell’s “biological” interpretation of Wittgenstein’s forms of life, presents us with an alternative explanation for what Gellner also notes – that in Wittgenstein’s *Investigations* “no concrete culture was ever named”. Gellner ascribes this “omission” to the fact that Wittgenstein “expounded his position in a stratospherically abstract form” (Gellner 2004:75), but Cavell’s explanation seems more convincing – Wittgenstein names no concrete cultures, because his main interest does not lie in the ethnological, but in the biological sense of forms of life. If he is interested in culture, then it is not any one specific culture, but culture as specifically human form of life. His point is not that belonging to a specific culture makes us human, but that living in culture is a part of being human. Or, as Cavell says, according to Wittgenstein, culture as a whole is to be thought as
“a system of modifications of our life as talkers that are specific and confined to us, to the human life form, like running in place, or hoping” (Cavell 1989:48).

In his book *This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures on Emerson After Wittgenstein* (Cavell 1989), Cavell explicitly discusses Wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture. Starting from the claim made by G.H. von Wright, that Wittgenstein shared Spengler’s pessimistic view of contemporary culture, Cavell argues that, despite clear influences of Spengler’s thought, Wittgenstein did not share either the German philosopher’s pessimism, or his cultural and historical determinism. The basic parallel between the two thinkers, Cavell notes, is in their vision of modern culture as a “loss of human orientation and spirit that is internal to human language and culture” (Cavell 1989:59). However, according to Cavell, where Spengler sees this loss of orientation as an inevitable consequence of the transformation of culture into civilization, Wittgenstein sees the perpetual threat that is inherent in our “life as talkers”, or as beings of culture, a threat which can be treated and overcome equally perpetually as it occurs, through the same means that causes it – language and culture. Pointing out the difference between the two views, Cavell quotes a passage from Spengler which evokes the problems that Gellner discusses in his interpretation of Wittgenstein – opposition between folk culture and cosmopolitan civilization, roots and rootlessness, vitality and artificiality, urban and rural:

Civilization is the inevitable *destiny* of the Culture... Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of developed humanity is capable humanity is capable. They are a conclusion--- death following life, rigidity following expansion, petrifying world-city following mother-earth. They are... irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again—a progressive exhaustion of forms... This is a very
great stride toward the organic... – what does it signify? The world-city means cosmopolitanism in place of “home”... to the world city belongs (a new sort of nomad), not a folk, but a mob. (Cavell 1989:65)

If, indeed, this was Wittgenstein’s view also, then that could be another source of corroboration for Gellner’s interpretation of the *Investigations* – in affirming forms of life, Wittgenstein might seem to defend culture in Spenglerian terms – meaning rural, folk culture – against the threat of rootless cosmopolitanism posed by the urban, universalist high culture or, as Spengler would say, civilization. But, as Cavell argues, this is not the case, and despite a certain affinity between Spengler’s and Wittgenstein’s view of culture, there is also a deep difference between them:

I will characterize a difference by saying that in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein *diurnalizes* Spengler’s vision of the destiny towards exhausted forms, towards nomadism, toward the loss of culture, or say of home, or say of community: he depicts our everyday as brushes with skepticism, wherein the ancient task of philosophy, to awaken us, or say to bring us to our senses, take the form of returning us to the everyday, the ordinary, every day, diurnally. Since we are not returning to anything we have known, the task is really, as seen before, of turning. The issue then is to say why the task presents itself as returning – which should show us why it presents itself as directed to the ordinary. (Cavell 1989:66)

According to Cavell, then, Wittgenstein does not propose a return to earlier stages of culture, Gellner’s folk culture on the “village green”; quite the contrary, he recognizes such a return to be impossible. The way out of solitude, and towards community, is not back into a mythologized past, but into the present, the everyday, but, as we have previously seen,
a transfigured everyday. The picture of how community must look like – as a peasant community on the village green, for example, then presents itself not as a way out of solitude, but, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, as one more “picture that holds us captive”, that we have to overcome in the philosophical work of turning, or awakening. As Cavell writes: “Something is under attack in Wittgenstein, ways of arriving at the certainty of our lives, pictures of closeness and connection, that themselves deny the conditions of human closeness” (Cavell 1989:45).

In this, Cavell claims, Wittgenstein has more in common with the American Transcendentalist, Ralph Waldo Emerson, than with Spengler, for what is under attack in Emerson is, “a way of arriving at the future (a way of discovering America), pictures of progress and piety that deny the conditions of a society of undenied human beings remain to be realized” (Cavell 1989:45). Both thinkers, Cavell finds, recognize poverty as a condition of philosophy: Wittgenstein in destroying metaphysical “structures of air”, and Emerson in writing of America as a place of poverty – meaning, a community lacking its own high culture and a history of European metaphysics – a poverty that Emerson does not see as a deficiency, but as an opportunity. Cavell writes:

Poverty as a condition of philosophy is hardly a new idea, Emerson deploys it as an idea specifically of America’s deprivations, its bleakness and distance from Europe’s achievements, as constituting America’s necessity, and its opportunity, for finding itself. Others take Emerson to advise America to ignore Europe; to me his practice means that part of the task of discovering philosophy in America is discovering the terms in which it is given to us to discover the philosophy of Europe. Its legacy may hardly look like philosophy at all, but perhaps like an odd development
of literature. By European patterns, Americans will seem, in Thoreau’s phrase, “poor students”, the phrase by which Thoreau identifies the unaccomodated who are his rightful readers. It might well prove of peculiar interest to an American that what Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* means by the ordinary should strike certain readers as an impoverished idea of philosophy in its own systematic shunning, its radical discounting, or recounting, of philosophical terms and arguments and results, its relentless project to, perhaps we can say, de-sublimize thought. (Cavell 1989:71).

But there is, according to Cavell, another aspect which connects Wittgenstein and Emerson, and both of them with Freudian psychoanalysis. This effort to de-sublimize thought has to be one of returning from the metaphysical and ideal, into the everyday, but as Freud teaches us, it is never the that we have once known, or how we have pictured it, repetition is impossible. I take this also to be the point of Gellner’s claim that nationalism is *fraudulent* – although it claims to offer a cure for rootlessness and homelessness, for alienation and anomie of modernity, it does not recreate the folk communities of old but establishes modern states in their name. To translate it into Emersonian terms, nationalism is a sort of “clutching” – Emerson writes: “I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (Emerson 1950:357) – to the idea of home and soil, this time as a firm foundation of the political community, its firm rootedness in the peasant culture of old: an attempt at willful repetition, aiming for the familiar, but ending up in disappointment and tragedy. However, Cavell also notes that Emerson also reminds us of the “handsomest” part of condition, which presents a way out of this “clutching”, and it is our capacity to be attracted to things (Cavell 1989:89). But, in order to allow ourselves to
be attracted, to desire again, we must surpass our fixated desires, let them be “rotated around the axis of our real need” or, in another Wittgensteinian phrase, to free ourselves from the pictures that hold us captive. It is here that Cavell sees the necessity of Wittgensteinian practice of philosophy as therapy, as well as its relatedness to psychoanalysis as a therapy and Emerson’s thinking on replacing founding (of a nation, in this case, of America), with finding:

Finding ourselves on a certain step we may feel the loss of foundation to be traumatic, to mean the ground of the world falling away, the bottom of things dropping out, ourselves foundered, sunk on a stair. But on another step we may feel this idea of (lack of) foundation to be impertinent, an old thought for an old world. (...) Philosophy begins in loss, in finding yourself at a loss... Philosophy that does not so begin is so much talk. Loss is as such not to be overcome, it is interminable, for every new finding might incur a new loss. (Foundation reaches no farther than each issue of finding.) Then philosophy ends in recovery from terminable loss. Philosophy that does not end so, but seeks to find itself before or beyond that, is to that extent so much talk. The recovery from loss is, in Emerson, as in Freud, and in Wittgenstein, a finding of the world, a returning of it, to it. The price is necessarily to give something up, to let go of something, to suffer one’s poverty. (Cavell 1989:109)

Indeed, for Emerson, as Cavell notes, America has yet to be found, or re-found, again and again, for it is dependent on its promise of freedom and community of “undenied human beings”, that still does not exist. Emerson writes that we need “to die out from Nature, and into this new yet unapproachable America” and Cavell interprets his words to mean that the America he speaks about is: “Unapproachable by a process of
continuity, if to find it is indeed (to be ready) to be born again, that is to say, suffer conversion; conversion is to be turned around, reversed, and that seems to be a matter for discontinuity.” (Cavell 1989:91)

In an earlier text, his reading of Shakespeare’s *King Lear*, in unexpected digression, Cavell writes of America thusly:

It had a mythical beginning still visible, if ambiguous, to itself and to its audience: before there was Russia, there was Russia; before there was France and England, there was France and England; but before there was America there was no America. America was discovered, and what was discovered was not a place, one among others, but a setting, the backdrop of destiny. (…) But its fantasies are those of impotence, because it remains at the mercy of its past, because its present is continuously ridiculed by the fantastic promise of its origin and its possibility, and because it has never been assured that it will survive. Since it has a birth, it may die. It feels mortal. And it wishes proof not merely of its continuance but of its existence, a fact it has never been able to take for granted. (Cavell 1976:344-345)

Commenting on this passage, Richard Eldridge notes that, as opposed to European countries, “America has been from the beginning and remains the nation of no settled tribe or Stamm, of no national religion, not even of any national language.” (Eldridge 2003:177) The bearing of Cavell’s vision of America both on his reading of Emerson, and on Gellner’s problem of nationalism is clear – America is not, and indeed cannot be, a nation state like the European nation states – it lacks both the high culture, and the folk culture in whose name the high culture claims to speak. That is its poverty, but also its mortality – it is incapable of seeing itself as a continuation of the vital and vibrant local ethnic culture, it was founded by
contract, and therefore seems fragile, and dependent solely on the preparedness of its citizens to continue living together and recognizing each other as members of the same community. But Cavell’s point is that this is not to be lamented but recognized and accepted, together with conditions which make this re-finding possible – a preparedness for conversion, for leaving behind pictures “closeness and community” that deny us the possibility of finding real closeness and community. In this respect, what seems as America’s fragility, may turn out to be its privileged position – unburdened with a specifically European stock of such pictures (of folk culture and the village green), it lays bare what nationalism “fraudulently” covers up – that the modern society cannot be turned back into a tight-knit, ethnically homogenous community, and cannot guarantee its stability by pretending to stand for one.

But if philosophy is what awakens us to the everyday, helps us come back from our fantasies and pictures that hold us captive, into the everyday, and find our way to community with others, how is America, bereft of European philosophical heritage, to be able to articulate its own philosophy? As we have already seen, Cavell believes that according to Emerson, this philosophy might not look like philosophy at all, but might be (like in Emerson’s own, but also in Thoreau’s case) more like literature, or art. But again, a question might be posed, without a high culture of its own, how can America articulate it philosophical voice, even in literary, or artistic terms? Cavell sees a possibility for this articulation in what he refers to as “the wild intelligence of American popular culture” (Cavell 1990:13). In his book The Pursuits of Happiness, he gives several examples of how, through a seemingly mundane Hollywood genre of romantic comedy exemplifies the kind of philosophical work which is supposed to awaken us from our illusions and allow us to return to a transfigured everyday. (Cavell 1981)
Let us summarize the essential disagreement between Gellner and Cavell as interpreters of Wittgenstein, and the implications of this disagreement for the political problems of community and nationalism. Gellner sees Wittgenstein’s thought as determined by the Habsburg Dilemma, as leaving essentially no third option in the choice between universalism, urban cosmopolitanism, rootlessness and high culture, on one side, and unreflexive ethnic communalism, rootedness in rural customs and practices and folk culture on the other, and the *Investigations* as arguing for the second option. Cavell, on the other hand, sees the *Investigations* as calling for a transfiguration of everyday customs and practices, not according to an outward universalist blueprint (like Plato’s Sun, which stands outside the cave of everyday experience), but through a process of conversion, or awakening from the pictures that hold us captive – pictures of how a community must look like if it is to be a community at all. Cavell’s reading of Emerson through a Wittgensteinian lens, together with his readings of Hollywood film, further open up a third option that Gellner remains blind to – a community based neither on high culture (the culture of the universalist Empire, Spengler’s civilization of the metropolis), nor on folk culture of rural communities, but on popular culture. Such a community represents another way out of solitude, but it does not take itself to be guaranteed by common origin. Instead, its stability presents a perpetual task for its members, a task of finding ways to talk to each other, express themselves and their interests in ways which lets them continue the conversation about their community. In a sentence, community is not to be founded, but found, or perpetually re-found.

**Makavejev on Being Yugoslav**

In the beginning of his famous book, *Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State*, Zoran Đindić writes:
The condition we call Yugoslavia exists. On its outward dimension, intersubjective consensus can be easily achieved. We can point to a clearly bounded territory and a proper name that is assigned to it. But, what is the situation with the inward dimension of this condition, its “identity”? Will it, like some kind of ontological “surplus value”, appear by simple addition of objective elements, the territory and its name? What kind of “subjective factor” will we find if we look for the inward dimension of the territory called Yugoslavia? Yugoslavs? Could we say that Yugoslavia represents a territory populated by Yugoslavs? We all know that this tautology is not true... The assertion “I am a Yugoslav” cannot be either true or false... This hovering between truth and falsity is not just a simple gnoseological feature, but follows from the condition of the object to which the statement refers. It follows from Yugoslavia itself being a hovering condition. (Đinđić 2010:1-2)

What Đinđić was referring to in calling Yugoslavia a “hovering condition” was the question of Yugoslavian sovereignty which had been, fifteen years before his writing, relegated to its constituent republics, resulting, according to Đinđić, in a kind of Spenglerian pseudomorphosis, in which the empty Yugoslavian framework has effectively been “filled out” by the crystalline structure of the emerging ethno-national states. However, according to Đinđić, this situation was not primarily a product of an institutional deficiency, but of a lack of symbolic and emotional identification on behalf of the citizens to Yugoslavia as a state:

If we look at our situation from this angle, that is with a national focus, it is clear why Yugoslavia cannot become a nation-state in the real sense of the word. It is not only that the formal attributes of national statehood have been robbed from it by the republican nation states, so that it can only
be what is suggested in concept of pseudomorphosis – an empty form. A lot more important than this institutional emptying is the lack of symbolic and emotional substance. A nation-state in not integrated primarily through institutions, but through shared symbols in which the unity of a political community is present, and does not have to be specifically addressed... Such a type of symbolic identification with Yugoslavia is impossible, it is possible only with the nations within it. (Đindić 2010:5)

In Đindić’s vision, Yugoslavia is than not a state, but a “condition”, marked primarily by its lack, its incapability of becoming a national state, or a community with which its citizens can identify. In short, Yugoslavia lacked a foundation.

But as we will see, there is a different view of the matter of Yugoslav identity, one offered by the Yugoslav director Dušan Makavejev. In order to interpret this view, we will first have to turn to Cavell’s article on Makavejev, “On Makavejev on Bergman”. In this article, Cavell calls Makavejev “a patriot of the still invisible fatherland” (Cavell 1979:329), recognizably referring to Emerson’s “new, yet unapproachable America”. Guided by this phrase, we can turn to the elements of Makavejev’s vision which would confirm a vision of community that he recognizes in Emerson’s (and as we have seen, in Wittgenstein’s) writing – one based on finding instead of founding, on popular, instead of high culture.

Cavell’s insight proves vital for understading Makavejev’s film *Innocence Unprotected* (1968), a film most specifically concerned with the question of what it means to be Yugoslav, that is on the question of Yugoslav identity. Just like many other Makavejev’s films, *Innocence Unprotected* is a collage made out of documentary footage combined with fictional material, but what makes it especially interesting is the fact that the fictional
material is, in this case, a romantic comedy, first Yugoslav “talkie”, filmed in Belgrade during the German occupation in WWII – *Innocence Unprotected* (1941). This film is then intercut with pieces of German wartime propaganda shown in Belgrade cinemas during the occupation, film-journals made by the Serbian quisling government, and contemporary documentary footage of Makavejev’s interviews with actors and authors of *Innocence Unprotected* (1941).

The original comedy, clearly modeled on Hollywood comedies of the era, has a seemingly simple plot – a young acrobat, played by then famous real-life strongman, Dragoljub Aleksić – falls in love with a girl whose mother wants her to marry someone else, a rich older man. Although his love is reciprocated, the mother’s plans presents an obstacle which the young couple must overcome in order to end up together. In a subplot, we learn that the acrobat used to have another girlfriend, over whose picture he sometimes still nostalgically pines. In the end, the mother’s plans to stop her daughter from marrying the acrobat are thwarted (Aleksić bursts through the window of the room in which the girl has been held captive by her mother and her aggressive older suitor, and runs away with her using his acrobatic skills, meanwhile knocking out his opponent and once more proving his strength and skill). In the conclusion of the subplot, the acrobat gives a monologue directed at the picture of his old flame, telling “her” that he will always cherish their time spent together, but that now he is prepared to let her memory go, and then he convinces his new girlfriend that his feelings for her are real, by singing a romantic song – “Don’t you know that you are my only love?”. Throughout the film, we are shown scene of Aleksić’s acrobatic feats – walking on tightrope, doing headstands on top of tall metal constructions, and, most fascinatingly of all – hanging from a flying biplane while holding to an iron chain only by his bare teeth.
Intercut with the footage from the original film, is a speech by the prime minister of the quisling government, general Milan Nedić, from a propaganda film entitled “The New Serbia”. The prime minister, General [Milan] Nedić said in his speech:

“I want to see my people once again free, united, and happy. The survival of our nation comes first, and we shall defend it by every means available, so rally behind the Serbian banner. There are some people who still think only of Yugoslavia, but I ask them, ‘What about Serbia? What about the Serbian people and their future? Brothers, do you want a Serbian cooperative state where the peasants’ voices are heard, or do we descend again into nebulous uncertainty and lose sight of what is truly Serbian?’ The people enthusiastically replied, “We want a Serbian peasant state!”

Nedić’s vision of Serbia is instantly recognizable as one based on the picture of a homogenous peasant community. Equally recognizable is his vision of Yugoslavia as a “nebulous uncertainty” – rootless super-state, without, to use Eldridge’s phrase, its own “tribe or stamm”. As Gellner teaches us, this appeal to the Gemeinschaft is fraudulent, and behind it lies a project of establishing a “modern chauvinist nation-state” – which is exactly what Nazi occupied, Nedić’s Serbia was. Makavejev shows us this fraudulence through a skillful montage of Nedić’s speech with the footage of German military orchestra playing Serbian folk songs – this is the truth of Nedić’s fraudulent vision.

On the other hand, Makavejev combines the footage of Aleksić’s acrobatic feats with the contemporary, color footage of now aged Aleksić, recreating these feats while holding the flags of the new, socialist Yugoslavia. The soundtrack to these scenes, added by Makavejev, ranges from L’Internationale (during the
scenes in which Aleksić is performing an escape act, freeing himself from the chains) to American swing numbers. This is how Makavejev sees what it means to be Yugoslav – as a balancing act, literally – “a hovering condition”, only for Makavejev, this is not a deficiency of being Yugoslav, but a feat, an opportunity. Is this rootlessness? “A nebulous uncertainty”? It is certainly not a picture of a rooted identity, but neither is it “bloodless”, or “lifeless”, much less solitary – it is a part of popular entertainment, or popular culture, just like Aleksić’s romantic comedy, which, once again, through Makavejev’s montage, intercut with the scenes of German propaganda, uncovers its emancipatory message – the “arranged marriage” between Serbia and Nazi Germany will be pulled asunder, escape is possible, Yugoslavia, once again, found. On top of that, Aleksić gives a lesson in mourning, or overcoming loss. Instead of staying captive to the picture of his old love, he comes to terms with the loss, and is prepared to love again. This is a lesson of replacing founding with finding. As Cavell writes: “Finding ourselves on a certain step we may feel the loss of foundation to be traumatic, to mean the ground of the world falling away, the bottom of things dropping out, ourselves founded, sunk on a stair. But on another step we may feel this idea of (lack of) foundation to be impertinent, an old thought for an old world.” (Cavell 1989:109) A passage that might as well have been written to describe Aleksić’s acrobatic performance of being Yugoslav.

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Introduction

István Bibó (1911-1979) is “a great sage of a small nation living in an epoch of hysteria,” as Adam Michnik puts it in his foreword to this Hungarian political thinker and practitioner’s recently published collection titled *The Art of Peacemaking: Political Essays of István Bibó* (2015). The legacy of Bibó’s thought is as relevant today as it was brilliant, striking, and yet sidelined 70 years ago when his original essay “The Miseries of Small Eastern European States” was written in 1946. Its deep and far sighted conclusions serve as an invitation for the consideration of the character and dynamics of the contemporary challenges in Central and Eastern Europe in the quarter century after the end of the Cold War. In this paper, I critically reflect on the main themes from Bibó’s *small states* book, such as nationalism, political hysteria and identity crises, and put them in context of the discourses of the post-socialist, post-authoritarian, and post-conflict transition in the former Yugoslav countries (or the region that is most commonly referred to as the Western Balkans, South-Eastern Europe, or post-Yugoslav

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1 Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade
2 In Hungarian. Serbian translation in 1996.
space). This region is a signifier of a prolonged period of transformation that is parallel but contrastingly different from the rather more successful democratization process that has taken place in Central Europe and the former countries of the Warsaw Pact. As usual observations in the literature, there can be found references to the problems of democratization in “post-Communist Europe” that are related to semi-consolidated democracies, illiberal political regimes, legacies of ethnonationalism, and the importance of the EU’s enlargement policies in the region of small states.

A quarter century after the beginning of the wars in Yugoslavia that tore the fabric of the country and its society apart, what can be noted is the resurgence of the nationalist rhetoric and political practices best characterised as ethnonationalism.

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3 For this see, for example, Ekiert, Kubik, Vachudova 2007. For a more recent and thorough analysis of the key problems in the Western Balkans and the implications of the crisis of the EU enlargement policies, see a Clingendael Report (2014: 5). The key problems for the region in general are depicted with the following representations that can illustrate the differences between the transformations in the two regions after the end of the Cold War: “kept back by deep-seated political and inter-ethnic divisions, resulting in the stagnation of economic and political reforms, high unemployment, and widespread corruption. Although the steady stream of EU reports acknowledges the dire situation in the region, the EU and its member states have resigned themselves to the status quo”. Some of the language that characterizes the political dynamics and reality in the region is, for example, “rent-seeking elites”, “chronic malaise,” “uncompromising political elites”, “ethno-nationalist parties”, “refeudalization”, “weak regional governance,” “clientelism,” “patronage,” “stagnation”, “muddling through”.

4 Cf. Vachudova 2014; Vachudova 2006.

5 As Benedict Anderson famously argues, nations are “imagined communities.” Also, Uriel Abulof (2009: 234) in his study of small peoples gives a useful discussion connecting the notion of “etnie” that is “has given rise to the national creed” is a form of “national polity” that is “contested, like ethnic identity, from within and without.” He notes that
In his book of a telling title *Ethnic Times*, Dušan Kecmanović (2002: 6), a university professor and psychiatrist who left Yugoslavia in 1992, offers the general, yet contextually informed understanding of the ‹dark side› of the ethnonational conceptions:

Belittling others and aggrandizing one’s own is a basic characteristic of ethnonationalism. The fact that ethnonationalism can be demonstrated paradoxically both as hatred towards one’s own folk, along with a completely uncritical attitude towards the entonationalism of the community with which one’s own is in conflict.

Writing about the idea and practice of ethnonationalism in the post-Yugoslav space, Kecmanović also refers to “narcissism of small differences” and points to the fact that “the bloodiest civil wars are fought because the enemies have a lot in common, thus the saying there is no war until brother fights brother. At the heart of this phenomenon lies every ethnic group’s need to establish and maintain its identity as permanently and as firmly as possible. Painstaking skill is required to distinguish yourself from those who resemble you. This is accomplished by the members of one ethnic group projecting onto the members of another ethnic group all that is negative in themselves and that they do not wish to acknowledge as part of themselves. The ideal object for this projection is not someone whose characteristics are quite different from ours, but someone who is similar – just like us, and yet different” (Kecmanović 2002: 5).

This paper takes the position of social constructivism in International Relations (IR) to reflect on what Alexander Wendt “ethnonational creed may materialize in varying degrees”, and I would add here that depending on the context we study, it may have not only implications in terms of “self-government, autonomy, or sovereignty”, but as it has been the case in the Balkans, in the more extreme forms of exclusion and political violence.
(1999: 231) terms as “motivational force” of identity, in an “intentional equation (desire + belief = action).” The construction of state identity is an established subject in the literature and has many applications, and here we explore the co-constitutive relationship between the idea and conceptions of nationalism and the resulting national and state identities that are of relevance for understanding the regional and international relations in the framework of Wendt’s “three cultures of anarchy.”

In this sense, I add here that the best way to connect Bibó’s thinking to international relations discussions is through constructivist approaches of IR. Namely, Wendt’s culture of anarchy via its understanding of patterns of amity and enmity – and exploration of the relationship between nationalism and enmity can be achieved through his conceptualisation of the Hobbesian world.6 This ‘world’, its dynamics, internalisation of norms by way of different degrees of acceptance and its mechanisms – while bearing in mind the possibility of transition between the different cultures from enmity, to cooperation, to amity – is contextualised to the experiences of the regional dynamics of the post-Yugoslav space.7 The latter is taken as the

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6 Wendt (1999: 252) writes this about the Hobbesian culture in the Realist tradition within IR: “Following Hobbes, scholars in the Realist tradition have tended to argue that shared ideas can only be created by centralized authority. Since in anarchy there is no such authority states must assume the worst about each other’s intentions, that others will violate norms as soon as it is in their interest to do so, which forces even peace-loving states to play power politics. Any shared ideas that emerge will be fragile and fleeting, subject to potentially violent change with changes in the distribution of power. “

7 For example, Abazović and Žarkov (2014: 1) provide a good panoptic view of the academic arguments and political dynamics pointing to the importance of greater focus on studying identity shifts in the Balkans: „At the same time, in the last two decades, scholarly attention to the region of the former Yugoslavia has largely been focused on the war and violence as the central political processes; nationalist institutions
designation for two reasons – to ensure continuity of explanation and processes in a longer historical context, and to ensure a possibility of internal, emancipatory and agency-oriented approach that looks at how domestic, regional actors can transform their relations from conflict to cooperation in what I argue is a small state agential capacity and the only durable way of conceiving peace in the commonly understood region of conflicts. In the next section, I present Bibó’s theoretical positions and the relevance of his conceptualisations for the present context, and then look at Wendt’s thinking on the three cultures of anarchy. The last section takes on the contextual discussion of the Balkan post-Yugoslav reality and what Bibó’s ideas and critique of nationalist pathologies could mean for making sense of the past and present via the constructivist notion of identity in international relations and the forms of ideational factors that affect security dynamics at the regional and global level.

**Writing a late invitation to István Bibó, to “re-visit” the post-Yugoslav reality**


There are some big anniversaries that make certain authors and books ring like a bell and act as a refresher of thinking about the world in a different context. István Bibó’s work is probably a rare example of the thinking that puts a reader in a state of deep puzzlement regarding the continuity and change in world politics – as well as the persuasion that different societies as the central actors; and ethnicity as the central identity. More recently, academic interests in the region have centered on institutional state-building and economic post-conflict reconstruction processes. However, scholars have paid rather minimal attention to either systematic considerations of the contemporary shifts in identities and interpretations of the past, or of perceptions of the future.”
across Europe can face similar and recurring political crises as far apart as 70 years. Preeminent Hungarian political thinker Zoltan Denes, as one of the most prominent students and keepers of Bibó’s legacy, is trying to undo the old ethnocentric, national characterology in the context of the challenges that the post-Trianon Hungary was facing. Bibó was a “liberal nationalist” who, with his training in international law, philosophy of law in the interwar period, shows the importance of understanding long sweeps of history and the logic of the formation of national identity and its related phenomena of nationalism in the times of the deep identity crises of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the interwar Hungary before the Second World War. As Denes (2015: 10) notes, “the discourse on national characterology increasingly dominated, within which national ontologies, the timeless schemes of national features, became widespread alongside reinterpreted national historicism. All this was expressed in the collectivist political language of national egotism, ethno-protectionism, and the homogenous nation-state – the fallout of social Darwinism.” Today’s modern social sciences view this national characterology as an obsolete way of thinking. Although, in the modern political science this sort of generalised thinking is considered somewhat obsolete, compared to the more prevalent empirically-oriented studies and middle-range theories. Also, a call for a more contextualised and denaturalised thinking and research strategies is present within the context of the contemporary international relations theories. For example, constructivist scholars such as Alexander Wendt (1999) point to such a direction, although the study of state identity is on the limit of the applicable and operational conceptualisation in International Relations.

The aim of this section is to present Bibó’s key ideas and discussion on the place and significance of the idea of nationalism in the formation of collective identity and its consequences
for domestic and regional politics. Bibó, in my view, offers a double contribution to the question of the identity transformation and its related conflictual societal dynamics among the ex-Yugoslav countries in the period between 1991 and 2016 that is dominated by the process of establishing new nation-states across the region. Nation, as Anthony Smith (1991: 14) famously defines it, is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.” He further goes to suggest that previous definitions of nationalism are open-ended and suggests that “the nation, in fact, draws on elements of other kinds of collective identity, which accounts not only for the way in which national identity can be combined with these other types of identity – class, religious or ethnic – but also for the chameleon-like permutations of nationalism, the ideology, with other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism” (Smith 1991: 14). As to the national characterology that attempts at reification and generalisation in a sort of collective identity among individuals in terms of some singular traits that, in the nations – according to that anthropological approach – seeks to ascribe some features of individual identity to the collective national identity in terms of the collective body of the nation and its citizens. A relevant critique of the latter can be found in what Smith (1991: 14) writes about national identity: “A national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element, even by particular factions of nationalists, nor can it be easily of swiftly induced in a population by artificial means.”

**Establishing the links: Bibó, national identity and small states in the cultures of anarchy**

My argument in this paper is that the idea of nationalism as a source of “identity myths”, that Smith (1991: 10)
characterizes as “so global a condition and so explosive a force,”
can be best understood as one being utilised in the Hobbesian
and Lockean cultures of anarchy, and here I show how it is posi-
tioned at different levels of its “internalisation” within Wendt’s
theoretical framework. Smith (1991: viii) also cites Mayall
(1990) who sees the “myths of national identity” as referring to
“territory or ancestry (or both) as the basis of political commu-
nity, and these differences furnish important, if not neglected,
sources of conflict in many parts of the world. It is no accident
that many of the most-bitter and protracted ‘inter-national’
conflicts derive from competing claims and conceptions of na-
tional identity.” This is particularly relevant, I argue, for ex-
ploring the character, trajectory, and dynamics of the unsettled
post-Yugoslav national identities and the place of the idea(s) of
ethnonationalism in the re-constitution of the contemporary
collective identities in this complex region. I reflect on Bibó’s
critical treatment of the “national characterology” thinking
and related political practices and take it up in my discussion of
national identity/cultures of anarchy nexus that I relate to some
discussions on national identity and ethnonationalism in the
post-Yugoslav space.

This prolonged period of uneven and uncertain social,
political, and economic transformation that has eventually
brought about the existence of semi-consolidated demo-
cracies (Freedom House 2017) can refer to the questions raised by
philosopher Boris Buden (2012) regarding “the end of the post-
communism” in which the original transition paradigm has
not been travelled fully. Thus a relevant question is what the
implications are for those states that have not consolidated their
democracies in the past quarter century and whose societies are
facing the accumulated problems related to “state capture” or
backsliding of democratic norms and institutions, while en-
countering new global problems (Clingendael 2014). After the
initial enthusiasm for democratic transition processes across the post-communist countries, the period marked by ‘global economic crisis’ and the resulting EU-crises and post-Brexit unravelling also affects the small states in the Balkans. Additional complexity of this process can be noted in conjunction of multiple Balkan crises that are entrapped by an enlarged focus of politics on national and state identities. This is, too, reflecting on their policy responses that are dependent on the said identity configurations whose convergence/divergence (Kovačević 2016) finds its realization in the positioning that reflects larger global instabilities. The consequences thereof are reflecting on their self-understandings and positioning in the world – which is a particular challenge for small countries in the region.

A case for Bibó’s temporal relevance in conversation with Wendt’s “three cultures of anarchy”

The post-Yugoslav states that emerged guided by the resurgence of ethnonationalism in the 1990s as the organising set of political ideas and the principle of societal homogenisation,

8 Ideology can be understood as a set of ideas that basically determine the direction of some political action. It can have a negative and a positive meaning. For example, in the context of early attempts to understand the nationalisms in the post-Cold War Europe, Verdery (1995: xv), defines national ideology in relation to individualized collective emotion as “a form of subjectivity or identity in which the person feels him – or herself to belong to something called “a nation”, and behaves in ways that show this feeling – such as responding to the invocation of national symbols, or invoking them on self. As a subjectivity, it may entail greater or lesser degrees of consciousness and political mobilization, but it always implies dispositions linking the individual with the development of a nation-state.” On the other hand, Anthony Smith (1991: vii), argues that “we cannot understand nations and nationalism simply as an ideology or form of politics but must treat them as cultural phenomena as well. That is to say, nationalism, the ideology and movement, must be closely related to national identity, a multidimensional concept, and extended to include a specific language, sentiments and symbolism.”
state-building and regional politics in the 1990s exhibit problems that are associated with what I suggest is a Bibóesque frame of reference that hangs on well onto the broader Hobbesian, ‘walled’, culture of anarchy proposed by Wendt in his seminal International Relations book *Social Theory of International Politics*. For Wendt (1999: 44), “identities evolve through two basic processes, natural and cultural selection”, and focuses on the latter that is based on “mechanisms of imitation and social learning.” Those “three cultures of anarchy” are the roles that states take in international relations based on “whether state view each other as enemies, rivals, or friends as a fundamental determinant” (Wendt 1999: i), and this in itself is a form of knowledge. What this means for the calibration of my argument in the present paper? I intend to look critically at the phenomena and their related discursive representations that reflect a more coherent set of ideas that are embedded within a culture that characterises a social structure of relations between states. Given the social and cultural underpinnings of Wendt’s constructivism that is focused on the possibility of change in international relations, “cultural change involves the emergence of new forms of collective identity” (Wendt 1999: 44). By this token, the cultures of anarchy and collective identities may change over time.

Smith (1991: viii) further suggests that “nationalist ideology” and “symbolism” have impact “on the formation of territorial and ethnic political identities,” and is particularly concerned with the “proliferation of ethnic conflicts and the chances of superseding identities and ideologies that give rise to such endemic instability”.

9 As Wendt (1999: 159) in his discussion about the relationship between agency and structure notes, cultures of anarchy as “structures” in IR can be understood at *macro* level “in terms of Durkheim’s idea of ‘collective representations’ or knowledge”, while “the concept of common knowledge provides a useful model of how culture is structured at the micro-level”. He suggests that “like the macro-/micro- relation more generally, collective knowledge supervenes on but is not reducible to common knowledge, and as such has a reality that is *sui generis.*”
The latter can be applied more specifically to say that the object that embodies and powers this Hobbesian culture of anarchy is the idea(s) of nationalism and its impact on the unravelling, flow, and realization of violent and enmity-like relations. Such discourses and practices were normalised in the period of the breakup of the socialist Yugoslavia, which had, as a consequence, disintegrated in a host of small and weak states. The co-production of nationalist discourses in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s continued to normalize conflict and wars under the Hobbesian culture of anarchy. This argument may resonate well with the concept of “small peoples” that Uriel Abulof (2009) develops based on Milan Kundera’s idea, and consequently strengthen the case for a logic of transfer and dialogue between the social processes taking place in Central Europe and the Balkans. This, then, further invites Bibó’s thinking about the trajectories of ideas that are, eventually, ‘stuck’ in the present of the neighbouring region. How, then, does Bibó’s work relate to this, different, temporal and spatial context, and what this can tell us?

I take Bibó’s observations as being rooted in the wider structural set of relations that can be understood as a critical inquiry into longer historical and structural views about world politics and concerns at various levels of analysis that are compatible with the early stages of development in the discipline of International Relations. Or, as Bibó would suggest to us, our subject of inquiry cannot be understood without taking into consideration historical development, capitalism, and

10 “Small peoples. The concept is not qualitative; it points to a condition; a fate. Small peoples do not have that felicitous sense of an eternal past or future, at a given moment in their history, they all passed through the antechambers of death; in constant confrontation with the arrogant ignorance of the mighty, they see their existence as perpetually threatened or with a question mark hovering over it; for their very existence is the question.” – Milan Kundera (1993: 25), cited in Abulof 2009: 227.
modernisation. This allows us for discussing, more generally, what *small state reality*11 is (as a relational concept), and how it can inform or feed back into the relationship between identity and materiality of politics.

**Whither national characterology and national identity?**

National characterology12 is then an instance of reification of collective, national identity that serves to stabilise the discourse, and to naturalise the characteristics in what Wendt sees as the “corporate identity” of the state. According to Smith (1991: viii), nationalism, as a set of ideas or an “ideological movement,” is a collective cultural and political phenomenon, whereas the idea of nationalism and national identity is connected to, yet different from, the precedent cases of ethnic identity and community. However, national characterologies in the analytical sense may offer helpful shorthand in thinking about the basic notions of any national identity, but at the same time hold the risk of being misused in the political arena, bordering on the notions of racism and radical forms of social exclusion. What is in question is a set of prejudices or a deep historical embeddedness of ideas and common beliefs about life in the

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11 Also see, Kovačević 2016.

12 Recent literature on this enduring and controversial subject includes Trencsény (2012), for Central Europe, and Romani (2002) for France and the United Kingdom. On this subject Max Weber remarked a century ago in his *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism* that “the appeal to national character is generally a mere confession of ignorance” (quoted in Romani 2002: 2).” Romani (Ibid.), on the other hand, argues that “Even a widely exploited catchword like ‘national identity’, which nowadays sounds more ‘modern’ than the stereotype-laden ‘national character’, often amounts to the same old stuff and proves equally over-comprehensive, and, in the end, equally elusive,” referring to the link between the two concepts that are subject to my discussion above.
political community. There is a need to examine the associated risks and receptions of such thinking.

What, then, can be the conditions required for democratic emancipation of small states and their societies in a time of crisis? Here I also seek to understand how the spirit of geopolitics in international relations is used together with the characterology by the dominant elites and discursive political and cultural entrepreneurs as a tool for making sense of reality and the role of small states in the world. At the time of this renewed interest and discourse of turbulence and change in international relations, and the “global disorder” as it is often termed these days, the spirit of pragmatism seems to prevail over long-term and principled thinking.

Also, if pluralism in thinking and negotiating national interests in the participative manner cannot be achieved, then a resulting democratic deficit is a veil under which such policies are then formulated and employed in combination of characterology and simple populist bets by the domestic ruling elites. They hold on to power in the time of changing global power and social dynamics, and seek opportunities, as it seems, to limit citizen participation in the political process that is controlled by various forms of discursive techniques and governance regimes under the pretext of preserving the stability of the existing systems. By means of the latter portrayal it can be said that small state reality today in Central Europe, and more so in the former Yugoslav republics is in the state of flux (although it has been “frozen” or parallel to the main stream of European

13 See, for example, Stefano Guzzini, ed. 2012.
14 For example, see Kovačević 2013; Acharya 2014.
15 For a good overview and discussion in the domain of political theory about the enduring and contemporary challenges to democracy, see Pavićević and Simendić 2016.
realities’ at the beginning of the 21st century). As it is now part of the mainstream opinion, political and media discourse, the external dimension of impacting the political reality of the region is realized through the penetration of the great power politics of Russia, China, (and Turkey as a regional power) in the time of the crisis of the European Union and its stalled enlargement policies that keep the status quo in the region.16

Thus, the key empirical and analytical question arising in this paper suggest dealing with the characterisation and assessment of the post-Yugoslav transition and the emerging discourse (and reality) of renationalisation of politics [or, ethnonationalism that is an enduring feature of the Balkan politics]17, and its implication for the political and international components of the collective, national, political and state identities. In the literature there are two approaches that seem convenient for researching this problematic, and here I note two thematic areas dealing with identity (and cultural intimacy in International Relations) as well as the recent strides in the research on emotions in politics. The recent work by Ayse Zarakol and Jelena Subotić (2012) makes use of “cultural intimacy” and its connectedness with external and internal dimensions of political

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16 As it is noted in Clingendael Report (2014: 19), “The EU’s bureaucratic autism created an ideal environment for short-term and ultimately self-destructive politics’ in the region. It usually takes a crisis for politicians and technocrats to change tack. Perhaps unfortunately, the Western Balkans is not in any visible and acute crisis. But the status quo is steadily becoming crisis-worthy, since the region is slipping out of the EU’s reach, and – most likely – into the hands of strategic competitors.”

17 Abulof (2009: 234) notes that “ethnonational polity” can range between ethnic and consociational democracy. He suggests that “It is important to differentiate between these two extremes and to track the possibilities in-between, but it is crucial to understand that in the eyes of small peoples there is often a linkage between their physical and political existence, as well as between the various expressions of the latter.”
identity that is beneficial for analysing the impacts it has on political practices. In this sense, the theme of emotions and politics, and the inquiry into what sentiments guide and move the trajectories for internal, interregional, and external and foreign dimensions of collective (state) identities along the spectrum of pessimism, optimism, or realism.

For Subotić and Zarakol (2012: 915), “cultural intimacy expresses those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of international criticism for the state, but are nevertheless used to provide insiders with a sense of national comfort, understanding and self-reflexive, ontological security. Cultural intimacy helps illuminate how states present themselves internationally and how they understand themselves domestically. It can also explain the seeming discrepancies and contradictions between a state’s domestic and international identities. Cultural intimacy, in other words, explains the mutual reproduction of different levels of identity.” The former can be seen as a possible explanation for what national characterology aimed at when liberal nationalism got into crisis after the First World War, based on the “revalorization” of national (Czech) identity and various historical fixations. What does this mean for the identity reproduction in the case of small states that function in the highly saturated context in which the idea of nation and national identity is instrumentalised in political, security, and

18 Ruth Wodak (2011: xii) starts one of her books with the following definition of politics by Murray Edelman (1967), which, also, can be important for our understanding of Bibó’s thought: “Politics is for the most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols, yet a parade which our experience teaches us to be a benevolent or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent. Because politics does visibly confer wealth, take life, imprison and free people, and represent a history with strong emotional and ideological associations, its processes become easy objects upon which to displace private emotions, especially strong anxieties and hopes.”

19 Cf. Trencsény 2012.
societal terms? This is where the interpretative framework that sees national identity through a lens of nationalism in its extreme forms as kind of specific type of collective political emotion and an individualised psychic state combines with the definition of nationalism provided by István Bibó in his assessment of the so-called “political hysteria.”

**Zooming in on Bibó’s three central themes in the post-Yugoslav context**

The puzzle of this paper is about establishing the logic of transfer of Bibó’s thought to zoom in on the underlying ideas and processes that are the markers of what I term the political reality of the post-Yugoslav small states – a social construct that has become strongly embedded in what they see as the objective world of their living. Next, I take three central themes discussed in Bibó’s book *The Miseries of Small Eastern European States* – namely, ethnonationalism, democracy, and political hysteria in a time of difficult state identity crisis. This is observed through the social constructivist framework Wendt’s cultures of anarchy which, later in the paper, I am going to relate to the conceptual framework of the Hobbesian culture in an attempt to probe into the ways different cultures of international relations’ social system perpetuate peaceful or conflictual views of the world supported in a ‘vicious circle’ by ethnonationalist worldviews. State identity is here seen as a combination of ideational and material factors that, in interaction, yield certain understanding and self-understanding consequential for domestic politics and international relations.

According to Denes, István Bibó “rejected the public belief that national character could be created and established in a programmatic fashion, [but] it can develop only through the successful solution of concrete tasks.” Bibó further argued against “mythicisation of national features, amends-seeking,
and victimhood; the political hysteries deriving from the historical fears of community and the traumatic experiences behind them; and the mechanisms and methods of allaying hyste-terias” (Bibó 2015: 11).

What is, then, political hysteria, and what can it mean in the spectrum of collective political emotions? In the case of Hungary, Bibó found the examples of “real community hysteria” that penetrated deeply from within the society and at the individual level, in what he saw as a situation that “occurs when all its characteristic symptoms are present together: an entire community’s loss of touch with reality, and inability to resolve the problems life creates, an insecure yet overblown self-assessment, and unrealistic and disproportionate response to the impacts of the outer world” (Bibó 2015: 44–45). It is not impossible to think in this manner about the period of the 1990s; that the Serbian political elites had unrealistic and erratic views that have spread, under the veil of political ideology, from the collective to the individual level.\textsuperscript{20} At the time of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, nationalist ideologies in their extreme and conflictual forms were present throughout the region; in what is a clear example of the Hobbesian culture that had permeated the logic of thinking and political action, capturing the elites and societies from Belgrade, to Sarajevo, to Zagreb.

The condition that the societies in the region found themselves could be also explained by what Bibó sees as

the false depiction of the state of the community and manifest the hysterical responses of the community,” whereas

\textsuperscript{20} For the discussions about the anthropological, cultural, political, and societal perspectives on the role of nationalism in re-shaping of the collective identity in the period of the Yugoslav wars, or the situation in Serbia, see for example, an excellent study by Ivan Čolović (2000), and Marko Živković (2011).
‘community hysterias generate their blind, furious and obtuse type of man, primarily prone to falling for and ranting their characteristic self-deceiving follies, their beneficiaries, who swim with the hysteric tide and profit by it...

Abundant literature has emerged on the political and societal dimensions of the Yugoslav crisis, and their consequences seen as the post-authoritarian and post-conflict context; however, it is beyond the scope of the paper to go into details. 21 We can agree that the consequences of politics based on nationalism were expressed in extreme forms of political violence and wars, while at the societal level the logic of enmity plagued individual consciousness of people – and resulted in the real separation and living not with each other, but apart, in parallel. Post-transitions took place after the wars of the 1990s ended, but the logic of nationalism still prevails in the region; it is a constitutive part of the political discourse as a technology of governing within the set boundaries of the ethnically separated communities. 22

This is important for understanding the deformations of state identity under the combination of pressures coming from the objective reality and inter-subjective processes mediated through the ideational structures of nationalism, in what Bibó aptly terms as “the deformation of the political self.”

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21 For a recent overview and critique of the academic debates on the Yugoslav crisis, see, for example, Bakić. 2011. Also, a comprehensive edited volume by Ingrao and Emmert (2009) merits attention.

22 For examples of this, different studies are available. See for example, Ćurak 2009, 2016 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Čolović 2014 for Serbia. Ugrešić 2008 is a good example of how literary narratives can shed light on societal and intellectual expression of the deep rifts that nationalism in the region had caused, and a pointed critique of the (non)sense of ethnonationalist politics.
Using the case of Hungary in the first half of the 20th century, Bibó notes that

The deformation of social structure was followed by the warping of the political self and a hysterical mental condition when there was no healthy balance among things real, possible, and desirable. The characteristically contrary psychic symptoms of maladjustment between the desires and realities can readily be observed among all these peoples: an excess of self-documentation and self-doubt, overblown national vanity and abrupt submissiveness, endless protestations of achievements and striking devaluations of genuine achievements, moral claims, and moral irresponsibility. The majority of these nations give themselves over to ruminating on former or possible great-power statuses, while they can so heart-sickeningly apply to themselves the term “small nation”, which would be utterly meaningless to a Dutchman or a Dane (Bibó 2015: 154).

In the passage above, Bibó in the 1940s addresses some of the key features of the political discourse connected to the idea of nationalism that permeates the realities and imaginaries of the small state nationalisms in the present-day Balkans – and most notably, those in the narratives of statehood and national identities of Serbia and Croatia. For example, Serbia faces an unresolved problem of state identity – with the problems of territorial integrity regarding the secession of Kosovo, its southern province (2008), in a process that has been burdening its politics for several decades and spurring serious problems relating to control and governance in a territory that is facing a competitive and rival Albanian nationalism.

In the case of Croatia, there is the idea of the other, and there is an abundant discourse of Serbia as constitutive other for the Croatian nation-building project. One can also look for
different meanings of such ideas relating to self-documentation, the narratives of national vanity and achievements (for example in the narratives of “Antemurale” and relation to the defence of Christianity throughout history). Serbia also faces another problem after the breakup of Yugoslavia related to its power status – since it still positions its identity in-between “East” and “West,” largely replicating the position of the former Yugoslavia, which as a middle power played an intermediary role in the rivalry between the Cold War superpowers. However, I argue that the position of Serbia today is more a performative act of a small state with a middle power mindset, which reminds us of what Bibó characterises as “maladjustment between desires and realities,” – but now in the period of post-socialist transition.

Different manifestations and representations of nationalist political ideology are present in the Balkans as they were noted by Bibó. For example, this “national materialism” is a good way to understand when he writes that as “all manifestations of national life were subjected to the most furious national theleology; all their genuine or imaginary achievements, from Nobel prizes, to Olympic records, lost their spontaneous purpose in themselves and were put in the service of national self documentation” (Bibó 2015: 155). It is sufficient to take a look at how some practices and representations of, say, sports results are taken as signifiers of national pride and something that captures not only the national imagination but engages the citizens in a sort of compensation for their lack of other measurable competitive global achievements. In this sense, national self-documentation is done by such exemplary sportsmen. In the cases of Serbia and Croatia, the national teams or exemplary

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23 More on this in Kovačević 2016. Also, see Jović 2009 for an overview of the Yugoslav period and the run up to the fall of Yugoslavia. Keil and Stahl, eds. 2014 for an overview of the particular foreign policies of post-Yugoslav states.
individual athletes usually capture the attention of the nations, and are followed with great awe as a way of building a sort of parallel imaginary of a better and more purposeful existence mediated through the national self and participation in such a collectivized identity.

The political elites are also subject to Bibó’s assessment that can sharply and accurately speak about the present day condition in the Balkans, in the service of building a specific constellation of “reality.” He writes that “the use of science, pursued not for itself, not only corrupted the scientific quality of these countries but also put the elites of these nations in a radically sham relationship with reality; it accustomed them to build not on reality but claims, not on achievements but wants, and to think outside the simple chain of causes and effects” (Bibó 2015: 156).

The final, relevant motif that Bibó finds is the position of minorities in Hungary, which – mirrored to the Balkans of the 1990s – can give relevant markers in the context of dominance of nationalism and its various degrees of presence in political life and the ideational sphere. However, ethnonationalist discourse never disappeared from the political spectrum; it just managed to mimic itself within various forms of the transition policies. This is particularly notable in the case of border disputes and language nationalisms in the region. In this sense, national identities are upheld on the ethnic principle, and this is the difference between what Anthony Smith sees as the citizen and ethnic nationalism in Europe. In Serbia and Croatia (national) minorities are treated differently and today their protection is enshrined in legal frameworks, but the recent examples from Croatia (2016) and the increased rhetoric against the Serb minority can be a cause of concerns about the durability of such a model of communication and the crisis of citizenship practices.
Concluding remarks

If the ideas about conflict dominate the political discourse, and there is no effort to overcome the populist ethnonationalist rhetoric, then, the reappearance of the Hobbesian condition makes the impression of the system that is made in the image of its states. For example, as Bibó discusses, of the role of fear, such emotion causes the feeling of existential unease.\(^{24}\) Just take, for example, the problem of incomplete desecuritization in the region, the burdensome legacy of Yugoslav wars, the (mis)use of media (Kolsto 2009), whereas the more recent inflammatory rhetoric by the regional political elites is making the process of normalization of relations between states more difficult. One should add also the stagnation in the process of developing regonal security community in the proper sense of the word. Those collective identities communicate well at the level of individuals, and the logic of this ethnonational character or “being” is socially constructed, and is pragmatically reflected at the decision-making level.

The regional variant of the system in the post-Yugoslav space could be seen as a variant of a regional anarchy, or a regional security subcomplex\(^{25}\) (in which states exhibit relations in the patterns of enmity, rivalry, or friendship). Given the present dynamics, those relations converge around rivalry, and very limited degree of (elite) “friendship” which has not been produced with intrinsic and sincere domestic efforts, but is largely kept afloat by the external influences in the region (e.g. the European Union). The regional cooperation is still weak to sustain on its own, and the states themsevels are facing various internal

\(^{24}\) Also, for a good overview of discussions in political theory about fear and courage in politics see Podunavac 2011.

\(^{25}\) For regional security complexes and analytical framework on regonal security, see Buzan and Waever 2003.
pressures and contestations of their identity. In the past quarter century, the image of enemy has been transformed through the security regimes to some forms of small elite security communities as forms of cooperation that encompass the leaders’ building of good official relations in the period of democratic transition. This raises the question of the nature of transformation of national identities, and the role that the metastructure of the so-called Hobbesian culture still plays in constructing and keeping in its potentiality the discourse of conflict. During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, this culture was prevalent and the enemy role was largely reciprocated throughout the region between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, as Wendt (1999: 274) writes, states are “carrying the culture around in its ‘head’, defining who it is, what it wants, and how it thinks”. On the other hand, a Lockean culture of anarchy will exhibit the pattern of rivalry, as a ‘collective representation’ with which “states will make attributions about each other’s ‘minds’ based more on what they know about each other, and the system will acquire a logic of its own” (Wendt 1999: 283).

In the end, what would be Bibó’s view of the present reality and future in our regions? He is a cautious and sceptical observer, aware of the aggressive nature of nationalisms in Central Europe and their historical practices. Here, he underlines social relations that prove to be increasingly relevant across Central Europe in 2016 and 2017, marked by discourses of walls and xenophobia which can be viewed against the backdrop of what he defined in 1946 as

anti-democratic social relations: from the coarse political methods and the narrow, small-minded and aggressive

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26 On this, see more in Kavalski 2007. Also, see Grillot, Cruise, and D’Erman 2010, and Cruise and Grillot 2013.
nationalisms of the area, the fact that political power is in the hands of aristocratic estate owners, tycoons, and military cliques of whom these countries cannot rid themselves on their own, to the belief that this area is a hotbed of various befuddled, foggy and deceptive political philosophies... This way of looking at the matter does have factual grounds, but its final conclusions are gravely misconceived. (Bibó 2015: 147).

Seventy years later, we live in the times when democracy is also contested by the challenge of ethnonationalisms and populist political elites in the period of post-truth rhetoric. Bibó’s cautionary remark on the position of democracy is particularly instructive here, as part of his discussion of the emotion of fear. “To be a democrat is first and foremost not to be afraid—not to be afraid of those who have a different opinion, speak a different language, and are of another race; not to be afraid of revolution, conspiracies, the unknown evil intentions of the enemy, hostile propaganda, disdain, and generally all those imaginary dangers that become real because we are afraid of them” (Bibó 2015: 152). At least, societies always have hope of prudence and what they have learned from history in an attempt to overcome the looming Hobbesian trap and through dialogue shall seek ways to re-imagine the ethos of cooperation and friendship.

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Discourses of Hospitality, Politics of Hostility: Instrumentalization of the “Refugee Crisis” in the Serbian Press

In this paper, we argue that a combination of three contextual factors contributed to the seemingly sympathetic attitude of the Serbian press and Serbian political elite towards refugees and migrants: a) Serbia being the country of transit, i.e. not preferred destination for the vast majority of the asylum seekers; b) Serbia being an EU candidate; and c) Serbia being the political community that carries the double burden of its position within the symbolic geography of Europe and the label of a “rogue” state from the 1990s. The framing of “the Serbian response to crisis” thus became a litmus test to prove both state competence and its “behavior in the European fashion” (Greenberg & Spasić 2017: 315). As we will show, the Serbian media were strongly engaged and creative in highlighting

1 Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
2 Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
3 The first version of the paper was presented at the conference “Us vs. Them: Populism, the Refugee Other and the Re-Consideration of National Identity in Central and Eastern Europe” in May 2017 in Budapest, organized by the Project “Flight, Migration and Integration in Europe” of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Center for European Neighborhood Studies of the Central European University.
the contrast between the Serbian nation, hospitable to the refugees in transit and dedicated to the preservation of European values, and other EU countries, which decided to build fences against people in need.

From the Balkans to Europe: Re-Imagining Post-Milošević Serbia

After the collapse of Milošević’s regime, along with the socio-economic and political transformation, Serbia faced a pressing need to have a “symbolic make-over” of its identity. It was a political community that carried the burden from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and war crimes perpetrated by Serbs during the 1990s. In addition to the post-communist and Balkan stigma, Serbia was also periodically labelled as an “outlaw nation” / “rogue state” / with a “renegade government” / led by “the butcher of the Balkans.” There was a need to cross to the other side of imagological map and obtain legitimacy by enhancing the often invoked image of Serbia in/for the world.

Serbia presents one of the most dramatic examples of the necessity laid upon a given political community to perform an identity make-over and reposition itself in the symbolic geography of Europe. As a rule, the process of accession to the European Union requires a political, economic and cultural “Europeanization” of less European countries, primarily the post-socialist states located on the eastern part of the continent. This “new Europe,” as Volčič argues, “has embraced the mania for self-branding with the enthusiasm of the newcomer vying for position at the table” (Volcic 2008: 396). The discourse accompanying the EU enlargement may also be seen as the discourse of Western European authority, supervision and guardianship of the candidate countries “predicated on a symbolic ordering of the continent that positions the region at a lower level on the evolutionary scale,” which underlies “the implicit
argument that the region cannot progress by itself, but requires external guidance to avoid slipping into the mistakes of the past” (Hammond 2006: 19; cf. Majstorović 2007; Petrović 2013).

This should be read in light of a theoretical tradition of Orientalism (Said 1977) and its localized variant – Balkanism (Todorova 1997). Europe has, according to Said, defined and created the Orient, as the Other in which to mirror itself and in relation to which to build its own superior identity. Certain societies have been portrayed as continuously lagging behind in what has been set as the reference and the ideal – the West. Over time, the orientalist logic has been found in other contexts. Balkanism is primarily a phenomenon of the late 19th and 20th centuries, when the name “Balkans” began to be used as a derogatory label associated with the traits and practices Europe had allegedly left behind – war, hostility, violence and perpetual conflict. As with the orientalist logic, in the balkanist discourse Europe came to symbolize order, legality, efficient administration – a higher degree of cultural development.

Milica Bakić-Hayden (1995) argues that in the former Yugoslavia Orientalism is reproduced, or “nested,” as long as there is a collectivity or culture which is one step further east and south. In other words, the concept of “nesting Orientalisms” denotes that the gradients of the Orient compose a pattern according to which the foundational dichotomy is being recursively repeated. In their struggle for a European affiliation, the Balkan nations have engaged actively in orientalizing others. This also entails reproduction of tutorship – as one of the countries joins the European Union or comes closer to Europe – by relying on the colonialist trope of offering help (Petrović 2013).

Foreign symbolic approval has often been a major legitimizing factor within Balkan societies. It also assumes its role in constituting internal political cleavages and contestations over
the foundations of the Serbian political community. National identity and the sense of belonging in Serbia are constantly being reworked and reimagined, with a profound political confusion as to whether Serbia “really” belongs to the West / Europe or the East / the Balkans (Volčič 2005: 156; Omaljev 2013). Recently, this line of symbolic confrontation has been gradually alleviated due to the political rhetoric of Aleksandar Vučić, leader of the Serbian Progressive Party (notorious for their former nationalist politics). His rhetoric combines elements from both sides of the symbolic divide: Euro-integrationist stance and the highly pragmatic pro-EU foreign policy, patriotic pride and devotion to national interests, as well as accentuating their orientation towards the future instead of dwelling in the past (Petrović-Trifunović & Spasić 2014: 185). This is well-exemplified in some of the discourses that have followed “the refugee crisis” in the Serbian press.

Context: Asylum System in Serbia and the Refugee Crisis

The asylum system in Serbia was introduced in 2008 as part of the process of accession to the EU. Harmonization of national legislation with international standards in the field of rights of asylum seekers and refugees, as well as in the areas of control of illegal migration and readmission, was a condition for signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement and visa liberalization.

In the last nine years, based on the number of requests for asylum and the institutional response time, we distinguish four waves of migration. The first covers the period from 2008 to 2013, when the number of asylum applications was relatively modest with a tendency of slight growth; the second covers 2014 and the beginning of 2015, when the number of claims jumped more than three times compared to the previous period. The
third lasted from spring 2015 until March 2016, and includes what is called a refugee or “migration” crisis, during which a large number of people passed through the territory of Serbia, hoping to enter the European Union. The official “closing” of the Balkan route opened a new chapter, characterized by a search for alternative routes, reduced flow of refugees and migrants, longer retention of people on Serbian territory, and a higher percentage of the migrant population entering the asylum procedures.

This study primarily tackles the third wave of migration, when most migrants and refugees tried to reach the European Union along the Balkan route. Although there are no exact data of how many people passed through the territory of Serbia, the increase in the number of individuals expressing their intention to seek asylum in Serbia is a good indication. From 1 January to 31 December 2015, 577,995 persons expressed intention to seek asylum in Serbia, a number 35 times greater than the year before (Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2015: 37). However, only 583 individuals filed an asylum application and most of the proceedings were discontinued because the asylum applicants left the country. In 2015, the Asylum Office accepted a total of 30 asylum applications.

In general, refugees stayed in Serbia for a few days, just long enough to organize themselves for their journey towards EU countries, primarily Germany. The majority of refugees who registered as asylum-seekers in Serbia did not plan to remain there. During the crisis, the state response amounted to providing short-term assistance in the form of temporary accommodation and the most basic humanitarian aid, rather than devising long-term strategies of inclusion (Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2015: 21; Sicurella 2017). Efforts were directed at setting up several temporary camps and transit centers close
to the borders, registering all foreigners passing illegally, meeting the refugees’ basic needs and facilitating their “shipping” form one border to the other. Civil society organizations criticized Serbian officials for claiming open border politics and providing guarantees that Serbia will accept thousands of refugees while simultaneously supporting measures aimed at encouraging refugees to leave Serbia as quickly as possible (*Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia* 2015: 21). When we analyze a national-level response, it is also important to acknowledge the multiplicity of actors because basic needs and services had largely been provided by NGOs, volunteers and the refugee groups (Greenberg & Spasić 2017).

In May 2015 the Hungarian government announced a plan to prevent migrants from entering illegally and secure its border with Serbia with a physical barrier. The construction of a fence began mid-July, and the refugee crisis reached its culmination on September 15, when Hungary officially closed the corridor. The closure of the border impacted the movement of refugees, who were now forced to stay in Serbia or cross into Croatia on their way to Western Europe. This had serious repercussions for Serbia and Croatia, having now to respond to an increase in the number of refugees. Serbian and Croatian officials accused each other of shifting the burden of handling refugees, eventually escalating into the short “trade war” from September 21 until September 25.

In the next few months, Serbian officials feared that the country would become a collection center for refugees, especially since Austria and Slovenia had also begun to build border barriers (Sicurella 2017; Vezovnik 2017). Furthermore, throughout November 2015, countries along the Balkan route decided to allow only refugees from “war-afflicted areas” (Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) to enter their territory (*Right to Asylum in the*
Politics of Enmity

Republic of Serbia 2015: 26). Others were labeled as “economic migrants.” The situation remained unchanged until March 2016, when the EU negotiated a controversial resettlement agreement with Turkey, which resulted in the closure of the Balkan route. Serbia, among other countries along the route, imposed stricter border controls. The refugees became a less interesting topic for the Serbian press.

Methodological Framework

Regardless of the emergence of new modalities for sharing meanings, representations and information in the public sphere, the power of the press and other conventional media to influence knowledge, values, social relations and social identities, which comes with the control over terminology and, thus, meaning, remains significant (Fairclough 1995; Rheindorf & Wodak 2017; Sicurella 2017). This is particularly true in times of crisis, when media manifest stronger power to orientate social actors, by setting the agenda and framing events in a certain fashion. Accordingly, newspapers, which still find their way into the everyday life of many Serbian households, provide a valuable source and channel through which the refugee crisis and Serbian response to it was constructed and represented. Our analysis rests on approaches developed within the field of critical discourse studies, where discourse and social reality are understood as mutually constitutive in a sense that discourse is both a reflection of social structures and relations as well as their constitutive element (Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 1998; Wodak & Meyer 2009).

Media coverage of the refugee crisis included instances of political discourse, discourse of the mass media as relatively independent actors, discourse of experts and discourse of intellectuals. All these discourses intersect, conflict and complete one another, creating a shared field of public discourse which
was the object of analysis. We analyzed the reputable broad-sheet newspaper *Politika*, as well as popular tabloids of wide circulation – *Blic* and *Kurir*. *Blic* is seen as more pro-European and liberal, while *Kurir* is considered more conservative and nationalist. The main sample consisted of reports, columns, op-eds, commentaries and opinion polls published in selected media outlets throughout various phases of the refugee crisis, between 1 April 2015 and 31 March 2016.

After the collection of data, we identified several distinctive discourses accompanying the refugee crisis in the observed dailies. The next step was to identify the dominant discourse(s) on the refugee crisis as found in the corpus. Finally, our goal was to reconstruct the linguistic tools and discursive strategies used to frame events and distinguish between various binaries of *Us* and *Them* (van Dijk 1998).

**General Observations and Identified Discourses**

As the number of refugees passing through Serbia during 2015 rose, so did the media attention devoted to this topic.\(^4\) In each of the newspapers we looked at, the number of articles reporting on refugees grew from about 20 to 30 in April to July, to over 100 in August. The crisis reached its peak in September, due to the closing of the Hungarian border and the escalation of the short “trade war” with Croatia. During this month, there were more than 150 articles covering refugee crises in each observed daily. Aside from the increase in quantity, differences were also noticeable in the surface structures of the texts – headlines grew bolder, articles were longer, accompanied by

\(^4\) The number of asylum seekers gradually grew from 2,425 in January to 9,034 in May, then from 15,209 in June, to 37,463 in August and 51,048 in September. After a peak of 180,307 people who expressed the intention to seek asylum in Serbia in October, the numbers began to decrease (*Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia* 2015: 37).
many illustrations, they occupied front pages more frequently. There was a change of tone, as well as focus. This is the period when the refugees were transformed into an issue, or the issue. Even though the number of refugees peaked in October, after the conflicts with Croatian officials were settled, refugees were backgrounded as a topic and the number of reports gradually decreased during the winter. In the next section we pursue whether this also suggests that the refugee crisis might have been instrumentalized for other political and discursive goals.

As far as struggles over defining (naming) people affected by the refugee crisis are concerned, our analysis shows that the four terms with the highest frequency in the corpus (migrants, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers) were often used interchangeably. Their usage is inconsistent and meaning often unclear. There was, however, one exception: the term refugee was more frequent in articles that held a positive representation, humanization or victimization, referring to their suffering and fostering urgency for providing help. Sometimes they were represented by their nationality, at times they were just people, and other terms include emigrants, illegal immigrants, illegals and “nevoljnici” (which translates to destitute, but also connotes unwillingness and inertia). Like in the Slovenian case (Vezovnik 2017) refugees were quite often presented in aggregate, portrayed as a unified mass of people and referred to in numerical terms.

We further identified several distinct discourses regarding the refugee crisis in the Serbian press. At the beginning of the observed period, media coverage of refugees boiled down to brief reports of trafficking and smuggling in the crime section of the dailies, which constituted the criminalization of smugglers discourse. This was followed by the refugee crisis as a crisis of humanity discourse, which entailed the use of strategies of humanization and individualization. Here, journalists focused on
detailed personal accounts when writing about horrible events the refugees had witnessed. We found an abundance of heartwarming stories assigning voices to individual refugees (“I live for the day when I’ll hug my son and wife again;” “I didn’t have the strength to save them, the sea took my kids away;” “We miss our mothers, fathers and teddy bears”). *Blic* maintained the most sympathetic attitude towards refugees throughout the crisis. Their positive representation also manifested in the way this daily reported about bad deeds allegedly perpetrated by refugees, by relying on passive voice in their reporting.

This was not the case with all analyzed media, which at times followed the opposite strategy, the *securitization* of migration discourse. The securitization discourse created the impression that the state borders and security were threatened by the massive influx of refugees and consequently the need to secure the borders (“Terrorists are on their way to the Balkans!,” “Are there some ISIS ‘sleepers’ among migrants?”). Securitization also occurs with the stress on risks to public health (“Migrants bring MERS and polio to us”), national, religious and cultural identity (“Migrants will Islamize Serbia soon”) or welfare (“Migrants will cost us 100,000 euro daily”). All these risks were mitigated by assurances that Serbia will remain a country of transit and that refugees are just passing through (“Serbia

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5 Securitization may be defined as a signifying process through which something is presented as posing a threat to a designated referent object, such as the state, government, territory, society or majority of its citizens (Buzan et al. 1998). Migration has increasingly been securitized both in Europe and the United States (Vezovnik 2017). Even the very act of labelling a movement of people from countries affected by war, natural disasters and/or poverty as “crisis” is highly problematic. It is a process of classifying certain forms of human mobility as an event distinct from the political “norm”, which then calls for “emergency” governmental measures aimed at eliminating a “security threat” (Rácz 2017).
won’t become a collection center,” “Thank you, Serbia, but we are going to Sweden”).

The most common discourse we have identified is the one built around Serbia’s response to the crisis and the unrivaled mastery this political community displayed in dealing with this issue. It is a discourse of Serbian hospitality and kindness towards refugees, and stands in stark contrast to the way many EU states as well as the rest of Serbia’s neighbors handled the crisis – by betraying European values. We have named this rhetorical stance Serbia wins the refugee crisis discourse.

**Serbia Wins the Refugee Crisis: Discursive Construction of the Serbian Response**

When talking about the usage of the pronominal pair of Us vs. Them, one commonly thinks about negative reactions and profound othering of the incoming refugees. While we have shown that instances of such rhetoric occurred in Serbia as well (particularly in the form of the securitizing discourse), it can be argued that a different version of this binary prevailed. The discourse about the behavior of the Serbian state, nation and citizens during the crisis accentuated the unrivaled mastery they exhibited in crisis management, but even more so their plain humanity and dedication to “civilization” and “European” values.

If the Us was defined by the press in this way, who was the Them? Here, van Dijk’s “ideological square” proves useful. The overall strategy of ideological communication, according to van Dijk (1998: 267), consists of the following main moves:

1) Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us.

2) Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them.
3) Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them
4) Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us.

We can identify Us and Them from the corpus if we look at how various actors had been portrayed during the crisis. On the opposite side from positively represented Serbia, we discovered Them: Serbia’s neighboring countries as well as other “less European” EU countries, which built walls and fences against people in need and treated them poorly.

We found that this “discursive complex,” stretching across various types of discourses that occur in the press (media discourse, discourse of politicians, discourse of experts, etc.), consists of several discursive strategies. First of all, there was an emphasis on Serbia “defending” universal civilizational values by being very hospitable and maintaining a humane treatment of refugees. Numerous articles wrote about the humanitarian actions carried out by various actors, mostly compassionate citizens. These included headlines such as “Asylum seekers are our really good guests,” “A touching gesture from our fellow citizens,” “Serbia’s exemplary treatment of migrants,” “Hospitality is the coat of arms of Serbia and Belgrade,” etc. This was accompanied with statements provided by refugees themselves: “Here we feel like human beings again,” “Migrants: Thank you, this will not be forgotten,” “Serbia is our safe harbor.”

The Serbian press emphasized that “our image in the world” has finally changed. In September 2015, Blic published an article entitled “Serbs are once again the good guys,” in which a BBC journalist conveyed a story about a photo, which went viral, featuring a Serbian policeman smiling while holding a little Syrian boy, “showing the world a different image of Serbia, unlike the one from the 1990s.” The journalist wrote that
Serbs told her on Twitter that they experienced the photo as “the moment of salvation, because they themselves have been through the war” (Blic, 12 September 2015, p. 4). It was a “Serbia to be proud of,” as another article in the same issue stated, particularly because Serbia was finally on the “good side of history,” as opposed to some other countries (“Others beat them down, Serbia helps them,” Blic, 22 August 2015, front page).

Serbia was frequently represented as a defender of “European values,” understood in this context as a dedication to open borders, freedom of movement, human rights and rights of refugees. According to the sampled media, Serbia was at once “EU’s best partner” and the one now “teaching Europe a lesson,” that is, “saving Europe’s soul” by calling for open borders and refusing to build walls. The Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić underscored that this will continue to be Serbian policy in the future, adding that he “can’t wait for somebody from the EU to come and lecture us on human rights” (Kurir, 20 June 2015, p. 2–3).

The next constituent aspect of this discursive stance was based on the fact that Serbia’s efforts were recognized by its more legitimate peer states and actors. Lots of articles reported on international praise Serbia was receiving for its efforts during the crisis (“Davenport: Serbia can rely on increased help by Brussels,” “Western diplomats: Vučić hasn’t given a single wrong statement,” “Merkel and Vučić: milk and honey,” “Ambassadors: Humane Serbia heading towards EU,” “Unending praise for Serbia,” “Serbia is now more appreciated”).

The strategy of obtaining legitimacy also went hand in hand with delegitimizing others, by emphasizing their bad deeds and mitigating positive information about them. “Europe” was portrayed as “yammering while children are drowning,” and “defending its borders, while ignoring humans,” and treating
refugees like “a hot potato.” Dailies wrote about “Germany’s struggle with hatred towards refugees,” Italians who “beat down and denigrate refugees” and how the “Viennese [were] annoyed by refugees in their city.”

The most negative depictions are found in the behavior of Serbia’s neighbors (“Neighbors put Serbia in chains,” “I would rather die in Baghdad than stay in Macedonia for another day,” “Bulgaria sends tanks on refugees,” “Slovenians do not care about tears,” etc.). Hungary’s decision to build a fence on its southern border with Serbia fueled dramatic responses, marking Hungary’s defensive attitude as unjustified, hypocritical, or plainly wrong (Sicurella 2017). Victor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, was at the center of attacks for the “shameful” act of building “his wall,” with clamors for him to “come to his senses” and discard his silly idea. Serbian dailies depicted him as “crazy,” “enraged,” “out of his mind,” “the evil neighbor,” “fascist from the heart of Europe,” etc. Hungary and Hungarians were portrayed in similar fashion, as those who greet refugees (including babies) with tear-gas, beat them up and spit on them, leaving Serbia to save them.

Major symbolic conflicts also took place between Serbia and Croatia. There were reports about “Croats forcing women and children into a frozen river,” “insidious plans of the Croatian police” to smuggle refugee women and children back to Serbia, and Croatian police attacking people on Serbian territory. The hostile discourse was amplified during the short “trade war” between these two countries, leaving Croatia with an “indelible spot” on its international reputation, at least according to the Serbian press. The Serbian tabloids wrote that Croatia deserves cuffs from the European Union, and needs to finally “get off Serbia’s back.” Again, the Croatian Prime Minister Milanović (dubbed “an idiot” in Kurir) was the one to be angry with for his “pre-election lunacy,” which is why his people are
“ashamed of him.” The nation states formed after the dissolution of Yugoslavia frequently engage in political rivalry fostered by their governments and media outlets. The refugee crisis was no different, and became a means to score additional points and symbolically negotiate who actually belongs to “Europe,” and who, in turn, hides their true Balkan identity.

We have here given a small (but representative) portion of discursive strategies used during the events following the refugee crisis in Serbia, its region and Europe. The issue is so broad and complex that any further inspection and presentation of the data collected would require a separate publication. Our aim here was to shed light only on the symbolic aspects of the effects the refugee crisis had on re-imagining the Serbian national identity, and reformulation of its relations with relevant political entities, including the European Union.

**Concluding remarks**

Our analysis suggests that among several distinct discourses accompanying the topic, the *Serbia wins the refugee crisis* discourse was dominant in the corpus. This discourse can be seen as the embodiment of the strategy employed by the Serbian government and press outlets: a) to reposition the country on the symbolic maps of Europe; and b) to reconstruct the role of Serbia as an important (and righteous) actor on the regional and international political scene. To achieve these goals, state competence and “behavior in the European fashion” needed to be demonstrated.

One of the consequences of this strategy is that the frequency and strength of this discourse helped reduce the pressure on political actors and the media to rely on overtly xenophobic rhetoric. This contributed to marginalizing right-wing populist reactions and preventing them from setting the political agenda during the crisis. The othering of refugees was
mitigated, partly because (even) tabloids were framing the crisis in compassionate terms.

Since, despite this rhetoric, the Serbian state often delegated the provision of assistance and other humanitarian duties to volunteers and the civil sector, it is at this point that we find confirmation of our premise that the refugee crisis was instrumentalized in Serbian national politics. The notion of European values was “hijacked” by the local political elites (Petrović 2014: 14) and used in an attempt to revitalize Serbian national pride and self-image with a mixture of “European values” and “civilizational standards,” through a hostile competition with the EU countries in the region (particularly Croatia).

Not only did the state officials create a public image of impeccable Serbian policy regarding the 2015 refugee crisis, they also abnegated their international legal obligations to provide protection to refugees. Serbia provided no durable solutions, no protection of asylum seekers, nor any plan for the integration of those who perhaps wanted to stay; rather, it only eased their journey through Serbia. The message conveyed was very clear: we will help, as long as you are in transit.

We believe that the way the refugee crisis was shaped symbolically by political officials and the media belies the very assumptions upon which the symbolic geography of Europe and the world is based: the never-ending reproduction of Us vs. Them dichotomies. This also illustrates the relation of tutorship that exists within the process of accession to the European Union: the “less European” countries competition to acquire legitimacy allows for ever more robust versions of nationalism to bloom.
References


The project of creating the Greater Albanian state was based on the national idea from the late 19th century that all Albanians should live in one state (Borozan 2001:1). The idea of solving the Albanian question was awakened by the “League for the defense of the rights of the Albanian nation” founded in Prizren on 10 June 1878 (read more in Borozan 2001: 21; Skendi 1967: 88; Bogdanović 1980; Hadži Vasiljević 1909; Vojvodić 1989: 1-21). The League, although it was abolished by the Turkish authorities, permanently influenced the main directions of the struggle for territorial and ethnic Albania.

1 The program of the League was created in cooperation with Albanian intellectuals and Turkish politicians, and included the following: 1. that all areas inhabited by Albanians in the Balkan part of Turkey make a unique Albanian Vilayet, 2. the administration in such vilayet is to be entrusted to Albanians 3. that the Albanian language is the official language in schools and court 4. recruits are to perform military duties only in the territory concerned and 5. the local budget is mostly aimed at the needs of this vilayet. Vilayet is supposed to extend to the territory of Skadar, Janjina, Bitola and Kosovo, as well as the Thessalonica Vilayet. In this region a little less than 44% of the population were Albanians, with the rest being Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Turks, Greeks, Vlachs, Romani, Armenians and others.
Thus, the next Albanian League, founded in Peć in 1899, followed the principles of the Prizren League, except for the fact that in the meantime the idea of territorial and ethnic Albanian unification was firmly incorporated in the strategic vision of the great powers (Borozan 1995: 44-45). With the creation of Albania led by Ismail Kemal (28 November 1912), the idea of the Greater Albania expanded with the support of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Avramovski 1992: 39). The Albanian government sent to the London conference in early 1913 a memorandum in which it expressed their pretentions to a maximum of territorial variants included in the program of the Albanian movement (Peć, Mitrovica, Priština, Skoplj and Tetovo and surroundings) (Borozan 1995: 58). As a result of a compromise between Austro-Hungarian and Russian diplomats, a border between Montenegro and Serbia with Albania was created, which ran from the Adriatic coast along the river Bojana, including part of the Skadar Lake, while Plav, Gusinje, Peć, Dečani and Djakovica were added to Montenegro, and Prizren, Debar and Ohrid to Serbia. Also, the diplomats have created an autonomous, independent and hereditary Principality of Albania, headed by Wilhelm Vida opposite the unrecognized government of Ismail Kemal in Vlore (Vojvodić 1989: 149-161). Along with the Albanian diplomatic struggle for the expansion of the territory, there was an uprising among the Albanian refugee population from Kosovo in Albania, whose organizers were Hasan Priština, Isa Boletini and Bajram Curi (Hrabak 1988: 33-38). Although they withdrew, the government of Ismail Kemal sent a message that it should be kept in mind that “Kosovo was and will remain Albanian” (Borozan 2001: 19).

In World War I the Austro-Hungarian Empire had supported Albania, primarily in order to open the second front in

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2 After 30 May 1913, by the Treaty of Peace with the Balkan countries, Turkey has lost all rights to the territories west of the line Enos – Midia.
Serbia (more about the Austro-Hungarian policy towards Albania: Mitrović 1990: 79-104). That has helped the Committee for the Defense of Kosovo, formed in 1912, led by Hasan Priština, Isa Boletini and Bajram Curi (Borozan 1995: 67). The Austro-Hungarian Empire clashed with Bulgaria during the war (more in: Mitrović 1981: 61-131) because it supported the Greater Albania plans and their claims to Kosovo and Metohija. Meanwhile, Italy began to intensively get involved in the Greater Albania plans, in particular with the weakening of the Austro-Hungarian power, when the Italian general Ferraro declared independent reunification of Albania under the protectorate of Italy in Djirokastra. Also, Italy has helped the formation of the Committee for the Liberation of Kosovo in November 1918, which was renamed the Kosovo Committee and had significance in all political matters (Antonić 2006: 30; Borozan 1995: 75). Finally, with the help of Italy, the new Albanian government Turhan Paša Permeti requested at the Paris Conference in 1919 that the composition of the future Albania includes the eastern parts of Montenegro, Peć, Kosovska Mitrovica, Priština, Gnjilane, Uroševac, Kačanik, Skoplje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Kičevo, Debra, the area south of the Ohrid and Prespa lake to the Greek mountain Gramos; hence, the border would stretch to the Preveza bay, whereby the idea of the Greater Albania was displayed again. (Borozan 1995, 80; Dimić, Borozan 1998: 632-633; Mitrović

3 With new boundaries Prizren, Priština, Uroševac, Gnjilane and Kačanik were added to Bulgaria, and Peć, Djakovica, Kosovska Mitrovica and Vučitrn to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while the Albanian border has not changed.

4 The objectives of the Committee were to fight fervently for the defense of the territorial integrity of the country, the restoration of the Albanian League of Prizren, as well as freeing Kosovo and other Albanian territories from “the occupiers”. Chairman of the Committee was Hodža Kadriu, and at the heads were Hasan Priština, Bajram Curi, Sali Malići and Sotir Peci.
Hasan Priština, one of the leaders of the Kosovo Committee and the main figure in the activities against the Yugoslav state, also forwarded some requests to the great powers at the Paris Peace Conference. The withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo was requested and was to be replaced by English-American troops, after which a plebiscite on the status of Kosovo would be executed leading to its merging with Albania (Dimić, Borozan 1998: 632-633). In late June 1919, Priština was in Durres and received a support from General Pjacentini for the Albanian troops to attack with the aim to expel the Serbs from the area to the right of the river Drim up to the border of Macedonia. Also, Priština was staying with an Italian poet and politician D’Annuncio in occupied Rijeka (Mitrović 1990: 242).

Kosovo Committee has promoted the idea of the Greater Albania primarily in Drenica, Istok and Peć’s district, and worked with the IMRO’s right-wing Makedenstvujuščih\(^5\). Thus, in Albania in 1920, Aleksandar Protogerov signed a protocol in the name of IMRO with the leadership of the Kosovo Committee on organization \textit{kachaks} and \textit{komites}\(^6\) from bases in southern Albania (Borozan 1995: 92). In order to organize its structure and financing, the members of the Committee met frequently\(^7\). President was Sali Vučitrnac, and vice president

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\(^5\) The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was a revolutionary national liberation movement in the Ottoman territories in Europe, that operated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

\(^6\) \textit{Kachaks} is a term used for the Albanian bandits active in the 19th and early 20th century in northern Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, and later as a term for the militias of Albanian revolutionary organizations against the Kingdom of Serbia (1910–18) Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–24), called the “Kačak movement”.

\(^7\) Command of the Third Army Region has reported that on 26 June 1932 a meeting of the Committee was held in the Kosovo village of Droc (near Tirana and Kavaja), which was attended by Abdurahman Kros, Redžep Jema, the mayor of Tirana, Muharem Barjaktar, Sali Vučitrnac,
Muharem Barjaktar, but in the reports of military attaché in Albania another person was often mentioned as the head of the committee (Šacir Cur, Ahmed beg, Ćerim beg, Feriz Salković, Mehmed Ali). They printed and distributed pamphlets and brochures with their ideas with the help of the Italian publisher, and by canvassing the areas along the Yugoslav-Albanian border reminded people “not to forget the enslaved Kosovo”. The Albanian consulate in Skopje and Prizren had a major role in spreading the Albanian propaganda. The Consulate in Skopje had a map on which the cities that were supposed to belong to Albania were marked, from Peć to the east in the direction of Podujevo, Vranje, Pčinja river and Vardar river to the Greek border. Due to this role, we can assume that the statement of the Albanian deputy in Belgrade, who complained to the Yugoslav government in 1932 that the secret police was spying on

Naki beg Starova, Jusuf Efendi Bešir and an Italian (Military archives (hereinafter referred to as MA), listing (hereinafter referred to as l) 17, a box (hereinafter referred to as b) 27, No.47 / 1, 5.august 1932).

9 Albanian professor and a member of the Kosovo Committee Mehmed Vokši issued a brochure in Albanian language in Rome named “Arbanija and Arbanasi 42 years – one language and one fatherland” in 1930, and Italian version in early 1931 “Tutt al’Albania di tutti gli Albanese” (“Whole Albania all Albanians”), in which the idea of Kosovo Committee were represented. According to his vision, the borders of Albania went from the Adriatic coast from the Bay of Spiez, in the north of Bara, following the direction of the northeast, Lake Skadar, Trgoviški hills, Skadar, Hoti, Gruda, Gusinje, Plav and Peć, the whole highland in the north of Mitrovica, to Kuršumlija and Prokuplje, south to Kumano-vo, Skopje, Bitolj, Kastoria and Preveza in the Adriatic. (MA, l. 17, b. 95 a, f. 2, the General intelligence Department).

10 MA, l. 17, b. 95 a, f. 2 The reports for July, August and September 1931.
Albanian consulate in Skoplje and hindering normal operation, was true (Avramovski 1986: 92).

In 1932, there was a rise in incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian border, which the Albanian government was warned about. The British believed that these raids were only a consequence of the economic issues on the border (Avramovski 1986: 92). According to Vreme a large number of Albanians fled to the Yugoslav territory, reporting as reasons the unbearable situation, fiscal levies, hunger and terrorizing by the police authorities, because many were suspected of maintaining ties with the Albanian emigrants to the Yugoslav territory (Vreme, 6. July 1932).

In early 1934, in the January report, military attaché of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Tirana, stated that the Albanian authorities had banned any gatherings or illegal crossing to the Yugoslav territory, so that „there could be no larger and severe komites-kachaks crossings”. There were individual passes for the purpose of robbery and blood feuds. Albanian authorities, at the order of King Zog, conducted energetic confiscation of weapons from the people and they had orders to prevent any activity.\footnote{MA, l. 17, b. 95 g, f. 2, No.1, General Headquarters to attaché of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Tirana for March 1934.} However, 1934 was marked by the interest of the Albanian Government to prevent the emigration of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija and Macedonia to Turkey and Albania. Kosovo was being promoted as part of Albania which increased the propaganda of the Kosovo Committee (Borozan :124-125)

In addition to rising propaganda\footnote{MA, l. 17, b. 24, no. 6/1, reg. 111, 112 and 113, Report for November and December 1937; Archives of Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as AY), the Ministry of Justice, City Hall of Peć, City Police Guard, 4 October 1937.}, Kosovo Committee organized frequent incursions by rebel groups from Albania and
delivering weapons, which was reflected in the results of the investigation of weapons in Djakovica county. There were about 600 rifles and ammunition, and the weapons were sent from Drenica, Kosovska Mitrovica, Kačanik and Podrima districts. Also, there were reports that the main channel of the Committee was from the Djakovica district, partly in Istok, including parts of Drenica, through Žabare municipality in which the Committee had the support of Mayor Šaban Redža. From here, channel continued to Kosovska Mitrovica to supporters of Ferat beg Drača, and where another fraction of the committee existed consisting of Džafer Deva, Šaban Mustafa and Mustafa Alijević from Mitrovica. After Mitrovica, the channel went to Šalja, Vučitrn, Priština, Uroševac, Kačanik, Skoplje-Albanian consulate.

The problem that had increased the Albanian discontent and aggravated the situation was the process of agrarian reform and colonization. The Albanian population considered that distribution of land was unfair and that the land was being taken away from them, although the Yugoslav government tried to divide uncultivated state land, abandoned plots and the land confiscated from the renegade kachaks (Jovanović 2002: 125, 225). In response to the dissatisfaction of Muslims that their land was taken „to such an extent that they will all become homeless”, the Yugoslav authorities argued that „they do not carry out any violence, but implement limitations to the land for purposes of colonization under the provisions of the Law on Settling the Southern Parts, which was not specifically directed against the Muslims, but was implemented on both the Muslim and Christian population, and there was no intention to forcibly drive anyone to move out of Yugoslavia”. It was also emphasized that „80% of the Albanian population was not

13 AY, The Ministry of Justice on 1 August 1938.
14 MA, l. 17, b. 95a, f.2, No.1.
covered by the agrarian reform because they had no more than 0.40 ha per capita".  

The second issue that exacerbated Yugoslav Albanian conflicts was the matter of education. It was, both for the state and for national minorities, one of the crucial ones. In order to suppress the national movement that had spilled over from neighboring Albania to Kosovo (particularly through the Albanian schools), Yugoslav state had planned to open several central schools with boarding in areas with a majority of Albanian population (Dimić 1997: 101). Thus about 1,400 schools were opened, 486 school buildings constructed, about 100 libraries formed and around 2,000 teachers and other education workers employed. Albanian historian Ali Hadri claims that the Serbs made progress while nothing was done for the Albanian national minority. He stated that the problem was that the teaching in public schools was held in the official state language, so the Albanian children rarely attended, which led to their high illiteracy (over 90%. 1939). However, the Yugoslav education authorities have sought for Muslim and Orthodox children to learn together, in order to increase religious tolerance. Provincial school authorities strictly forbade anyone from jeopardizing the national identity of Turkish and Albanian children (such as removing caps in school). Muslim customs and religious rituals were to be tolerated, because „Albanians or Turks could

15 AY, 37-42-297, 6 August 1938.
16 School year 1929/30: in schools in Vardar Banate in purely Albanian classes there were 4,092 male students and 148 female students (Dimić, knj.3, 1997: 128). School in the village of Gornje Ljubinje was the first one built in a purely Muslim village (AY, 66-1406-1589, 4 April 1930).
17 School year 1940/41: in primary schools there were 24,914 Serbian and Montenegrin children and 11,876 Albanians, and in high schools 2% of Albanian children (Hadri 1967: 80-83).
18 AY, 66-746-1201, 14 Oktober 1929.
not be turned into Serbs or Croats“ and it was to be worked on “the development of affection towards Christians and the common state, the king and the royal government“.

In the villages and cities schools were opened for Muslim children called “Sibijan mektebs“, in which the Koran was the basis of learning, Albanian primers were used and all explanations were given in their native language. The Yugoslav educational authorities considered these schools to be “nationally harmful institution” because the educational function was performed by the imams and muftis who did not know Serbian well,. However, in order to solve educational problems in the south, by the decision of the Minister of Education dated 3 March 1931, opening of these institutions was officially allowed. Despite the decision, the Muslim authorities opened these schools without the knowledge of the Ministry of Education, although each new opening should have been regularly reported.

The situation in Kosovo and Metohija depended on the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy, as well as the relations between the two countries with Albania. Yugoslavia and Italy signed an agreement in 1937 that guaranteed the Albanian independence, mutual respect for the borders, protection of the interests in the case of threat and aimed to promote trade. The signing of the Yugoslav-Italian treaty signaled a change in the state of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania, as well as Italy and Albania, but Count Ciano assured king Zog that the Italian-Albanian relations will not be affected (Avramovski 1963: 26).

The external political situation affected the expansion of activities of the Kosovo Committee. For its expansion, the Kosovo Committee took advantage of Yugoslav policy to move a

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19 AY, 66-1401-1589.
20 AY, 66-22-51.
21 AY, 66-1407-1589, 19 Oktober 1931.
large number of Albanians from the Yugoslav territory to Albania, considering it to be in the interest of Yugoslavia. Albanians were received and “inhabited where they wanted”, governed by the Department of Agrarian Reform, led by Sali Vučitrnac. Also, Ferat beg Draga, through his agents kept in touch with Murat beg from Peć, who after fleeing to Albania became one of the officials of the Kosovo Committee, and organized secret courts that represented the local offices of the intelligence service through which ties with Albania were maintained. The leaders of this courts were Bećir Miftar from Ponoševac, Ali Ali from Riznić, Aziri Sadik, Aslan Bajrami from Vokša, Arif Hodža from Morina, Hodža Avdul from Batuša, Ahmet Sulejman and Nek Aslan from Ponoševac and Malj Bajram from Šišman. Prominent role in organizing the Greater Albania propaganda in the Djakovica district had Bećir Miftar and Ali Adžija, presidents of Ponoševac and Riznić municipalities, Djakovica’s imam Afiz Guta and Albanian emigrant in Prizren Kadri Memet, who asked to be transferred there. What is most interesting, as emphasized by Yugoslav senator Andra Kujundžić, it is that all the agitators were the most energetic supporters of each current government and its party, such as MP Mustafa Durgutović, Šerif Voca and Beca from Suva Reka and mayors in Podrima district.

The Committee additionally activated after the Munich crisis in September 1938. The commander of the Third Army Region, Milan Ječmenica, wrote on that occasion, to the General Headquarters that “Albanian population raised its head and Albanian irredentism stepped up its propaganda, spreading voices

22 MA, l. 17, b. 27, no. 40/3, 29 February 1936; MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 3, no. 1; MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 3, no.1, 26 January 1937; MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 1, no.16, 22 March 1938.
23 MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 3, No. 1.
24 MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 3, No.1, 26 January 1937.
that Metohija and regions inhabited Albanians will be back to Albania” (Avramovski 1964: 126). Albanian books, brochures, leaflets and badges were shared on market days with a picture of the Albanian royal couple, primarily in Djakovica and Prizren county. Albanian couriers, under the guise of small shops, passed on the messages and advice from Albania on market days. They were divided regionally – in the former Sanjak of Novi Pazar, the chief commissioner was Akif from Novi Pazar, originating from Djakovica, for Kosovo and Drenica the former president of Drenica Sedlar Banuš who fled to Albania, for Podrima (Orahovac and the surroundings) the chief commissioner was Bejzad Durgutović, a trader from Orahovac.25 In the county of the Sharr Mountain Albanian primers were distributed, and in December 1938 130 brooches were transferred from Peshkopi and Kukes.26 Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija took an Albanian flag with a slogan “Long lives the Kingdom of Albania” as a symbol of their organization. These flags were kept in the houses of prominent Albanians and displayed only when meetings were held.27 Messages and encouragement were coming from Odza and Sehler dervishes of Prizren, Orahovac, Djakovica and Peć, with the support of Albanian younger generation. Through religious schools, Sibijan mektebs, the message that Albania “will expand to Kačanik with Italian help” also spread out.28 These messages were spreading through the frequent visits of Albanian citizens, mostly teachers, to Djakovica and Prizren.29

In Korča, the demonstrations where participants demanded the unification of “unliberated Albanian province”

25 MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 1, No. 16, 1938
26 MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 1, No.16, 26 December 1938.
27 MA, l.17, b. 94 f. 1, No. 16, General Headquarters, 24 October 1938.
28 MA, l.17, b. 94, f. 3, No. 1, 26 January 1937
29 MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 1, No .16, General Headquarters, 27 August 1938.
Kosovo and Epirus with Albania, erupted.\textsuperscript{30} In southern Serbia, there were widespread news that the Albanians were preparing for an uprising that would make a “slaughter of the Serbian population, and especially the settlers.”\textsuperscript{31} In addition, prior to the end of 1938 rallies were prepared by the leaders of Kosovo emigration, who required the intervention of the Albanian government and the major powers with the Yugoslav government to give minority rights to the Albanians in Yugoslavia. The Albanian government did not want to participate in this because it feared that Italy, in the event of an outbreak of the war in Europe, would seize the opportunity to attack Albania, but after the crisis had passed it continued agitation in the Yugoslav areas inhabited by Albanians (Avramovski 1964: 128). In light of this, the Committee was supported by providing arms, that was distributed in two directions – border towards Prizren, Suva Reka and Uroševac and the second bordars towards Djakovica, Orahovac, Drenica, Priština, which showed that they were counting on Albanians in Yugoslavia along the border. The main depot for the transfer of weapons was near the Albanian border in Tropoje from where the weapons were transferred to Batush and Morrish in the district of Djakovica. In Vlahnja in Albania was a depot for the transfer of weapons to districts of Has, Podrima and Podgora.\textsuperscript{32} Albanians were concealing weapons which was confirmed by the results of the search of the Albanian population near the border. In the district of Gnjilane two thousand guns and more bombs were handed over and in district of Nerodimlje eight hundred rifles and grenades. In other districts which are close to the Albanian border, this collection and surrender of weapons went a lot slower because the chiefs and gendarmerie, according to Senator Kujundžić, “loosely

\textsuperscript{30} MA, l. 17, b. 76, f. 2, No. 17.

\textsuperscript{31} MA, l. 17, b. 94, f. 1, No. 16, 1938.

\textsuperscript{32} AY, 37-53-54, 19 February 1938.
acted”, as was the case in Podrima and Podgora district, where “Muslim MPs and mayors encouraged people to conceal weapons and surrender to the authorities only the useless” because the Albanians from Albania sent a message to “keep guns at the cost of life, because they will soon need them”.33

The following 1939 continued with the Greater Albania propaganda. This happened in accordance with the foreign policy circumstances. Italy led the negotiations with Yugoslavia over Albania, where its division was being considered (Stojadinović 1970: 517-518). This is indicated in a study of 30 January 1939 which was done by Ivo Andric, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.34 Inspired by these events, the activities of the Kosovo Committee were continued in various ways. Lieutenant and trader from Kukes, Rešad Dida, served as an intelligence agent in Prizren. Since he often went to Prizren, he received instructions in Albanian boxes of cigarettes and answers returned in boxes of Yugoslav cigarettes.35 Among the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija Albanian flags were observed36 as well as the first public distribution of the Greater Albania maps with parts entering the Yugoslav and Greek territory. Yugoslav Ministry of Interior banned this but the map was still sold at a price of 0.50 francs per share. The official response from the Yugoslav and Greek side was lacking and this encouraged separatist movement. Military attaché in Tirana held that the map

33  AY, 37-53-56-58, 21 May 1938.
34  The study also noted that “the division of Albania would erase an attractive center for Albanian minority in Kosovo that would assimilate more easily. We could possibly get 2-300.000 more Albanians but they are mostly Catholics whose relations with the Muslims have never been good. The question of emigration of Albanian Muslims to Turkey would also be performed under new circumstances, because there would not be any stronger action to prevent it” (Krizman 1977: 89).
35  MA, l. 17, b. 31, No. 47/1-1, 10 January 1939.
36  MA, l. 17, b. 31, No. 43/1-1, 5 January 1939.
“The real and the true Albania” was solely the work of the Albanian government, which approved all the manifestations of the Greater Albania by Kosovo emigration. Also, the Albanian military authorities passed a large number of weapons and ammunition to certain areas of northern Albania. Between 15 and 30 January 1939, about 200 Italian *carbines* were brought to the village Šištevac in Albania, and in Tropoje about 100. These weapons were to be gradually transferred to Yugoslavia and divided to Albanian population, for which Dem Idris Cecaj from the village Djoc, in the district of Djakovica was responsible.

The leaders of the Kosovo Committee used every suitable moment to confirm Italy’s support to win over Kosovo, especially after the Italian occupation of Albania. So Ismet Krieziu beg, the brother of Gani beg Crnoglavić from Djakovica, and Avni Giljani addressed Benito Mussolini in relation to Kosovo and Metohija during the stay of the Albanian government delegation in Rome of mid-April 1939 for handover of Albanian crown to the Italian king. Soon after this, former Albanian deputy in Belgrade Tahir Štila, tried to address the same issue in an interview with Count Galeazzo Ciano (Avramovski 1964: 132-133). They never received any specific answers, because of the forthcoming visit of Yugoslav Prime Minister Aleksandar Cincar Marković to Italy, and Count Ciano wrote in his diary that first “Yugoslavs should be lulled” and Kosovo should be “dealt with later”, which would “keep alive an irredentist

37 MA, l. 17, b. 518, f. 5, No. 30, February 1939.
38 MA, l. 17, b. 31, no. 30/2-1, 18. April 1939, b. 31, 30/2-2, 18 March 1939.
39 Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini was an Italian politician, journalist and leader of the National Fascist Party.
40 MA, l. 17, b. 518, f. 5, no. 30, February 1939.
41 Gian Galeazzo Ciano, was Foreign Minister of Fascist Italy from 1936 until 1943 and Benito Mussolini’s son-in-law. Ciano wrote and left behind a diary.
problem in the Balkans” and constitute a “knife aimed at the back of Yugoslavia” (Ciano 1948: 69).

In May 1939, Italy started its activities in order to prevent the Yugoslav influence in northern Albania. Former envoy in Tirana, Jakomoni, gathered about 200 chiefs from the Debar region, gave them financial assistance, promised economic and cultural advancement (opening schools, building roads, draining marshes) and gave them permission to carry weapons. Therefore, the Albanian leaders, especially Tahir Zaimi and Bećir Maloku, were able to continue activities in order to create the Greater Albania (Avramovski 1964: 136). Ferat Draga beg worked on restoring Džemijet, and in Belgrade the activity of the student organization Besa was increased (Terzić 1983, 188; Imami 1998: 147).

Meanwhile, Albania had become an Italian corporate state. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had instructed its bodies to initiate an action in Kosovo and Metohija, which was

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43 Džemijet was a political party of the Muslim population in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It represented Albanians, Muslims and Turks in what was then “Southern Serbia” (Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija, Sandjak). It was formed in August 1918 and officially constituted in Skoplje in late 1919. The party participated in the 1920 and 1923 elections, in which 8 and 14 representatives respectively were elected. In January 1925 the party’s leader Ferhat Draga, an Albanian nationalist who had previously served as mayor of Mitrovica, was arrested and soon after the party was disbanded (for more information: Krivokapić-Jović 2002: 163-165).

44 Organization Besa was founded in 1935. The main organizer was Sermet Džadžuli, Secretary of the Albanian Embassy in Belgrade, and since 1937 consul in Skoplje. At the beginning of June 1939 financing of Besa was claimed by the Italian mission in Belgrade (MA, l. 17, b. 518, f. 6, No.7, General Headquarters Command of the Third Army Region, October 11, 1939).
supposed to take place in three phases – “general propaganda activities on cultural and religious grounds, a public organization in this field and a secret military organization that collaborated with Italian army in case of outbreak of inevitable Yugoslav crisis” (Ciano 1948: 96). Head of the Italian military intelligence service for Albania was Angelo Antika, based in Kuks. In parallel, the Fascist Party of Albania was founded (Borozan 1995: 202-203). One of the leaders of this party was Kole Biba, who had spent some time in Yugoslavia. Chiefs of the Kosovo Committee relied on the support of the Italians and put themselves at their disposal.\(^{45}\) They were contemplating the formation of “a border committee” that, using petitions addressed to the international community, demanded that Italy takes the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia under protection.\(^{46}\) In activating these issues, Ferat beg Draga, Mustafa Durgutović, Adem and Asim Marmulaku, Asim Ljuž\(^ {47}\), Bajazit Boletini and Džafer Deva were particularly engaged.\(^ {48}\)

Italian officials in their visits to Albania promised an increase in territory (Borozan 1995: 189).\(^ {49}\) Based on the support of the Italians, Albanian leaders pronounced that Kosovo and Metohija will be merged with Albania, which will create the Greater Albania.\(^ {50}\) In July 1939, Šefket Vrlaci, President of the Albanian government, asserted that “Albania was joined with Italy in order to help to annex the entire South Serbia to Albania”.\(^ {51}\) In the same month, the Yugoslav General Head-

\(^{45}\) MA, l. 17, b. 7, No.7/3-1, Report for June 1939.

\(^{46}\) MA, l. 17, b. 22, No. 49/10

\(^{47}\) MA, l 17, b. 22, No. 49/10, 1.

\(^{48}\) MA, l. 17, b. 519, f. 1, No.17, 24 July 1939.

\(^{49}\) AY, 14-23-56, Bulletin of the Ministry of Interior for August and September 1939.

\(^{50}\) MA, l. 17, b. 22, No. 49/10, 3.

\(^{51}\) MA, l. 17, b. 22, No. 49/10, 3.
quarters report highlighted that 18 renegades in Rugova gorge distributed flyers with the speech of the Albanian Minister of Education, Kolici, which emphasized Mussolini’s promise of the Greater Albania with Kosovo and Metohija. To this end, they held frequent meetings. In Kosovska Mitrovica, Arslan Rustem, a merchant from Suvi Do, “a demagogue who had influence on the Albanians”, held meetings in shops and mosques and sent a message that Albanians should “hold united to expel Christian people from their Albanian Kosovo”. In July 1939 in Peć, Muja Boljetinac met with leaders: Selim Šaban from the village Istinić, Ali Adžija, President of Rznić municipalities, Suljo Azandarović, former judge, as well as with Mamutbegović and Crnoglavić. According to the reports of the General Headquarters Command, they all cooperated with and worked in the Kosovo Committee. Salih Kadri, a lawyer from Gostivar and former Member of Parliament, was also likely to cooperate with the Kosovo Committee. He was a friend of Ferat beg Drağa, and in August 1939 he traveled through all the border districts of Albania.

Germany’s attack of Poland in early September 1939 influenced an increase in Albanian activities. Members of the Committee all worked within the organization “Black Hand”, the executive body of the Kosovo Committee, aided by agents of the Italian and German agencies following the agreement in Berlin (Borozan 1995: 203). In Djakovica and Peć there were meetings of the Albanian leaders, led by Rifat Mahmutbegović, rentier from Peć, Mehmet Jajagić, President Peć Municipality,

52 MA, l. 17, b. 518, f. 5, No. 43, General Headquarters, Command of the Third Army Region, July 27, 1939
53 MA, l. 17, b. 519, f. 1, No. 17, 16 June 1939.
54 MA, l. 17, b. 519, f. 1, No. 17, 24 July 1939.
55 MA, l. 17, b. 95 6, f. 4, No. 10.
56 MA, l. 17, b. 31, No. 2/2, 23 January 1939.
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Asim Ljuz, deputy of Drenica district, and in the district of Djakovica particularly thanks to Sulejman beg Krieziu. *Džemijet* was restored, in which beg Ferat Draga, Ilijaz Aguš, Ćerim Zeinović, Šerif Voca, Dačic Jahia, Jusuf Imerović, Adem Marmulaku, Sadik Kurtović and Asim Murteza were engaged.\(^{57}\) Ferat beg Draga especially urged the Albanians not to leave their homes and that Albania “is soon to be annexed territory up to Niš”, and so called leaders Sali Kadri from Gostivar, Ilijaz Aguš from district of Nerodimlje, Asim Murtezi from Drenica, Mustafa Durguti from Podrima district and beg Zejnel Stracimir from Kačanik district were told to transmit instructions about increased political engagement at a meeting in Prizren.\(^{58}\)

Italian support for the idea of Greater Albania was continued in 1940. Italian envoy in Belgrade Mameli sent an act to consul in Skoplje that he will support every action of Albanians in favor of Italy (offered 120,000 dinars), and then two boxes of promotional materials in which they emphasized the benefits of what Italy has done for the Albanian people.\(^{59}\) Also, in Rijeka has printed 10,000 leaflets and brochures that were to be spread among the Albanians.\(^{60}\) The Yugoslav Command of Debra reported that from Burelja and Kukes the Italian *carabinieri* who knew Albanian will be sent, dressed in Albanian local clothing and with permits designed to enable short stay in Prizren, Djakovica, Struga, Ohrid and Debar.\(^{61}\) Also, when the Italian army moved from southern and central Albania to Elbasan, and those from Shkodra to Kuks and Tropaja, it was widely rumored among the Albanian population in western Macedonia, Kosovo

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57 MA, l. 17, b. 7, No. 27/3-1, Report for October from 4 November 1939.
58 MA, l. 17, b. 22, No.16/3-1, The report of 20 August 1939; The same, No. 17 / 3-1, Report of 30 August 1939.
59 MA, l. 17, b. 95 6, f. 4, No. 9, 1. May 1940.
60 MA, l. 17, b. 95 6, f. 4, No. 8, 1940.
61 MA, l. 17, b. 31, No. 3/4-1, 2 April 1940.
and Metohija that *Kosovars* with the support of the Italian intelligence service were to organize a rebellion near Prizren, Djakovica and Peć. Albanian political emigrants had also been very active, especially in the district of Djakovica. Gani Bey Krieziu, the leader of Albanians near Djakovica, who collaborated with Serbia, arrived in Djakovica and talked with the local Albanian chiefs, when he pointed out that his efforts created the possibility that “all Albanians will soon be in one state”. Yugoslav Command of the Kosovo division is drawing attention to the Yugoslav government that “more committed work in relation with the Albanians would lead to reduced Albanian discontent”. This implied suppressing secret and clever propaganda of Albanian leaders by restricting their movements, controlling local authorities, changing corrupt officialdom and reviewing the agreement on local border traffic.

When Italy entered the war against France in June 1940 it strengthened Albania’s expectations for the expansion of the territory. Yugoslav General Headquarters received a report that news were spreading among Muslims in Metohija that Italy “would try to cause large-scale riots on Yugoslav territory as soon as possible” and “it would use the Yugoslav

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62 Emigrants from Kosovo or Southern Serbia were known in Albania under the general name *Kosovari*, moved away mainly for political reasons, because they were Turkish clerks and officers, influential chiefs and educated people, then criminals and military fugitives (MA, l. 17, b. 26, f. 39/2, doc.1)

63 MA, l. 17, b. 31, No. 3/4-1, 2 April 1940.

64 MA, l. 17, b. 95 b, F.4, Third Army District Headquarters to Chief of General Headquarters, 28 June 1940.

65 MA, l. 17, b. 26, f. 4, No. 31, Report on the situation in South Serbia.

66 MA, l. 17, b. 519, f. 3, No. 45, May 1940.

67 MA, l. 17, b. 26, f. 3 Report of 19 June 1940; AY, 370-22-538, 7 March 1940.
renegades located in Albania”. For such action weapons were being prepared, which was located near the Yugoslav border in Albania.\textsuperscript{68} Due to spreading news that the Yugoslav political and military circles prepared incursions of Albanian emigrants from the area of Metohija in northern Albania, Angelo Antika started organizing riots in Djakovica and Prizren, giving money to \textit{Kosovars} (six napoleons a month) and buying “besa” of the chief of the border.\textsuperscript{69} Also, he met in Tropoja with Sadik Rama and his son, Zećiri Radži, and Hisen Seid from Junik and deliberated with them to transfer \textit{kachaks} to work for Italy. In Tiranë, a new committee was created under the leadership of Ćerim Mahmudbegović from Peć.\textsuperscript{70} Šefket Vrlaci in August 1940, took the opportunity during his visit to Kuks to declare that the time has come to unite the Albanian people and to join Kosovo and Metohija, as well as other cities in Yugoslavia and Greece where Albanians live, with Albania.\textsuperscript{71}

In the second half of 1940, the situation in Kosovo and Metohija aggravated. Ferat Draga beg worked on ways to organize all the Muslims from Metohija, Kosovo, Sanjak, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Muslim community.\textsuperscript{72} Agents from the Djakovica and Prizren districts were active in submitting data on schedule and strength of the Yugoslav army in Kosovo and Metohija. The propaganda particularly came to the fore when the British bombardment of the Italian bases in Albania brought panic among the Albanian population that Italy will not be able to keep its promises.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{68} MA, l. 17, b. 95 b, f. 4, No. 12.
\textsuperscript{69} MA, l. 17, b. 31, 40 / 4-1, June 14, 1940.
\textsuperscript{70} MA, l. 17, b. 26, f. 3.doc 4.
\textsuperscript{71} MA, l. 17, b. 26, f. 4, No. 33/3, 22 August 1940.
\textsuperscript{72} MA, l. 17, b. 95 b, f. 4, No.14, 1940; MA, l. 17, b. 25a, No.5/3-1; b. 31, No.57/4-1.
\textsuperscript{73} MA, l. 17, b. 26, f. 4, no. 35/3, 14 August 1940.
In October 1940, in the report of Yugoslav Minister of the Army and Navy, it was noted that the situation in Kosovo and Metohija was becoming “very serious and worrying” and that it was “a result of improper conducting of systematic internal policies over the past 20 years”. It was also noted that the Albanian Muslims were more loyal to the interests of the Yugoslav state and were hesitant towards Italy, who gave primacy to Albanian Catholics. Accordingly, the district chief of Vučitrn reported that the Albanians did not show sympathy for the Italians, because they had heard that the Italians want to intern their youth in Abyssinia, and he stressed that “Albanian population would remain loyal as long as we can be firm and strong”. Also, many prominent leaders in northern Albania have resisted the Italian regime, such as Djon Lješi from Mirdita, Muharem Nezir and Muharem Bajraktar.

At the end of our study, we can conclude that the enmity of Yugoslavia and Albania that manifested itself above all in Kosovo and Metohija was a result of the policy of the Yugoslav state and the Albanian disagreement with that. The Yugoslav state was faced with a large number of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija (in the interwar period, about three-fifths, or 60% of the population). Although it proclaimed provisions for the protection of the rights of the Albanian minority, the Yugoslav state held them to a minimum. These provisions, since the Congress of Berlin (1878) and Saint-Germain contract (1919), included the equality of citizens. The problem with the Albanian side was that they opposed to the organized government because they were accustomed to their tribal customs and law of Leka Dukagjin but also because they lost the privileged position

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74 AY, 138, 7-725-727, 3 December 1940.
75 MA, l. 17, b. 956, f. 4, no.14, 1940.
76 MA, l. 17, b. 26, No. 29/3.
they had in the Ottoman Empire. One of the reasons for the poor neighborly relations were Yugoslav-Turkish negotiations about the emigration of Albanians by which the Yugoslav state pressured the Albanian population to move out from Kosovo and Metohija. This further contributed to the Kosovo Committee conducting intensive activities on propaganda against emigration. However, statistics from 1929 to 1939 show that 16,885 inhabitants of Yugoslavia emigrated to Turkey and 4,322 to Albania (Statistički godišnjak Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941: 137). This data does not specify the nationality of emigrants, and the population was moving out not only from Kosovo and Macedonia, but also from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Vojvodina. This shows that the migration of Albanians was not the only case. On the contrary, the greatest decrease in the Turkish population in Yugoslavia was in the years between the wars. The total number of Yugoslav immigrants to all countries of the world was 20-30,000 in one year. Therefore, the number of twenty thousand emigrants in Turkey and Albania for thirteen years (between the wars) cannot be considered a mass phenomenon. Of great importance in the Yugoslav-Albanian relations was the educational policy of the state towards the Albanian national minority, which had not yielded the expected results. The obligations of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to national minorities to provide education in their mother tongue remained unfulfilled, because the Kingdom was ignoring this matter. It was explained by the vital interests of the state and nation, as well as the lack of desire of the Albanian population to be educated. Albanian society was very conservative and was not ready to accept the educational policy of the country. The patriarchal customs, tribal consciousness, remains of feudal production and archaic concepts led to isolation of the Albanian society. Islamic religious community also contributed to separation of the Albanian population from the country because they wanted
to spread religious principles of Islam through education. Additional factors in the troubling situation were irredentism – defection from the state and the government repression. Attempts by the Yugoslav government to cooperate with Albanian leaders of the emigrants, to establish better relations with Albania and calm the unstable Yugoslav-Albanian border, were not entirely successful. The idea of the Greater Albania, aided by actions of the Kosovo Committee and the financial support of Italy, was један од the cause of bad neighborly relations, and therefore the constant illegal border crossings by Albanian rebels and clashes with Yugoslav border guards. Activities of the Kosovo Committee were becoming more open and more significant, resulting in the creation of the Greater Albania during World War II.

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The Myths of Albania-Yugoslavia Relations (1945-1948)

Introduction

In the period of 1945-1948, Albania and Yugoslavia enjoyed very close relations. The two countries signed several agreements that created joint state-owned companies, and Yugoslav specialists were helping Albanians in managing their economy, their army, even their Communist Party. They signed agreements that foresaw the creation of a customs union, parity between the Albanian lek and the Yugoslav dinar, and joint economic plans. Never before, and never after this period, have Albanians and the former Yugoslav nations had such close contact. (Pllumi: 2001). Then, in 1948, everything came to an end, and the silence thereafter was so profound that it seemed that the period of 1945-1948 had never existed.

The Yugoslav-Albanian relations have assumed a prominent position in Albanian historiography, especially in the aftermath of the fall of communism in Albania. Much has been said about the two countries’ relations, especially about petty denunciations and quarrels in the meetings of the Politburo of the Albanian Communist Party (Frashëri 2006; Plassari & Malltezi 1996; Hadalin 2011; Pearson 2006). Yet, there has been practically no understanding of these relations, no

1 Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS), Tirana, Albania
attempt at grasping their rationale, comprehending why they were constructed in that way, of getting a clearer idea of Enver Hoxha’s aims with respect to Albania’s foreign policy, his very conception of foreign policy. Albanian historiography has described the facts – public declarations, agreements, and the fate of the main protagonists during and after the period of the two countries’ close relations – but it has not gone deeper than that. In other words, Albanian historiography has tended to see the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia in a rather black-and-white manner. Such view of the two countries’ relations and other historical events tends to result in definite and arbitrary conclusions, which I have called myths. The myth of the Albania-Yugoslavia relations of 1945-1948 nowadays continues to influence, not only the relations between Albania and Serbia, but the two nations in general by way of their perception of the past, which is especially the case among Albanians (Begolli 2012: 86; Çela 2015).

At the same time, the mentioned myths have played a part in the criticisms of the communist regime, and especially the communist leader of Albania, Enver Hoxha, for his supposed desire to unite Albania with Yugoslavia, and for his alleged excellent and friendly relations with the “arch-enemy”, the Serbs. With regard to this period and the relations with Yugoslavia, Albanian historiography shows a tendency of equating the Yugoslav federation with Serbia. The myths have also served to amplify all the usual stereotypes about Serbia and the Serbs in Albanian historiography, and in the Albanian public more broadly (Plasari & Malltezi: 1996; Çela, A. 2015).

The period of 1945-1948 was atypical for Yugoslav-Albanian relations, and even more so for the relationship between Albanians and Serbs. The history of the relations between the two countries (Yugoslavia and Albania) and the two nations (Albanians and Serbs) is well documented and well-known. It is
precisely this history of wars, enmity, massacres and conquests that makes the relations between 1945-48 so exceptional. In those years, one official in the joint Import-Export venture Impeks wrote that people in Albania do not buy Yugoslav products because they are accustomed to Italian products (AQSH, fund 1003, file 89: 60-97). For the Catholic priest Zef Pllumi, the raising of the Albanian and Yugoslav flags next to each other in Shkodra in 1946 was the most unusual thing he had ever seen (Pllumi 2001: 24). It was not the raising of the flags per se that was unusual, but the fact that beside the Albanian flag stood the flag of the “hated Slavs”.

There are several myths about the interactions between Albania and Yugoslavia that continue to influence the Albanian-Serb relations up to the present. They are embedded in the mentality of the Albanian public and have contributed to the perceived enmity towards Serbia and the Serbs. This paper aims to analyze some of these myths, to go beyond the public declarations of the time and to see how much these myths can stand up to facts, to historical documents from the archives in Albania and Serbia which include private thoughts expressed in letters and reports and the conversations between Albanian and Yugoslav protagonists. Two myths that will be discussed and analyzed in this paper in particular are: the myth of Enver Hoxha’s desire to unite Albania with Yugoslavia and the myth of the economic relations between the two countries.

**The Fear of Yugoslavia**

The first and greatest myth concerning the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia is that of the supposed desire of the Albanian leadership, particularly Enver Hoxha, to unite Albania with Yugoslavia. This myth has proven so persistent and has been repeated so many times that people in Albania take it almost for granted. But the documents tell another story,
almost the reverse one. Enver Hoxha’s desire was not to unite Albania with Yugoslavia but, on the contrary, to make Albania as independent and self-reliant as possible, especially in the economy (ACKSKJ, IX, 1-I, 122).

This desire and goal of Enver Hoxha’s politics did not only concern the relations with Yugoslavia, but can be observed up to his death in 1985. He sought the same kind of self-reliance for Albania in his relations with the Soviet Union and later China. Hoxha’s pursuit of the model of economic self-reliance had to do with the fact that he and other members of the Albanian communist leadership had strong awareness of the Albanian-Italian relations in the 1920s and 1930s. Mussolini’s Italy had subdued Albania, first economically and later politically. Finally, on 7 April 1939, Italy invaded and conquered Albania. Enver Hoxha did not want to repeat the same experience with Yugoslavia.

In February 1947, in a report from Tirana to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Savo Zlatić wrote that Enver Hoxha and the rest of the Albanian leadership were concerned with Yugoslavia and its intentions in Albania. Zlatić further wrote that, in many circles in Albania, there were mentions of the agreements with Italy in the 1920s and 1930s and there was fear that the results of those agreements with Italy would be repeated with Yugoslavia. In addition, Zlatić says that the nature of relations that Albania had and would have with Yugoslavia was not very clear to the Albanian leadership. His conclusion was that the fears would dissipate only through the Yugoslav economic assistance to Albania (ACKSKJ, IX, 1-I – 128: 1-5).

One year earlier (in February 1946), Josip Đerđa, the Yugoslav ambassador in Albania, wrote a telegram to the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, saying that the Albanian leadership,
and Enver Hoxha personally, had been trying unsuccessfully to hide their fear of Yugoslavia. He wrote that this was also apparent from the lack of enthusiasm with which Yugoslav achievements and Yugoslavia’s leadership were propagated in Albania. Đerđa explicitly claimed that “there is a certain fear related to Yugoslavia’s plans with Albania”. He added that the arrival of the Soviet ambassador to Tirana had to some degree altered the situation for Albanians. He interpreted that as a sign that the Soviet Union was perceived by Albanians as a way to escape the danger posed by Yugoslavia. In another telegram sent to Tito from Tirana in February 1946, Đerđa wrote that things had begun to change a little. Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav leadership were now more present in the Albanian press compared to the Soviet Union. He hoped that this positive trend would extend to the foreign policy of Albania, and result in a “more healthy course of action”, by which he meant closer ties with Yugoslavia. According to Đerđa, Albanians were becoming more responsive to the Yugoslavs’ advice. It had been necessary to explain to the Albanians why they should listen to Yugoslav advice, and that this assistance and counsels were for their benefit. Đerđa wrote to Tito that he had spoken to Albanians about the sincerity of Yugoslavia’s intentions. It seems that his hopes were not fulfilled because, as can be observed from Savo Zlatić’s report from the following year, Albanians were still uneasy with Yugoslavia’s plans in Albania (ACKSKJ, IX, I – 128: 1-5).

In July 1947, Savo Zlatić wrote another report to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, in which he repeated that the Albanian leadership, and Enver Hoxha in particular, feared Yugoslavia. He writes that it is difficult for the Albanian leadership to change their ideas and conceptions from the past in relation to Yugoslavia, that it is difficult for them to have faith in the good intentions of Yugoslavia. According to Zlatić, the basis of this fear and the problems between Albania
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and Yugoslavia lay in Albania’s desire to have direct relations with the Soviet Union, in its desire to be more independent. Zlatić says that, in mid-1947, after many agreements with Yugoslavia, there was still, in the high echelons of the Albanian leadership “a widespread doubt about Yugoslavia, about its assistance and its objectives”. Zlatić writes that, of all the members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Albania, Enver Hoxha is the one with whom he has had the most difficult relations – another sign of the lack of good will on Hoxha’s part regarding Albania’s relations with Yugoslavia. Zlatić noticed that months could pass without him ever talking to Hoxha (ACKSKJ, IX, 11-I-128).

As it appears, Yugoslavs in Albania were perplexed about the reasons why Albanians did not accept Yugoslavia’s help and assistance with more enthusiasm, and did not appreciate Yugoslavia’s greater experience, especially in economic affairs (Životić 2011: 130). The answer to their perplexities lies in the history of the relations between Albanians and Yugoslavs, and especially in Albania’s experience of close economic and political relations with a neighbor, as had happened with Italy in the 1920s and 1930s. With the exception of Yugoslavia, during the almost half century of his rule in Albania Enver Hoxha sought to build close relations only with distant countries: first with the Soviet Union and later with China. This is not unintentional: by virtue of being far from Albania, the Soviet Union and China represented no direct threat to Albania’s independence and territorial integrity and, more importantly, did not threaten Hoxha’s absolute rule in the country. On the other hand, close relations with Yugoslavia (as with Italy a decade and a half earlier) could become a threat to Albania’s independence and territorial integrity.

Đerđa’s telegrams to Tito and Zlatić’s reports show that it was the Yugoslavs who were pushing for closer relations with
Albania, not Albanians with Yugoslavia. The Albanian leadership simply had no other options. The mentioned telegrams and reports illustrate the Yugoslavs’ view of their own relations with Albania – this was a quite different view from the one publicly articulated at the time, and also different from the one Albanian historiography has written about (Plasari & Malltezi: 1996). Enver Hoxha’s actual desire was to travel to Moscow and meet Stalin, but the Soviets were not so keen on his visit. In 1946, during the Paris Peace Conference, the Soviet foreign minister Molotov had said to Enver Hoxha that Yugoslavia stood between Albania and the Soviet Union and that Albania should maintain good relations with Yugoslavia (ACKSKJ, IX, 1\l I-99). During Tito’s visit to Moscow in May 1946, Molotov repeated that they had discouraged the Albanians’ intentions of coming to Moscow, but that Albanians nevertheless continued to insist on this (Kaba & Çeku 2011: 24).

Enver Hoxha’s fear of Yugoslavia was combined with the Yugoslavs’ own doubts about Hoxha’s and Albania’s loyalty. In April and May 1946, Yugoslav representatives in Albania were quite uncertain about Albania’s intentions towards Yugoslavia. Tito’s speeches were reported only on the second or third page of the newspaper “Bashkimi”, the official state newspaper, while news from the Soviet Union, which Yugoslavs considered to be of less or no importance, were published on the front page. It was unclear to Yugoslavs whether these actions were intentional or not (Kaba & Çeku. 2011: 24). In their earlier reports from Albania, the Yugoslav correspondents had written that Enver Hoxha had shown some sympathies for the West. He had talked positively about France and considered the possibility of having some sort of economic relations with Italy. In addition, Hoxha had promoted several persons inside the Party who were known to be anti-Yugoslav, and one of them had even been appointed Minister of Health.
The above mentioned Yugoslav documents show that Enver Hoxha in particular, and the Albanian leadership in general, behaved and spoke differently in their private dealings with Yugoslavs compared to their public positions and speeches. In public, the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were excellent and the two countries were on the verge of great joint accomplishments, but privately Hoxha and the Albanian leadership were trying to find a way to circumvent Yugoslav influence in the country. It thus follows that, contrary to the myth of Enver Hoxha’s wish to unite Albania with Yugoslavia, such unity was not in fact so wholeheartedly desired.

**Economic Independence**

The second myth concerns the economic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia represented by numerous mutual agreements, especially the one from November 1946. Enver Hoxha’s foreign policy was a mix of Albania’s earlier experience with Italy in the 1920s and 1930s and the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The first, and most important element of this mix made Hoxha a nationalist almost obsessed with making Albania as little dependent on a foreign power as possible – if this was not entirely achievable, at least the foreign power should have been as far from Albania as possible. Hoxha’s and Albanian leadership’s aims in their economic relations with Yugoslavia were to create a more independent and self-reliant Albania, not to unite Albania economically with Yugoslavia and subjugate Albania’s economy to that of Yugoslavia. Less economic dependence meant less political interfering.

Enver Hoxha knew very well that economic subjugation was the first step towards political subjugation and perhaps even conquest, as had happened in the 1920s and 1930s with Italy. The economic agreements of November 1946 between Albania and Yugoslavia foresaw the creation of a very close economic
cooperation between the two countries. Albania and Yugoslavia were to create a customs union, coordinate their economic plans (which in actuality meant that Yugoslavia would control the economic plan of Albania), create joint companies, etc. These agreements have been interpreted in Albanian historiography as constituting the first step towards an economic union with Yugoslavia. But in the eyes of the Albanian leadership at the time, these were the first steps towards the economic independence of Albania. Albanians demanded from Yugoslavia a kind of economic assistance that would eventually enable Albania to produce most of the products it needed domestically, not import them from Yugoslavia or other countries. Furthermore, these agreements were nothing special or extraordinary for that time and for Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had tried (unsuccessfully) to create joint companies with the Soviet Union. It had also signed an agreement with Bulgaria on the creation of a customs union, the abolishing of the two countries' border and their eventual unification. No such agreement was ever signed with Albania.

In mid-1947, an Albanian delegation headed by Nako Spiru, Minister of Economy, visited Belgrade. In the Yugoslav capital, Albanians demanded from the Yugoslav leadership assistance in building light industry in Albania, but Yugoslavia refused (Pearson, O. 2007: 109). Providing such assistance to Albania would have been the first step towards economic independence, which was not Yugoslavia’s objective. The most important fact, however, is that the economic agreement of 1946 does not tell the whole story, since Albania also signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1947, after the Yugoslav leadership had refused to help build light industry in Albania. Moscow agreed to give such assistance and to help motorize agriculture in Albania, which was very primitive for the time. This agreement demonstrates the real objective of the Albanian
leadership. They needed to build light industry in the country in order to decrease the dependence on other countries in imports, and their goal was not to unite Albania with Yugoslavia (Krisafi 2017: 123).

The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow demanded to see the text of the agreement. He also made it clear to the Albanian ambassador in Moscow that Albania could not sign an agreement with another state without the knowledge and consent of Yugoslavia (Pearson, O. 2007: 109). The fact that the Albanians did sign it without notifying the Yugoslavs, without giving even a general hint of what was happening between Albania and the Soviet Union, shows the real relations between the two countries in mid-1947.

The myth of the economic agreements and broader economic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia has become powerful primarily due to the fact that the Albanian historiography has so far stopped at agreements and public statements, without looking at what really happened in practice. The fact is that, in practice, very little of what was written in the agreements was really implemented. No customs union between Albania and Yugoslavia was created, the economic plans were never coordinated, the prices were never equalized, the foreseen economic exchanges between the two countries fell short of the expectations and the joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were a total mess. For example, the company for the export-import between Albania and Yugoslavia, Impeks, was totally unprepared for its work. The Albanians would claim that the Yugoslavs had neglected their work, while the Yugoslavs for their part insisted that the fault was with the Albanians. Some of the main problems with Impeks, which were almost identical to those of other joint companies, were related to the dual leadership of the companies. The director was usually Albanian, while his deputy was Yugoslav, and the administration
was composed of both Albanians and Yugoslavs. But the Albanian workers contacted with the Albanian director and the Yugoslav specialists with the Yugoslav deputy director, and this created confusion (AQSH, fund 891, file 3).

Enver Hoxha prepared the terrain for Albania’s agreement with Moscow in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador in Tirana one month before the actual signing. Hoxha mentioned to the Soviet ambassador Albania’s economic problems with Yugoslavia. He lamented the position in which the Albanian delegation headed by Nako Spiru had found itself in Belgrade, where the totally unprepared Yugoslavs had refused the Albanians’ demands. Hoxha said to the ambassador that “they [the Yugoslavs] continue to have a lofty perception of themselves. They value little the opinions of the Albanians. The Yugoslavs think that they know everything and that the Albanians would have to accept everything unconditionally and without contradicting them”. Later on in his conversation with the Soviet ambassador, Hoxha stated that Albania needed Yugoslav assistance and help, but added that “we would like that they treat us as an independent country, that they consider our opinions and respect our representatives… The Yugoslavs try to emphasize their superiority at all times, they mock the Albanians at every opportune moment” (Kaba & Çeku: 2011: 47). These are not the words of someone who intends to unite Albania with Yugoslavia.

While Albania’s relations with Yugoslavia were complicated and marked by considerable problems, the relations with the Soviet Union began to change for the better. In conversations with the Soviet ambassador in Tirana and during the visit to Moscow in the summer of 1947, Hoxha talked freely about the problems with Yugoslavia, and it seems that Moscow was more than willing to listen to his complaints. Before his visit to Moscow, Hoxha had declared to the Soviet ambassador in Tirana that the national interests of Yugoslavia did not comply
with those of Albania and that he would seek the economic assistance of the Soviet Union in Moscow (Kaba & Çeku: 2011: 45). These were also not the words of someone who envisioned a unification of Albania and Yugoslavia.

The first question that arises regarding all the problems of the Albanian economic relations with Yugoslavia is why Enver Hoxha and the Albanian leadership decided to sign the agreements with Yugoslavia at all. If Albanians were full of complaints regarding Yugoslavia, and if, in the end, very little of those agreements was realized in practice, why did they sign them in the first place? One possible answer is that Hoxha had been compelled to sign them; there were no alternatives. He could not go to the “imperialist” West on the one hand, and, on the other, the door of the Soviet Union was closed at the time. Hoxha needed economic assistance and, as he could not get it from the Soviet Union (which was the first option for the Albanian leadership), he was willing to sign anything with Yugoslavia to get assistance. Even in July 1947, during Hoxha’s meeting with Stalin in Moscow, the Soviet leader told him that the Soviet Union would continue to help Albania only through Yugoslavia. Hoxha had come to Moscow to demand exactly the opposite. Everything he said during his visit to Moscow was a denunciation of Yugoslavia’s relation toward Albania. His were not the words of someone who intended to continue building close relations with Yugoslavia.

This can also be observed from the fact that, during his visit to Moscow, Hoxha told a high Soviet official about the plans for changing the name of the Albanian Communist Party to the Albanian Labour Party. Hoxha said that Albanians had consulted the statutes of other communist parties in Eastern Europe, including the Bulgarian, Romanian, Polish, even the Mongolian one, but he did not mention Yugoslavia. In terms of possible models for the new statute of the Albanian Labour
Party, the Albanians had consulted the statutes of the Pan-Soviet Party and those of the Bulgarian and Romanian Communist Parties (Kaba & Çiku: 2011). Again, Hoxha made no mention of Yugoslavia. Given the level of relations between Albania and Yugoslavia and the number of Yugoslav experts in Albania working and counseling in different areas, it is difficult to comprehend why Yugoslavia had no influence in so important a matter as the new statute of the Albanian Labour Party. This case shows that the Albanian complaints about Yugoslavia and the desire to avoid Yugoslav interference were not related only to the economy – the economic fears were a continuation of the ones mentioned above.

Hoxha’s visit to Moscow was organized through bypassing Yugoslavia. This was the first case of direct communication between Albanians and Soviets. Yugoslavs had little knowledge of the visit and, even though they had a strong presence in Albania, they found out who the members of the Albanian delegation to Moscow were only in the last minute (Životić 2009: 94).

After Hoxha’s visit to Moscow, Savo Zlatić wrote to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party from Tirana that the Albanian leader’s visit to Moscow had clarified some things regarding Albanian relations with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Životić A. 2009: 101). One senses from his words the feeling that Yugoslavia was being sidelined by Albania. From now on, the focus would be on Albania’s relations with the Soviet Union. Zlatić wrote that it was unclear what would happen with the economic agreements between Albania and Yugoslavia, as, upon his return from Moscow, Enver Hoxha stated that Albania would get direct economic assistance from the Soviets (ACKSKJ, IX, 11-122).

By that time, Hoxha had managed to secure what he aimed for from the very start: direct relations with the Soviet
Union. Savo Zlatić wrote that the policy of the Albanian leadership towards Yugoslavia was not sincere, since, according to him, the main interest of the Albanians was to establish direct relations with the Soviets, especially in the area of the economy. According to Zlatić, what was primarily behind this policy was the Albanian desire to be independent (Životić 2009: 101).

The above analyzed statements and acts of both Albanians and Yugoslavs paint a totally different picture from the one that the Albanian historiography has so far presented. The relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were far from excellent. There were attempts to build good relations, but Albanians in particular had different foreign policy objectives. For the Yugoslavs, all the economic problems with Albania had to do with politics, not economics, while for the Albanians the problems within the economic relations were of a practical nature. In a report from July 1947, Savo Zlatić writes for the first time about the “two lines” in the economic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia (ACKSKJ, IX, 1/I-128: 1-5). These “two lines” were a continuation of the doubts that Yugoslavs had about the Albanian leadership since 1946, and were also a reflection of the fears that the Albanian leadership had regarding Yugoslavia. The first line was that of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, which defined the course of the country’s economic ties with Yugoslavia, while the second line related to how the economic relations actually functioned in practice. These “two lines” and the Albanian coldness towards Yugoslavia, according to Zlatić, can also be observed in Enver Hoxha. Zlatić claims that all of the above actually comes from Albania’s desire to have direct relations with the Soviet Union. According to Zlatić, all the sensitivity concerning the sovereignty of Albania and the desire to have as little interference as possible in the internal issues of Albania stems from this desire (ACKSKJ, IX, 1/I-135:4).
The entire history of the economic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, especially in the period between 1946 and mid-1948, is a long line of disputes, doubts, non-coordination and very few successes. The myth of the close and excellent relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, the myth of the agreements of 1946 that would create an economic union between the two countries, are no more than that – myths. For Albania, the main objective in the economic relations with Yugoslavia was to get the necessary economic assistance to begin the creation of an economically independent and self-reliant Albania. This can be observed from the fact that Albania demanded from the Soviet Union the same economic assistance that it demanded from Yugoslavia, with the same objective of creating a self-reliant economy. This continued to be the main economic objective until the end of the communist regime in Albania.

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Dealing with the Past and the Process of Reconciliation in Kosovo

Introduction

Kosovo society remains deeply affected and divided when it comes to the understanding and interpreting its recent past. The movement for an independent Kosovo escalated into war during the late 1990s, resulting in numerous casualties, missing persons, political prisoners, victims of sexual violence, war crimes, and violations of international law. For more than a decade, Serbs from Serbia and Kosovo alike, including those who supported Belgrade’s policies towards Kosovo, had the power to perpetrate violence in Kosovo. The Kumanovo agreement, which established the International Security Force for Kosovo was on 9 June 1999. However, the post-war period was dominated by chaos, and Albanians

1 Department of Languages and Cultures, University of Ghent. This article previously appeared as a chapter of the book “State-building in post-independence Kosovo: Policy Challenges and Societal Considerations”, published by Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, ISBN 978-9951-503-04-4. It has been included here in accordance with the editors. I am grateful to the editors for including it in this collection as well.

2 Estimated numbers of casualties, political prisoners, victims of sexual violence and displaced persons vary by source.

3 The war ended with the Kumanovo Treaty, with Yugoslav and Serb forces agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an international presence.
were involved in retaliation acts. The Ahtisaari Plan, which was drafted in the run-up to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, requires that Kosovo deals with the past and addresses the legacies of human rights abuses.\(^4\) This obligation, along with the entire Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, was incorporated into the Kosovo Constitution, upon declaration of independence of Kosovo on 17 of February 2008.\(^5\) However, despite continuous pressures from the Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and international community, key executive, legislative and judiciary institutions in Kosovo have not made any convincing attempt to initiate a comprehensive process of dealing with the past. Due to the lack of serious institutional engagement in the implementation of existing legal norms and frameworks, the majority of citizens declared no trust in the Kosovo Government mechanisms for addressing appropriately “dealing with the past” concerns.

The purpose of this paper is to determine if the lack of proper institutional engagement hampered the reconciliation process in Kosovo. However, being aware that there are also other factors which cause blockades for sustainable social acceptance, this paper aims to set a baseline for further exploration of

\(^4\) Article 2.5 of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1).

\(^5\) The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 143: 1. All authorities in the Republic of Kosovo shall abide by all of the Republic of Kosovo’s obligations under the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007. They shall take all necessary actions for their implementation. 2. The provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007 shall take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo. 3. The Constitution, laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Kosovo shall be interpreted in compliance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007. If there are inconsistencies between the provisions of this Constitution, laws or other legal acts of the Republic of Kosovo and the provisions of the said Settlement, the latter shall prevail.
other dynamics that hamper the reconciliation process in Kosovo. Using Public Pulse\textsuperscript{6} data, this paper aims to check whether the government’s lack of serious engagement to deal with the past caused low social acceptance or social exclusion among communities living in Kosovo. From this paper, among others, it is also understood how important it is for Kosovo people find out the truth about all war crimes, regardless of the ethnicity of victims and perpetrators. Examining opinions about whether or not members of their ethnicities have committed war crimes, etc. is also important.

In what follows the paper provides explanations on the methodological approach used as well as about concepts and current state of affairs related to dealing with the past in Kosovo. Subsequently, the paper offers survey results and analysis associated to dealing with the past in Kosovo.

**Methodology**

The present study employs qualitative and quantitative research methodologies which consist of a combination of different sources on this topic, as well as expert interviews conducted with activists working in the field. The main sources of empirical research include a desk review of literature and Kosovo Government documents as well as materials taken from specialized NGOs. In addition, expert interviews were conducted with representatives of organizations working in the field, whereas for quantitative research, findings from the Public Pulse surveys were used. Through a quantitative research methodology, Public

\textsuperscript{6} Public Pulse is a decade-long research project implemented by United Nations Development Program in Kosovo. Since 2009, the Public Pulse is managed and administrated by the author of this article. The results are based on an opinion poll sample that surveyed 1,306 citizens of Kosovo. Between 2002 and 2010, surveys were conducted biannual basis. Since 2010, the Public Pulse survey is being conducted on a biannual basis.
Pulse measures perceptions of Kosovo Albanians (K-Albanians) and Kosovo Serbs (K-Serbs) about interethnic relations in Kosovo, in addition to a wide array of topics. The data from the survey conducted during October 2016 were compared with the data collected with similar research methodology since 2005. The surveys are representative of the adult population (18+). The breakdown of the population by municipalities is based on the 2011 population census, broken down by municipality and type of residence (urban and rural). Exclusions include people in hospitals, prisons, military facilities and the like. The survey employs multi-staged random probability sampling. The sample is representative of households in Kosovo. The universe is divided into three sub-sets: a) Albanian sub-set, 890 effective interviews, b) Serb sub-set, 200 effective interviews, and c) Non-Serb minority sub-set (Turkish, Bosnian, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian), 200 effective interviews. Although the Public Pulse surveys oversample minorities in Kosovo (K-Serbs, K-Others) in order to be able to disaggregate data by ethnicity, when numbers are calculated for totals the data are weighted by actual population figures.\footnote{Based on the Kosovo Census 2011 and Kosovo Statistical Agency Population Estimates.} The sample is stratified by region and the residential profile of each region for the Kosovo Albanian population (Prishtina, Mitrovica, Prizren, Gjakova, Gjilan, Peja and Ferizaj), as well as non-Serb minorities living in the same localities. As far as the Kosovo Serb population is concerned, the sample is stratified by region and residential profile of each region (Northern, Central, Southern and South-eastern). Regions are defined by geographic borders. Each sampling point in the Albanian sub-set is designed to have 8 households irrespective of the type of residence (urban or rural),\footnote{Urban and rural settlements are defined by administrative borders set by each municipality, i.e. neighborhoods of a city/town are clearly} 112 sampling points in total. In
the Serb sub-set, each sampling point was designed to have 5 households irrespective of the type of residence, 42 sampling points. Finally, in the non-Serb minority sub-set, each sampling point was designed to have 10 households, irrespective of the type of residence, total 20 sampling points. The residential split is 40% urban vs. 60% rural.\(^9\) Within each region, the sampling points are selected executing a step over the list of settlements ordered per their size of population, the one with the highest number of dwellers being on top of the list and each sampling point is given a starting point. Selection of household is based on the ‘random route’ method. Selection of a respondent is carried out using the ‘next birthday’ method, for following through face to face interview.\(^10\)

**The concept of Dealing with the Past**

‘Dealing with the past’ is a relatively new concept introduced by the international human rights movement. Initially, it applied to the judicial process of addressing human rights violations committed by dictatorial regimes in the course of democratic transition. Later, the term also came to be used for dealing with war crimes and massive human rights abuses committed in violent conflicts (Kritz 1995; Minow 1998, 2002; Teitel 2000).\(^11\) The concept has been widely discussed by peace-building agencies engaged in war-torn societies during the past two decades, and along the way, it has gradually extended its meaning. Today it covers the establishment of tribunals, truth

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\(^10\) Detailed information on the Data Collection Methodology are quoted from the Technical Report for Public Pulse Survey in Kosovo.

\(^11\) Cited after – Fischer and Petrović-Ziemer 2013
commissions, lustration of state administrations, settlement on reparations, and also political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-finding, reconciliation and cultures of remembrance (Fischer and Petrović-Ziemer 2013: 20). Following the recent wars in the Balkans, in Kosovo as well, the local actors are urged and supported to establish legal norms and frameworks and other mechanisms responsible for dealing with the violent past. This process is often considered as a base for reconciliation and sustainable peace-building.

The literature on former Yugoslavia highlights the need to deal with the past as a necessary prerequisite for reconciliation (Di Leillo 2012). The dealing with the past process is supposed to be implemented through judicial and non-judicial measures following the steps of transitional justice. However, despite continuous pressures and professional support by the CSOs and international community, Kosovo executive, legislative and judicial institutions did not make convincing attempts to initiate a comprehensive process of dealing with the past in Kosovo. Gordy also argues that political elites in Kosovo did not show commitment to deal with the past. According to him, such a process was considered as harmful for their interests and humiliating for ethnic identity (see Gordy 2013). As such, Kosovo did not regulate its transition from war to peace clearly or through mutual consensus, including how to deal with past crimes and how to provide truth and justice for the victims from all sides of the conflict (KIPRED 2008: 28).

Meanwhile, literature shows that, in South Africa for example, the truth and reconciliation process was explicitly based on the hypothesis that knowledge of the past will lead to acceptance, tolerance, and reconciliation in the future. James Gibson tested this hypothesis. One of his most important finding is that those who accept the “truth” about their society’s past are more likely to hold reconciled attitudes. Gibson further
argues that, to a considerable degree, reconciliation depends on inter-ethnic contacts. This evidence adds weight to the “contact hypothesis” investigated by western social scientists. Ultimately, these findings show hope for post-conflict countries to make successful democratic transitions, since racial and/or nationalistic attitudes seem not to be intransigent (Gibson 2004). Although literature on the theoretical and conceptual complexity of reconciliation is growing, scholars acknowledge the existence of a “gap” in empirical research regarding various ways in which reconciliation is understood, contested, and given meaning in legal, social, and political debates in the former Yugoslavia (Touquet and Vermeersch 2016: 2). However, certain theories argue that a localized emancipatory peace can emerge should it be rooted in dialogic commitments of local and international actors and reformed state institutions (Visoka and Oliver 2016: 2). What remains under-researched in the case of Kosovo is whether or not the lack of institutional engagement in the implementation of existing legal norms and frameworks of dealing with the past is what caused the lack of communication and understanding among major ethnic groups in Kosovo. Moreover, did this contribute to further prejudices and low social acceptance between Albanians and Serbs, therefore hampering the establishment of stabilized and reconciled relationships?

**Dealing with the past in Kosovo: the current state of affairs**

The first elements of dealing with the past in Kosovo were established after 10 June 1999, when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, authorizing international, civilian and military presence in Kosovo and effectively

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12 Social scientists define contact hypothesis as one of the most productive ways for improving the relations among groups affected by the conflict. This hypothesis is developed by Gordon W. Allport, and is also known as Intergroup Contact Theory.
establishing the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In 2000, UNMIK established a Victim Recovery and Identification Commission to assist in recovery, identification and disposition of mortal remains, the collection and maintenance of data related to remains, and coordination of exhumation and investigation activities with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and competent judicial authorities. In June 2002, the UNMIK Office of Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) and UNMIK Department of Justice, became the sole bodies responsible for issues surrounding missing persons. The double mandate of the OMPF included providing information about the fate of missing persons and providing a forensics system up to European standards in Kosovo. The OMPF tasks included identification of burial sites, and excavation, exhumation, autopsy, and identification of mortal remains. In 2008, OMPF was transferred from UNMIK to the EULEX Justice Component. In 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNMIK and the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) was signed in order to support the DNA identification system within Kosovo. This MoU still serves as the basis for support for the Department of Forensic Medicine.

In 2004, an internationally mediated dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade on technical issues and the “Working Group on persons unaccounted for in relation to the events in Kosovo between January 1998 and December 2000” was


14 In 2010, the Office of Missing Persons and Forensics was renamed the Department of Forensic Medicine. The Department of Forensic Medicine maintained the mandate to continue missing persons operations and the delivery of forensic medicine, and was given new competences including further developing local forensic capacities.
established within the framework of the Vienna Dialogue. The Working Group held its first meeting in March 2005. The meetings were held between delegations from Kosovo (with UNMIK) and from Serbia, and were mediated by representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross. The primary mandate of the Working Group was to provide support to search for persons who went missing due to the war in Kosovo and to inform families as needed. Although, in theory, the Working Group continues to function as a dialogue forum between Kosovo and Serbia on the issue of missing persons, no real progress has been made regarding sharing sensitive information. The political changes after Kosovo’s declaration of independence have delayed the progress of the Working Group, and, with it, the disclosure of the fate of the missing persons.

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15 The Vienna Dialogue was launched by the EU in October 2003. The dialogue involved discussions between Kosovo and Serbia on missing persons, returns of displaced persons, energy, transport, and telecommunications. The President of Kosovo and the Assembly Speaker of Kosovo both took part in the launch of the dialogue. The dialogue was meant to open lines of communication between Kosovo and Serbia before the beginning of the final status process. The Working Group on Missing Persons met for the first time in February 2004. However, the Dialogue was suspended in March 2004 after violence erupted in Kosovo.


17 Ibid.

18 The number of missing persons varies from source to source. The ICRC published the fifth edition of the Book of Missing Persons, which
Initiatives were undertaken by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions for Self-Government between 2000 and 2007. These included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Kosovo Liberation Army members and the establishment (and reform) of security, judicial and other governmental institutions. During this time, CSOs were actively involved in collecting war-related information and fact-finding in the field.

Negotiations with Serbia for Kosovo’s independence concluded with the finalization of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement in March 2007 and the unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia by Kosovo on 17 February 2008. The Comprehensive Proposal included among its guiding principles for Kosovo independence an obligation to undertake transitional justice initiatives to deal with the past, and promote reconciliation. Its text included the clause: “Clearly highlighting that Kosovo shall promote and fully respect a process of reconciliation among all its Communities and their members, through establishing a comprehensive and gender

contains the names of 1,754 people reported missing by their families. See also the ICRC family links website at: http://familylinks.icrc.org/kosovo/en/pages/search-persons.aspx [Last accessed on 01 December 2017]


20 The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is also known as the Ahtisaari plan, after the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, who led the development of the plan. It is available at: http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf [Last accessed on 01 December 2017].

21 In October 2008, Serbia requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. On 22 July 2010, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion concluding the unilateral declaration by Kosovo did not violate the general principles of international law.
sensitive approach for dealing with its past, which shall include a broad range of transitional justice initiatives.”

In February 2008, the International Civilian Office (ICO) was established to oversee the implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (ICO, 2012). In 2008, the Government Commission on Missing Persons was established as an inter-institutional mechanism on missing persons issues. The Commission is made up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Department of Forensic Medicine, the Ministry of Local Government Administration, the Ministry for Kosovo Security Force, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and three representatives from the Missing Persons Families’ Association. The 2011 Law on Missing Persons and Regulation No. 15/2012 define the mandate of the Commission as a governmental mechanism that reviews and informs families on the outcome of search requests, leads, supervises, coordinates, and harmonizes the activities of local and international institutions with regard to missing persons issues, and enlightens the fate of persons who went missing as a result of the 1998-1999 war, regardless of ethnicity, religion, military, or civil status. The Law on Missing Persons guarantees the right of families to know the fate and whereabouts of family members missing as a consequence of the war in Kosovo, regulates the legal status of missing persons, and enables the creation of a Central Registry on Missing Persons (Law No. 04/L-023).

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22 Art. 2.5. of The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement

The Kosovo Ministry of Justice established the Institute for War Crimes Research, which began working on 1 June 2011. The aim of the Institute is to collect, systematize, process, and publish data on crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide committed in Kosovo during 1998 and 1999. The Institute is mandated to analyze and verify crimes and other relevant events in order to develop a database, notes and cases for criminal prosecution that may then be utilized by other specialized institutions. The Institute has been criticized for its inactivity and lack of coordination with other organizations, which has been attributed to its lack of funding and human resources.\textsuperscript{24} It has begun work to identify and investigate locations where war crimes occurred in Kosovo. Even though the current operational status of the Institute is unclear, so far they have published books on missing persons (lists of missing from 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1998 until 16\textsuperscript{th} June 1999) as well as the narratives of 100 killed civilians during the war in Kosovo. In addition, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo has a Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights, Gender Equality, Missing Persons and Petitions. The mandate of this Commission is to organize public discussions, supervise the work of governmental institutions engaged on the issue of missing persons, engage the issue of missing persons in the Assembly, and encourage the issue of missing persons to become part of the work and agenda of the Assembly.

In 2012, the obligation to undertake transitional justice initiatives to deal with the past and promote reconciliation was operationalized through a commitment to work with the

\textsuperscript{24} For a critique on the inaction of the Kosovo Institute for War Crimes and Research see: Balkan Transitional Justice, Kosovo War Crimes Institute Accused of Inaction, available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-war-crime-institute-lags-in-work-experts-say [Last accessed on 01 December 2017]; Interview with the member of the KWCRI (date of interview 10 May 2016).
Government to adopt a strategy supporting reconciliation and dealing with the past (ICO 2012, 112). A series of workshops were held with government staff and CSOs in early 2012, followed by a one-day international conference on transitional justice, on 22 May 2012. At the international conference, the Minister of Justice announced the intention to form an Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation (IMWG DwPR). On 4 June 2012, the IMWG DwPR\textsuperscript{25} was formalized by government decision (Decision No. 03/77), which outlined the composition, purpose, mandate and standards of the group. Its main purpose was to draft a “transitional justice strategy.” The decision was amended in April 2014 to add a second deputy chair position to the group structure to be fulfilled by a CSO representative (the chair and first deputy chair being government representatives), and amending the reporting method, giving charge to the government with a copy to the European Union (EU) (Decision No. 06/181).

In October 2014, Decision 03/77 was further amended to add four institutions of the Office of the Prime Minister to the group and to clarify the group’s ability to receive financial support from the government and donors to implement activities (Decision No. 04/200). The rules of procedure and work plan of the IMWG DwPR were approved by the Government in October 2014.\textsuperscript{26} However, years after its initiation, the IMWG

\textsuperscript{25} The IMWG consists of 12 Kosovo institutions and eight civil society representatives, as well as members of the international community as observers. The IMWG Secretariat is situated within the Office of the Prime Minister (the Decision will be amended to add three more members; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Agency for Gender Equality, and Office for Good Governance).

\textsuperscript{26} Decision No. 02/200 and Decision No. 03/200 of 15 October 2014. The Rules of Procedure were subsequently passed into Regulation 18/2014 On the Work of the Working Group on Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation LINK: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/
DwPR is at a standstill and can hardly manage to move forward in organizing public consultations with stakeholders, including victims of war and communities as initially planned (NPISAA 2015). In October 2015, the Government of Kosovo signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union (EU). In December of the same year, the Government of Kosovo approved its National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (NAPISAA). Referencing the General Principles of the SAA, obligations for approval of a transitional justice strategy is included within the NAPISAA.

A significant role in processes of dealing with the past in Kosovo is also played by CSOs, who have been heavily involved in the implementation of the SAA. Articles 3-19 of the General Principles of the SAA outline Kosovo’s obligations regarding international law, democratic principles, human rights, and rule of law (3, 4); Kosovo’s commitment towards improved relations with Serbia and cooperation with other regional neighbors and EU members (5, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 19); cooperation with the ICTY and Rome Statute of the ICC (6); and commitment to WTO Agreements (10).

Within the Matrix of Short Term Measures, Government approval of a Transitional Justice strategy is noted an item under the Regional Cooperation and International Obligations section to be completed by the third quarter in 2016: p. 449. As this timing was not in line with the IMWG DwPR’s own timing, it sought clarification, via its secretariat, from the Kosovo Ministry of European Integration. The Ministry informed the IMWG DwPR via email on 14 March 2016 that the timing had been pushed back to the first quarter of 2017. As at October 2016, the NAPISAA timing is being reviewed. In line with this, the Report on the Implementation of the National Programme for Implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement during January – June 2016 does not address the Transitional Justice strategy in its assessment of the implementation of short-term measures.

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28 NAPISAA, pp. 40, 43, and 449. Within the Matrix of Short Term Measures, Government approval of a Transitional Justice strategy is noted an item under the Regional Cooperation and International Obligations section to be completed by the third quarter in 2016: p. 449. As this timing was not in line with the IMWG DwPR’s own timing, it sought clarification, via its secretariat, from the Kosovo Ministry of European Integration. The Ministry informed the IMWG DwPR via email on 14 March 2016 that the timing had been pushed back to the first quarter of 2017. As at October 2016, the NAPISAA timing is being reviewed. In line with this, the Report on the Implementation of the National Programme for Implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement during January – June 2016 does not address the Transitional Justice strategy in its assessment of the implementation of short-term measures.
in the search for missing persons. The groups include the Missing Persons Families’ Association, the Kosovo Red Cross, the Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Humanitarian Law Center. In 2001, over 20 associations joined together to create the Coordinating Council of the Association of Families of Missing Persons in Kosovo. CSOs have been involved in the documentation of mass violations of human rights, including: the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, the Humanitarian Law Center, the Center for the Protection of Women and Children, the Humanitarian and Charitable Society ‘Mother Teresa,’ and the Kosovo Rehabilitation Center for Torture Victims. Beside this, regional initiatives were developed to support publicizing facts about war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia from 1991-2001. RECOM is a regional commission of nongovernmental organizations which began at the First Regional Forum for Transitional Justice in May 2006 as a debate on the instruments of truth-telling and for the disclosure of truth about the past. At the Forum, NGO representatives and associations of families of missing persons and victims from the former Yugoslav countries voted for the creation of a regional body for the establishment of facts about

29  RECOM website: http://www.recom.link/ [Last accessed on 01 December 2017]

30  The Coalition for RECOM was established as an intergovernmental committee at the Fourth Regional Forum for Transitional Justice on 28 October 2008. The Coalition consists of over 1,900 members – organizations and individuals from all the countries of former Yugoslavia. The mandate of the Coalition is as an extra-judicial body that is to investigate all allegations of war crimes and other serious human rights violations in connection with the war; list the names of all war victims and victims of crimes pertaining to the war; collect information about the camps and other centers of forced detention; and initiate debate about instruments for detecting and finding the truth about the past in the former Yugoslavia.
war crimes. In 2013, presidents from the former Yugoslavian countries appointed envoys to RECOM. The Fourth President of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga, appointed her legal representative as the envoy from Kosovo. The envoys’ mandate ended in 2014 after four meetings were held and their proposed Amendments to the RECOM Statute Proposal were adopted by the RECOM Coalition. For the purposes of addressing dealing with the past issues, Kosovo institutions were also supported by international organizations.

Approval of the national strategy to implement the SAA with the EU, which included a component on dealing with the past, was originally scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of 2016. However, upon clarification by the Ministry of European Integration, the group was advised that the expected timeframe for the approval was the first quarter of 2017. The European Union office in Kosovo reports on transitional justice progress in its annual reports (EU Progress Report 2016, 31). In December 2013, the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo and the United Nations Development Programme in Kosovo (UNDP) entered into a cooperation agreement to support the IMWG DwPR. In June 2014, together with Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP established the Support to Transitional Justice in Kosovo (STJK) project. UN Women and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) joined the project towards the end of 2014, bringing the support of the United Nations Kosovo Team (UNKT) to the project.  

31 NAPISAA, p. 449. Clarification as received from the Ministry of European Integration by email to the Secretariat of the IMWG DwPR on 14 March 2016.

32 Author’s interview with Vjosa Munoglu and Siobhan Hobbs, 11 October 2016, Prishtina.
Results and analysis

Research findings show that – depending on the engagement of the Kosovo Institutions – the perceptions of both communities about inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo have changed over time. Bekim Blakaj, Executive Director at the Humanitarian Law Center Kosovo, points out that the governmental standstill in “dealing with the past” processes reflected the inter-ethnic relations, respectively the entire process of reconciliation in Kosovo. While in 2005 about 95 percent of K-Serbs believed that interethnic relations in Kosovo were tense and not improving, in June 2007 this percentage decreased to about 10 percent. Similarly, when analysing perceptions of K-Albanians, it is observed that while in 2005 only 19 percent of K-Albanians thought that relations with K-Serbs continue to be tense and not improving, in June 2007 this percentage decreased to 5.5 percent. It is assumed that changes in perceptions of Kosovo citizens occurred in the same line with the initiatives undertaken by the Kosovo institutions toward addressing the “dealing with the past” issues. This is also visible in 2011, when the percentage of K-Serbs considering the inter-relations as getting tense and not improving raised to 90 percent, but the Government’s approvals of the IMWG DwPR work plans in November 2014 led to decrease of this percentage to 33 percent. Similarly, the percentage of K-Albanians considering inter-ethnic relations tense and not improving has seen significant decline from April 2012 (76 percent) to November 2014 (30 percent). During the interview, Blakaj, who is also a member of the IMWG DwPR, expressed his doubts that the work of this group could have impacted the perceptions of citizens, arguing that broader society barely knows about the existence of the IMWG DwPR.

33 Author’s interview with Bekim Blakaj, 11 December 2016, Prishtina.
34 Author’s interview with Bekim Blakaj, 11 December 2016, Prishtina.
However, it is assumed that beside political developments on the ground, public opinion was also affected by some international and local court verdicts against those involved in war crimes.

Although the percentage of K-Albanians concerned with the rise of the inter-ethnic tensions have increased compared to the K-Serb perceptions in this regard, during the last decade the percentage of K-Serbs who believed that the inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo are tense and not improving was constantly higher, and remains so to this day. (Figure 1).

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1.** Trend of respondents considering that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving

Dealing with the past comprehensively is a challenging endeavor for any society facing a recent history marked by serious violations of human rights. However, the majority of Kosovans think that dealing with the past is important. In October 2016, around 76 percent of Kosovans judged the need to determine the truth about all war crimes committed in the past, regardless of the ethnicity of victims and perpetrators, as either “very important” or “important to some extent”. Comparison between the October 2016 data with those collected in April 2014 shows that the percentage of Kosovans who consider
determining the truth about war crimes as “important” has risen about eighteen percentage points (Figure 2).

![Bar Chart](chart.png)

**Figure 2.** In your opinion, how important is for Kosovo people to deal with finding the truth about all war crimes committed in the past, regardless of the ethnicity of victims and perpetrators?

Respondents also shared their opinions about the most appropriate ways to reveal the facts of crimes committed during the war in Kosovo. The percentage of those that think it should be done through facts revealed during war crime trials increased from 24 percent as recorded in April 2014 to 30 percent in October 2016. Another 16 percent of Kosovans consider that the most appropriate way to reveal the facts about the war crimes is through the work of an international independent commission, which would investigate past events. About 10 percent of respondents declared that it should be done through the work of NGOs dealing with war crimes investigations. However, almost one third of Kosovans (29 percent) did not know or did not have any answer about the most appropriate way to reveal the facts about the crimes committed during the armed conflict in Kosovo (Figure 3). Disaggregating the data on an ethnic basis shows significant differences in the opinions of K-Albanians and K-Serbs on this matter. While one in four K-Albanian (25 percent) considers that the most appropriate way to reveal
the facts about the crimes committed during the war in Kosovo would be through war crime trials, majority of K-Serbs (20 percent) consider that those facts would be most appropriately revealed through the work of a Serbian Government commission. Only about 6 percent of K-Albanians and about 2 percent of K-Serbs would consider the Kosovo Government’s commission an appropriate mechanism to do that. This shows that due to the government’s lack of readiness to address this matter properly and efficiently, Kosovo citizens lost trust in their government. Also, significant differences in opinions of communities in Kosovo show the existence of prejudices and the creation of social distancing between communities.

Figure 3. In your opinion, what is the most appropriate way to reveal the facts about the crimes committed during the war in Kosovo?

The majority of Kosovans declared that members of their communities did not commit war crimes. Disaggregation of this data on an ethnic basis shows that only 8 percent of K-Albanians responded affirmatively when asked whether members
of their communities committed war crimes (Figure 4). Correlation analysis indicates that K-Albanians who accept that members of their community committed war crimes are the ones who consider that the democratic processes in Kosovo are not going in the right direction and expressed readiness to protest for political and economic reasons. One the other side, 25 percent of K-Serbs (as compared to 31 percent of them in April 2014) believe that members of their community committed war crimes (Figure 4). For K-Serbs, there is a significant positive correlation between the years of education, residence and affirmation that members of their communities committed war crimes. In other words, the K-Serbs who consider that members of their communities committed war crimes are from urban areas and are more educated. As far as K-others are concerned, the October 2016 data shows that number of those considering that members of their ethnicity committed war crimes increased by about seven percentage points as compared to April 2014 (Figure 4).

**Figure 4.** Do you think that members of your ethnicity have committed war crimes, or not (disaggregated by ethnicities)?
Given that in October 2016 only 21 percent of respondents declared that they trust Kosovo’s key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, the citizens were asked about their opinions on the fairness of prosecution for war crimes in Kosovo. The findings revealed that the percentage of those who believed that all perpetrators, regardless of ethnicity and political background, have been treated equally during prosecution has decreased to 29.5 percent from 46 percent in April 2014. When October 2016 findings were analysed by ethnicity, it was shown that while only 28 percent of K-Albanians think that the prosecution of war crimes favours K-Serbs, 80 percent of K-Serbs think the prosecution of war crimes favours K-Albanians (Figure 5). Again, these significant differences on similar issues, in the opinions of communities in Kosovo, confirm the presence of prejudices and social distancing among the communities living in Kosovo.

![Figure 5. Which of the following statements is closest to your view: Prosecution of war crimes in Kosovo](image)
Despite shifts in perceptions of inter-ethnic relations throughout the years, the statistical trend analysis does not show the same changes – particularly from 2007 – related to K-Serbs’ readiness to work and live in the same town with K-Albanians. October 2016 findings reveal that the percentage of K-Serbs who are ready to work in the same place – as represented by the blue trajectory – and live in the same town or street – as represented by the purple and orange trajectories – with K-Albanians is the highest since 2008. Nevertheless, these trends show that regardless of the institutional initiatives in “dealing with the past” processes, no significant changes have been noticed in the readiness of K-Serbs to marry K-Albanians since 2005, this trend is represented by the yellow trajectory (Figure 6).

**Figure 6.** K-Serbs willing to live and work with K-Albanians

It is important to note that contrary to K-Serbs’ increased readiness to work and live in the same towns or streets with K-Albanians, the opposite is true for K-Albanians. The findings reveal that K-Albanians’ readiness to work in the same place – as represented by the blue trajectory – and, live in the same streets or towns – as represented by the orange and purple trajectories – with K-Serbs decreased compared to 2008.
Similarly, no significant changes were noticed in the readiness of K-Albanians to marry K-Serbs since 2005. This trend is represented by the yellow trajectory (Figure 7).

![Figure 7. K-Albanians willing to live and work with K-Serbs](image)

Combining the responses of K-Serbs and K-Albanians expressing their respective attitudes towards living and working together or marrying each other, social acceptance measures were calculated for both ethnic groups. The interethnic social acceptance trends indicate that there has been an increase of K-Serbs’ social acceptance toward K-Albanians between 2008 and 2016. In contrast, during the same period of time, there has been a decrease of K-Albanians’ social acceptance toward K-Serbs (Figure 8). Statistically significant correlations reveal that K-Albanians who believe that inter-ethnic relations are not improving and will continue to be tense have lower social acceptance for K-Serbs as compared to those which think that inter-ethnic relations could be improved. The same analysis was conducted for K-Serb respondents. The results show negative correlations, as in the case of K-Albanians. However, this correlation is not that significant statistically. K-Serbs who consider that members of their communities committed war crimes
possess a higher social acceptance index, which is a statistically significant correlation. The findings also show that there is a significant positive correlation between those considering the prosecution of war crimes as transparent and social acceptance index. Meaning, K-Albanians which consider that the process of prosecution of war crimes in Kosovo treats all cases equally, possess a higher social acceptance index.

![Figure 8. Interethnic social acceptance trends](image)

**Conclusion**

This paper is a compilation of research findings and a summary of the main initiatives undertaken by Kosovo institutions in line with Kosovo’s obligation to deal with the past and promote reconciliation. Dealing with the past processes do not happen in a vacuum, and in Kosovo’s formative years, there have been numerous political and other processes that have intersected with transitional justice initiatives. However, this paper does not take stock of these intersecting processes, rather it is focused on – already raised concerns\(^\text{35}\) – respectively, testing whether the institutional lack of serious commitment to deal

\(^{35}\) Ahmetaj N. On reconciliation in Kosovo. Published at Transconflict (2013), Available at; http://www.transconflict.com/2013/10/on-reconciliation-in-kosovo-231/ [Last accessed on 01 December 2017]
with the past is preventing inter-ethnic reconciliation or contributing to keeping the relations tense in Kosovo. The findings confirm that 18 years after Kosovo’s *de facto* separation from Former Yugoslavia and Serbia, the negative stereotypes among Albanians and Serbs living in the Kosovo are still visible. The article shows that while legal norms and frameworks are in place, Kosovo institutions failed to guarantee their implementation in practice. From the analysis, it is also demonstrated how institutional standstills in the implementation of legal norms and frameworks for properly addressing ‘dealing with the past’ in Kosovo are reflected in the perceptions of citizens regarding inter-ethnic relations and social acceptance. Thus, the institutional obstacles affected reconciliation between communities in Kosovo. It is assumed that changes in perceptions of Kosovo citizens occurred in the same line with the initiatives undertaken by the Kosovo Institutions toward addressing the “dealing with the past” issues. However, besides significant differences in opinions of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo – which reveal the existence of prejudices and the social distancing among communities – all of them considered dealing with past crimes to be an important matter and declared no trust in the Kosovo Government mechanisms for appropriately prosecuting war crimes.

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**Documents**


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List of interviews

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Vjosa Munoglu – Project Manager for Support to Transitional Justice in Kosovo (STJK) Interview to author, 11 October 2016, Prishtina

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