Filozofija i društvo, Volume 26, Broj 4 (2015)


THE SLOVENE RE-ACTUALIZATION OF HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY
STUDIES AND ARTICLES
INTERVIEWS

THE SLOVENE RE-ACTUALIZATION OF HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY

Edited by Jure Simoniti 

Introductory Note
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In Defense of Hegel’s Madness
Slavoj Žižek (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ljubljana, Slovenia)
PDF  [EXPAND Abstract]The article is a confrontation with Robert Brandom’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, his attempt to systematically “renormalize” Hegel, i.e., to reduce his extravagant formulations to the criteria of common sense. The article analyses a number of Brandom’s “domestications” of Hegel’s speculative concepts: self-relating, determinate negation, mediation, In-itself, action, knowledge, Spirit, reconciliation, history. On the basis of the examples from Marx, Freud, structuralism, Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Lacan, Adorno, the text defends Hegel’s “madness”, the irreducible speculative, non-interpretable core of his philosophy. Hegel’s statements have to shock us, and this excess cannot be explained away through interpretation since the truth they deliver hinges on that.[/EXPAND]

Catherine Malabou’s Hegel: One or Several Plasticities?
Gregor Moder (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ljubljana, Slovenia)
PDF  [EXPAND Abstract]Through an original and extraordinarily fruitful reading of the Hegelian conception of negativity, Catherine Malabou developed the concept of plasticity which she keeps working on as one of her cardinal concepts even to this day. Engaging in the problematic of unity in Hegel, the paper takes on the task of trying to answer the question whether plasticity is one or are there several plasticities. The author argues that one must be careful not to reduce the inherent multiple of plasticity to a single plasticity which becomes plasticity par excellence: the plasticity of plastic explosion, of an abrupt and absolute break, to be distinguished from a creative or productive plasticity of habit. Malabou claimed that Hegel was – contrary to what Deleuz read in him – a philosopher of conceptual multitude as a multitude which cannot be reduced to only one image, the image of unity. If this is true, then the concept of plasticity itself with which she grasped the essence of Hegel’s dialectics, should be understood at least as a “unity in conflict”, if not as an inorganic, inhomogeneous, composed unity – and perhaps even as a unity of the pack. [/EXPAND]

True Sacrifice. On Hegel’s Presentation of Self-Consciousness
Zdravko Kobe (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ljubljana, Slovenia)  
PDF  [EXPAND Abstract]The paper provides a modest reading of Hegel’s treatment of selfconsciousness in his Phenomenology of Spirit and tries to present it as an integral part of the overall project of the experience of consciousness leading from understanding to reason. Its immediate objective is, it is argued, to think the independence and dependence, that is the pure and empirical I within the same unity of self-consciousness. This implies a double movement of finding a proper existence for the pure I and at the same time a breaking down of the empirical I’s attachment to particularity. It is argued that the Hegelian struggle for recognition intends to show how the access to reason demands the subject’s renunciation of its attachment to particularity, that is to sacrifice not only its bare life but every thing indeed, including its particular identity, and yet, to go on living.[/EXPAND]

Hegel’s Logic as the Exposition of God from the End of the World
Jure Simoniti (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ljubljana, Slovenia)
PDF  [EXPAND Abstract]The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, “being” and “nothing” are entitled to emerge and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of “being” is linked to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute thesis of the “thetical judgement”. And the article’s first thesis claims that Hegel couldn’t have placed “being” at the beginning of this great system, if the ground of its logical space had not been laid out by precisely those shifts of German Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason between “being” and “nothing”, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual beginning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by the invention of the “transcendental inter-subjectivity” in German Idealism, manifested, for instance, in Hegel’s life-and-death struggle of two self-consciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that “being” and “nothing” are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation of (at least) two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a sphere by the name of “public” whose structure is defined by the invalidation of two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorbing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact.[/EXPAND]

The Owl of Minerva from Dusk till Dawn, or, Two Shades of Gray
Mladen Dolar (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ljubljana, Slovenia)
PDF [EXPAND Abstract]The paper takes as its starting point the figure of the owl as the emblem of philosophy, it looks at its history and takes up its most significant philosophical use, the notorious passage where Hegel uses the owl as the indic ation of philosophy’s necessary belatedness. This is the passage which is usually taken as the point of indictment of Hegel’s position and the role he ascribed to philosophy. Hegel’s adage ‘What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational’ is scrutinized in its various aspects, particularly in view of its other version, ‘what is rational must happen’. The tension between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ is perhaps the clue to understanding this adage, where Hegel doesn’t opt for the one or the other, but aims at the paradoxical intersection of the two. Hegel’s adage is put in contrast with Marx’s Thesis Eleven. The paper considers the concepts of the rational, the actual, the belatedness/retroaction, the grayness and finally the owl (and the part that bestiary plays in philosophy), thus trying to circumscribe the task that should be assigned to philosophy. [/EXPAND]

 

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

How is a Philosophy of Photography Possible?
Valery Savchuk (Professor, Philosophy Department the University of St-Petersburg, Russia)
PDF [EXPAND Abstract]This paper focuses on the following question: how is philosophy of anything possible? Where lies the boundary of specialisation area beyond which the term “philosophy” loses not only its strength, but also its meaning? When we talk about specific genre, for example, graphic art or sculpture we use the term “philosophy” in a broader, metaphorical sense. Why then should philosophy of photography be any different? All of the abovementioned questions are discussed in the present article. Philosophy of photography is, indeed, a legitimate discipline, just as philosophy of language, philosophy of science and technology and philosophy of politics are. [/EXPAND]

Why Does a Woman’s Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority?
Aristotle on the Political Role of Women

Irina Deretić (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)
PDF [EXPAND Abstract] In this paper I will discuss Aristotle’s controversial philosophical views on women. I will critically examine three main interpretations of his claim that women have deliberative faculty “without authority”. According to the first line of interpretation, Aristotle has in mind that women’s incapacity of advice-giving and decision-making in public affairs are determined by conventions in the political context of his time. I will attempt to point out the disadvantages of this kind of interpretation. Furthermore, I will put forward the reasons why is implausible the more recent interpretation, given by Marguerite Deslauriers. According to her reading, the lack of authority of deliberative faculty in women means nothing else than the tasks over which women have authority are for the purpose of the tasks put forth by men. The prevailing interpretation among scholars is that, in Aristotle’s view, women are naturally inferior to men, due to the fact that they are all too frequently overruled by the irrational “forces” of their nature. I will argue that this line of interpretation elucidates what Aristotle presumably has in mind, although it makes his account of women and their rationality, if not inconclusive, then indisputably problematic. In other words, I attempt to prove that, if the prevailing line of interpretation is correct, such view of women produces some philosophically “insurmountable” problems for Aristotle. The aim of the last section of the paper is to point out how some of these problems could eventually be resolved.[/EXPAND]

Mimesis, Gesetz, Kampf. Ein Beitrag zur Sozialontologie
Rastko Jovanov (Research Associate, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade)
PDF [EXPAND Abstract] In dieser Arbeit werde ich mich auf und gegen der Theorie von Edith Stein über die kollektiven Identität anknüpfen, mit dem Versuch eine neue sozialontologische Theorie von der verschiedenen Gestalten des Gruppenidentität anzubieten. Ich unterscheide drei grundlegende Gestalten des Zusammenlebens: Masse, Vereinigungen und Gemeinschaften. Jede von dieser drei Formen wird durch verschiedene Eigenschaften charakterisiert. Zugleich werde ich mit der Hilfe von der Hegelschen Lehre über dem objektiven Geiste diese drei Gestalten der kollektiven Identitäten differenzieren und auslegen.[/EXPAND]

(Re)acting Together: Grexit as Revival of Intellectuals
Gazela Pudar Draško (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade)
PDF [EXPAND Abstract]The paper explores the messages of engaged global intellectuals in the case of Grexit, the case of Greek attempt to break up with neoliberal practices and produce a left turn in politics and society, which was followed worldwide. How their words contribute to the general understanding (if there is one) and change (if there should be change)? What kind of action we can expect from intellectuals, as it is intrinsic to the concept? The issues examined in this paper deal with the intellectuals as bearers of articulating social critique, focusing on the specific Greek case in the time of temptations.[/EXPAND]

Science et philosophie chez Gilles Deleuze
Igor Krtolica (Institute For Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade)
PDF [EXPAND Abstract]Deleuze n’attendra pas la fin de son œuvre pour formuler une théorie du rapport de la philosophie et de la science. Les premières formulations de ce problème apparaissent dès les années 1950-1960, dans les études sur Bergson et Nietzsche, puis dans Différence et répétition et Logique du sens. Il est vrai que cette question sera reprise en détail en 1991, dans Qu’est-ce que la philosophie ? Mais du début à la fin de l’œuvre, l’idée directrice ne changera pas. Cette idée nous paraît comporter trois aspects principaux : 1° dans une polémique contre l’héritage épistémologique néokantien, elle consiste d’abord à refuser la définition critique de la philosophie comme « réflexion sur la connaissance scientifique », et à lui substituer une conception inspirée de l’ontologie expressionniste de Bergson, qui répartit la science et la philosophie sur les deux moitiés de l’être ; 2° dans un effort pour réhabiliter le concept de dialectique, elle consiste ensuite à faire de la dialectique des Idées la sphère commune à la science et à la philosophie ; 3° enfin, dans le but de spécifier chaque forme de pensée, elle consiste à déterminer la manière dont chacune exprime ses Idées ou ses problèmes dans des signes propres. Ces trois aspects nous semblent définir le cadre le plus général de la conception deleuzienne du rapport de la science et de la philosophie. Nous les examinons ici successivement, en tenant compte exclusivement de la première période de l’œuvre de Deleuze, c’est-à-dire des ouvrages pré-guattariens.[/EXPAND]

 

INTERVIEWS

Anselm Jappe: La fin du capitalisme ne sera pas une fin pacifique
Mark Losoncz (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade)
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Submission Instructions
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