February 26, 2020

Katarina Njegovan Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility

With the regard to Kant’s famous claim “hence that the ground of obligation here is to be sought not in the nature of the human being or the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason” [Ak 4: 389] it seems that research examining the role of the emotions in moral motivation is on the wrong track. However, this paper shows that emotions play morally significant role when Kant deals with 1) the subjective incentive by the objective moral law – a feeling of respect; 2) the obligatory ends of self-perfection and happiness of others. Bearing in mind that 1) a feeling of respect is the subjective condition of the receptiveness for any obligation while 2) points to ends that are duties for everybody but due to the width of their obligational force are more than “ordinary” duties, the paper concludes that Kant speaks of the emotions at crucial places of his ethical learning.

Katarina Njegovan graduated at the Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Her final paper delas with Kantian Conception on Duty Regarding Non-rational animal . She earned master’s degree at Faculty of Political science, University of Belgrade, Department of European Studies MA Thesis title: The Problem of the Citizenship in EU seen as Unfinished Political Community. Currently she is a PhH student at the Department of Philosophy where she continues to examine Kantian duty to oneself. She spent her last summer semester on specialization at the University of Paris, Panthéon 1, Sorbonne. For the past two years she was engaged in teaching at the Philosophy Department at the Belgarde’s Faculty of Philosophy on the two subjects, Philosophy of Science and Introduction to Philosophy and Critical Thinking.

Posted in Uncategorized